INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI®

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

By

DAVID H. CLARK

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester, 1999

The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of David H. Clark defended on JUNE 17, 1999.

Dale L. Smith
Professor Directing Dissertation

Neil Jumonville
Outside Committee Member

Douglas Lemke
Committee Member

Will H. Moore
Committee Member

For Lin ...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

So many things including this dissertation are possible only because of the endless and tireless patience and support of my wife, Lin. I am supremely grateful to her for making me want to do all things well, and I love her dearly. Additionally, Pokey and Doris have provided unending support and a tremendous amount of humor and forbearance over these years, and more than they know, deserve my thanks and love.

I also have depended heavily on the wise and patient advice of Dale Smith, Doug Lemke and Will Moore, all of whom have no doubt heard quite enough about how institutions matter. They have made this a better dissertation and have made me a better scholar than I ever would have been under lesser tutelage.

Finally, and by no means least of all, I'm appreciative of my parents whose unfailing encouragement and faith in their children make nearly anything possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

Recent international relations research focuses on the linkages between domestic politics states' actions in the international system. Two literatures are especially prominent. The first, democratic peace research, asserts the singular behavior of democratic states and seeks to explain the pacific interactions of democracies based on the structures and norms inherent in democratic polities. The second, diversionary research, claims that adverse domestic conditions drive leaders to seek foreign policies to distract domestic attention from domestic trouble and demonstrate the leader's competence in the foreign policy arena. Both of these research programs generally link either the structure of the state or conditions in the state with foreign policies, often international conflict. However, while the democratic peace literature asserts that democracies are more pacific than other states, the diversionary literature claims democratic leaders are sometimes compelled to seek conflict in order to maintain their elected positions. Moreover, democratic peace research tends to classify states according to their (unchanging) institutional structures rather than by the often–changing control of political institutions. Additionally, diversionary research generally assumes leaders will seek military solutions to domestic problems, effectively ignoring the range of policy options from which troubled leaders choose.

Alternatively, this research argues that institutional *character* rather than *structure*, the ease or difficulty with which institutions make policy decisions rather than the formal constraints on the executive, influences foreign policy decisions and makes the diversionary use of force implausible. This dissertation argues that the manner in which political institutions interact influences foreign policy making. Specifically, *institutional congruence*, the extent to which political institutions share similar or dissimilar preferences, influences a state's conflict propensity and affects the incentive for a leader to seek policy responses to domestic problems other than those based in military conflict. *Congruence* shapes the policy options from which a leader selects, making *policy substitution* virtually inevitable. The empirical analyses not only demonstrate the utility of *congruence* as a concept for refining how scholars think about domestic politics and international relations, but they provide among the first convincing statistical results showing that leaders substitute foreign policies depending on institutional character and domestic conditions.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the first half of 1973, US bombing efforts in Cambodia were increasingly threatened by declining morale in the US public and by growing Congressional interference, fueled to some extent by the President's mounting Watergate troubles. By May, the bombing campaign was publicly opposed by many in Congress, and the Congress had voted informally to cease the attacks. This same opposition and public turmoil had preceded the withdrawal of the last US troops from Vietnam in March 1973 and a marginally successful ceasefire in January. The apparent US division led North Vietnamese leaders, envoy Le Duc Tho in particular, to "gloat ... of the Congressional pressures" on the administration as Kissinger attempted to pressure Hanoi into an end of the ongoing conflict (Kissinger 1982, 356). May of 1973, however, found Kissinger unable to respond to Tho's gloating with much confidence; Kissinger writes "for the first time there was no conviction in my brusque rejoinder that we would handle our own domestic situation." (Kissinger 1982, 356) Any pretense of US unity and resolve was vanishing as Congress and the White House parted ways over foreign policy decisions, driven in part by the collapse of Nixon's domestic support as the Watergate investigation intensified. For better or for worse,

foreign policy in Indochina, in Cambodia in particular was being dictated, or at least its parameters were being dictated, by interests in the US Congress. Likewise, international opponents, aware of the President's hobbled state and of the difficulty institutional division posed for decision-makers, made strategy partially in response to US domestic political conditions.

Kissinger's trouble with Hanoi illustrates a portion of what political scientists refer to as the "linkage" or "nexus" between domestic and international politics. Political science research arguing that domestic and international politics are inextricably and importantly linked is so common it is easy to think scholars have succumbed to an academic fad. However, whether driven by the inertia that pivotal work linking these two spheres provides or by a richer theoretical story than those offered by alternative explanations of international politics, it seems clear that this "nexus" literature is a permanent fixture in political science.

What exactly the linkage *is* between domestic and international politics is not at all clear in spite of the prolific scholarship on the subject. In fact, it does not even seem especially clear how things domestic affect international behavior or international outcomes. Is there a direct link between societal behavior or societal structures and international events in some deterministic sense? Do domestic politics writ large provide a context within which certain types of behaviors or outcomes are more or less likely? Notice that these two alternatives (and no doubt, there are many more alternatives) do not rely upon the same sort of logical conditions, nor do they assume the same types of causal relationships. This logical and causal framework is

perhaps even less developed than explanations of international politics are unified. Social science relies heavily upon simple but strict notions of causality, but these constraints carry with them significant implications. Where causality is treated casually, where it is made equivalent to one of its component parts (correlation, for instance), the chance that theory diverges from reality increases just as the development of theory depends upon the careful avoidance of type one errors.

This dissertation tells a story that describes how and why the spheres of domestic and international politics are interdependent. The story revolves around the subtle political changes that occur in states during the course of normal political events like elections or budget cycles or economic boom or bust. These changes are omnipresent in the life of the state and they represent the ebb and flow of political groups and individual leaders into and out of power, and the positive and negative events and trends that beset a state over time. Normal political events influence the nature of decision making within political institutions as leadership turnover takes place, as policies are easier to agree upon and implement at some times than at others, and as the utility of policies changes depending on the needs of the state and its leaders. For example, decision makers in a state sometimes have similar policy goals, while their goals differ substantially at other times; so the ease with which policies are formed changes depending on the orientations of policy makers. Further, a particular policy, say the use of military force, may be extremely useful to a leader when she is faced by a belligerent foreign power; it may be largely useless otherwise, or at least, other policy alternatives may be far more useful. Subtle, nonrevolutionary changes in the

policy making process over the course of the normal political life of the state result in different policy choices at different times.

1.1 Approaches to the Domestic–International Nexus

Scholars who study American politics routinely examine the effects of normal political events on policy making, often examining how parties, elections, ideology, public opinion, or economic conditions influence changes in policy. Factors such as these change over time so that the character of decision making and of the policies that result change as well. Existing research in international relations largely fails to recognize that policy selection depends on normal political change. It also deals poorly (if at all) with the notion that state leaders substitute policies for one another, that they find a policy's utility to vary across time depending on the challenges they face. Actually, research that seeks to link the domestic and international spheres tends to examine the relationship on one of three basic levels, each of which has benefits, but none of which examine the influence of normal political events on foreign policy action or on foreign policy substitution. Scholars generally connect domestic and international politics either at the *regime or polity* level, at the *institutional structure* level, or at the *governmental* level.

Though international relations scholars increasingly recognize the relevance of the internal characteristics of states to international behavior, they often place states in relatively static categories indicating regime type or polity. These broad categories draw their distinctions upon the structural characteristics of states such as the extent

to which the executive is constrained, the frequency with which leaders are subject to election, what portion of the population is eligible to participate in elections, and the competitiveness of the political system. Regime or polity is determined by the combination of these characteristics which, in turn, rarely change except when political upheaval like revolution force structural changes.[1] Since polities change infrequently, scholars can only examine differences in how polities behave *across* states, rather than *within* individual states over time. As a result, scholars who study the behaviors of different types of regimes often speak only to the differences between democratic and nondemocratic states. Not only does this dichotomy exclude substantial variation within each of these categories, but it also presumes to some extent that, insofar as regime influences foreign policy, a state should make relatively constant foreign policy decisions across time unless it suffers a change in polity.

The democratic–autocratic dichotomy that much regime research creates is somewhat refined by research that explores the effects of institutional arrangements and constraints on foreign policy behavior. Research such as this often assesses the extent to which various legislative characteristics, or the frequency of elections constrain executive behavior. Often, researchers employ measures of constraint from the Polity project (Jaggers & Gurr 1995) that reports a variety of constraints and structural factors on regime type. This approach allows greater variability across nations than does the democratic–autocratic dichotomy, though states still tend not

[1]Note that *regime* and *polity* are interchangeable in this discussion.

to change across time much if at all. Once again, a state is assumed to behave similarly as long as its institutional structure and constraints remain constant.

More recently, a small amount of research has focused on changes in the *government* within a state, examining how the state behaves under the control of one party compared to its behavior otherwise (see, for instance Fordham 1998a, Fordham 1998b, Moore & Lanoue 1997).[2] Attention to the groups or individuals that control the political institutions at any given point in time allows researchers to develop hypotheses regarding time–wise variation in how a state makes decisions and how different political control influences different types of foreign policy. Though these researchers make substantial advances by examining how state behavior might change across time even in the absence of monumental structural change, they are often forced to speculate regarding why one group or party might be more inclined to use military force than another. Hypotheses such as these can rarely be justified except by assuming that a government responds to domestic political threats by resorting to arms when it faces a dilemma it is otherwise ill–equipped to handle.[3]

The figure below suggests a hierarchy of domestic political factors extant research suggests influence international behavior.

[2] *Government* indicates the elected individuals comprising a state's executive and legislative institutions.

[3] For example, Fordham argues that Democrats are better equipped to deal with some economic troubles than are Republicans, and *vice versa*. As a result, when an Administration faces an economic problem with which it is capable of dealing, it does so. When it faces a dilemma it cannot effectively address through domestic economic policy, it resorts to foreign policy and often resorts to arms. While different parties may be differently equipped to address economic problems, the presumption that they turn to foreign policy adventurism precludes the logical likelihood that other policy alternatives are available as well. Moore and Lanoue make a similar argument regarding Great Britain.

Regime – Polity [static]

Institutional Structure

Government [dynamic]

Institutional Interaction

The top two levels, *regime or polity* and *institutional structure* are largely static within states; variation in these factors is only observed when states experience upheaval–induced regime change. The third level, *government* recognizes intrastate change, but, as indicated above, attributing different foreign policy preferences to different governing groups may be difficult or even impossible.

Finally, the fourth level, *institutional interaction*, is the focus of the remainder of this research. How institutions interact with one another and arrive jointly at policy decisions is critical to what policies a state implements. Institutional interaction depends on the other three hierarchical levels in that *polity* often determines the number of institutional actors, *institutional structure* usually indicates the extent to which executives are constrained by electoral concerns and by other political institutions, and *government* reveals the groups that are in control of the political institutions. The extent to which a legislative body substantially influences policy making and can structurally constrain executive behavior, and the extent to which political institutions are controlled by groups with similar policy preferences or orientations toward policy making determine how amicable the interaction between political institutions is likely to be. The character of institutional interaction is likely

to vary substantially across time in states that have multiple political institutions relevant to the formation of foreign policy, in which the legislative institution can effectively influence executive action, and where turnover is frequent or at least *can* occur with some frequency. As political institutions make policy, their goals and preferences can be characterized as congruent or incongruent, indicating the extent to which they are similar or dissimilar. The degree of institutional congruence characterizing the interaction between political institutions will not only shape policies, but will influence what policy alternatives are available for an executive to implement.

Perhaps the most significant theoretical consequence of institutional interaction is the implication that the utility of foreign policies may vary across time. The extent to which an executive is constrained in her policy selection depends on the degree to which her policy preferences are congruent with those of other political institutions. When her preferences are substantially different from those of the legislative institution in her state, she will find some policy alternatives far more difficult to implement than she might have were their preferences congruent.

1.2 Building a Theory of Institutions and Policy Choice

Much of the existing research in international relations depends upon static dimensions of regimes and their institutions as indicators of domestic political motives or incentives. Alternatively, the following chapters explicitly examine domestic political institutions, identify how they change in ways that influence the

decision making process, and then examine how those changes are likely to influence policy selection and substitution; the research depends upon the dynamic nature of domestic politics. This three-pronged approach serves the larger goal of developing a theoretically logical linkage between domestic politics and international relations. Specifically, it proposes that domestic political institutions (in the democratic case executive and legislative institutions) serve to aggregate individual policy preferences into coherent, singular policies. However, because democratic political institutions are characterized by turnover, the ease with which institutions develop policy changes over time. Particularly in democracies, political institutions share authority over policy making, an arrangement that at a minimum creates the potential for conflict between institutions especially if those institutions are controlled by groups with opposing policy goals. Just as control of political institutions varies across time, so do the extent of institutional differences and the amount of institutional conflict extant in the policy making process. In particular, the potential for conflict, the likelihood of general agreement or disagreement between policy making institutions determines how easily policies will be agreed upon. Moreover, the policies a state ultimately adopts and, in fact, the policies it considers adopting are likely to change depending upon the extent to which political institutions can agree on the general direction of policy. Consider an example regarding a domestic policy decision over a tax increase. Tax increases are roundly unpopular, yet sometimes policy makers deem them necessary and implement them accordingly. A tax hike, however, is a policy that an executive cannot effectively or reasonably achieve in the face of

institutional opposition from the legislature. Not only will the policy be difficult to pass through the legislature, but the rhetorical attacks on the executive by a politically opportunistic legislature will be unbearable. In fact, if an executive recognizes the uphill nature of the battle, she is likely to forego it altogether and to investigate other policy options that are likely to help her achieve the policy goals she deems important.

The research, then, suggests several logically progressive propositions regarding domestic political institutions and foreign policy behavior:

1. democracies are most often characterized by two political institutions, executives and legislatures, that share authority over foreign policy.
2. political institutions in democracies aggregate policy preferences into singular policies.
3. political institutions that are controlled by groups with similar preferences will find agreement on policy considerably easier than will institutions controlled by opposing interests.
4. the extent to which political institutions agree or disagree influences foreign policy decisions, especially with regard to high–profile foreign policies including the use of military force.
5. conflict between institutions also will determine what policy options are reasonably available to an executive and will lead executives to substitute policies for one another.

The theoretical and empirical consequences of these propositions are

1. institutional interaction rather than institutional structure is the primary indicator of domestic political constraint on decision making.
2. domestic political factors are dynamic, changing over time in the normal course of the life of the state.
3. high–profile foreign policies like the use of force are likely to be discouraged by institutional conflict.

4. leaders are unlikely to resort to arms blindly, but to substitute policies that are less likely to generate institutional opposition and associated political costs.

The upshot is that institutional interaction, time–wise variation in how institutions constrain one another, has consequences for policy choice such that leaders theoretically should evaluate policy options differently across time.

1.3 Plan of the Book

The research in this dissertation proceeds in two sections. The first, encompassing chapters 2 and 3, addresses the theoretical, logical and empirical shortcomings of two prominent literatures in international relations, and proposes reconceptualizations of their primary questions. Chapter 2 argues that domestic political institutional configurations are centrally important to variation across states in terms of how they pursue foreign policy goals. More importantly, however, institutional structure and the manner in which institutions interact with one another help to determine a single state's behavior across time. Attention to institutions, especially insofar as they serve to constrain executive behavior is not novel in international relations. In particular, the democratic peace literature focuses on institutional constraint as a primary source of the pacific behavior of democratic states. However, the institutional explanation is faulty in that it generally fails to recognize the extent to which political constraints evolve and change over time so the executives are more constrained at some times, less so at others. Moreover, the manner in which those institutional constraints change across time influences the utility of various policy alternatives from which a leader

might select. The changing usefulness of policy options directly implies that leaders may at one point find policy A optimal, while under similar circumstances at another time, she may find policy B far more useful. In other words, subtle institutional change in the course of normal political events influence the reasonable alternatives from which a leader might choose when making policy. Chapter 3 explicitly links these two phenomena, arguing in particular that the central role institutions play in aggregating preferences makes them vulnerable to changes in their component parts, that these changes result in shifts in institutional constraints over time, and that fluctuating constraints influence the utility of policy options and force leaders to substitute policies for one another at different points in time.

The second portion of the dissertation transforms the proposed influence of institutional change and the dynamic nature of policy choice into testable hypotheses and reports empirical results. Chapter 4 argues specifically that institutional congruence influences dispute behavior in important ways as executives are constrained to greater or lesser extents at different times. The findings strongly suggest not only that institutional configuration varies in influential ways across time, but that leaders will variously be more or less able to pursue military alternatives in response to domestic political stimuli. Insofar as the military option is sometimes not at all easy to employ, leaders are very likely to examine other policy alternatives as they seek to deal with domestic political threats. Chapter 5 examines the extent to which leaders should theoretically and logically be expected to substitute policies for one another depending upon the nature of their political needs and depending on the

particular constraints they face contemporaneously. The analyses provide what may be among the first empirical evidence of foreign policy substitution. Moreover, this research as a whole provides evidence that reconciles the democratic peace assertion that democracies are more pacific than other states with the diversionary assertion that politically troubled democratic leaders will resort to arms to serve their political interests. Conceptually, institutional congruence refines assertions that democratic structures or norms make democracies less likely to fight each other. Further, the logical critique of diversionary arguments and empirical evidence of foreign policy substitution cast doubt on the notion that leaders have incentives to commence hostilities in response to domestic turmoil. But while the argument and evidence in the following pages may reconcile disparate literatures or convincingly demonstrate policy substitution, they also suggest other questions and paths for future research that are rather vast and are the subject of the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 2

NEXUS POLITICS

International relations scholars expend substantial energy attempting to name the varying camps of theorists who adhere to different tenets regarding what makes the international system work as it does. Robert Keohane has remarked that one is named by one's enemies, suggesting the vitriol which characterizes this debate. What the decades-long debate really revolves around, however, are questions of substantial theoretical importance to international relations scholars. These questions and their answers suggest where researchers should look to find the sources and to identify the processes which determine and define what states do in the international system. Among these questions are "who are the relevant actors," "what factors are relevant to international decision making," and "what are the goals and preferences of states." Much recent research suggests that domestic political processes are relevant to the determination of international politics. States are not the "billiard balls" Waltz once envisioned, but are dynamic mechanisms that affect their own destinies and behaviors not only on the basis of their international environments, but as a result of their internal structures and compositions. In a sense, this is the 'nature versus nurture' argument recast in terms of politics.

Interest in the relationship between domestic political processes and international relations has surged in the last two decades as scholars have begun to link the apparent pacificism of pairs of democracies with their internal political structures. While the democratic peace research is by no means the only academic work making domestic-international linkages, it is certainly among the most prominent. And increasingly, support for the notion that domestic and international politics are linked in fundamental ways has begun to sound the death knell for neorealist claims about the international system.

This chapter provides a framework for understanding domestic-international linkages from the broad theoretic debate between neorealists and neoliberals to its more specific components regarding what political institutions matter and how they affect policy decisions. It is against this backdrop that I argue for the importance of domestic political institutions in linking domestic characteristics of states with international behavior. Specifically, I examine how institutions facilitate policy making and suggest that institutions may vary in nonstructural ways that influence foreign policy decisions. Finally, I discuss the nature of foreign policy choice and address the extent to which leaders can and will substitute one foreign policy for another. The notion of policy substitution is of particular importance since it provides us a general story explaining when we should expect one type of foreign policy and when we might expect something different altogether.

2.1 The Liberal Context

A theory identifying domestic political institutions as important to the behavior of states in the international system is explicitly founded on the liberal tradition. This is especially the case if we treat the characteristics of states and their internal dynamics as variables rather than assuming that such characteristics exist for all states and essentially matter little to state behavior. Structural realism makes such assumptions, preferring instead to assert that changes in state behavior and outcomes in the international system result from structural changes in the system rather than from differentiation among individual actors or change within actors (Waltz 1979, Keohane 1989). Waltz argues that his variant of realism is analogous to microeconomic theory where firms differ from one another, but the strategies they adopt and the outcomes they achieve result from the larger environment, economic market conditions in particular (Waltz 1979, 89–95). Therefore, the particular characteristics of individual firms matter little to predicting how those firms will behave or whether they will be successful or not.

Perhaps more distressing to the liberal tradition is that such an approach ascribes nearly identical preferences to states on the basis of relative gains and security concerns, and differentiates among states only on their chances of achieving their goals via power. In this sense, state preferences are irrelevant to international politics since preferences are constant across states and presumably across time. As Keohane (1989, 53–54) notes, structural realists "understand that [state] interests cannot be

derived, simply on the basis of rational calculation, from the external positions of states;" rather, "*given state interests*, whose origins are not predicted by the theory, patterns of outcomes in world politics will be determined by the overall distribution of power among states." (original emphasis) Regarding preferences, Waltz (1979, 65) claims that, in the international system, "results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors" because "causes not found in their *individual* characters and motives do operate among the actors collectively." (original emphasis) In other words, characteristics of individual states (save power) matter far less to international behavior and outcomes than do collective, international factors which pervade the system. Even though states make decisions internally through their own domestic structures and processes, they do so in response to and in the presence of other states and their interactions with those states.

The implications of Waltz's statement are substantial. First, perhaps state action in the international system is largely futile. If the results of state action are not often congruent with the intentions of the actors, then the actors are not especially effective in achieving their goals, or they have little control over outcomes in the international system. Second, it seems that over time states generally would become increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo in the international system, because their actions, on average, move them further away from their preferred positions. This would be true even if one state's preferences were indistinguishable from those of other states. Under these conditions, as states pursued power and security, they

would find themselves often less powerful relative to other states and less secure and perhaps, in the eyes of realism, more prone to conflict.

Dissatisfied with Waltz's realist reformulation and its virtually myopic attention to state power, Robert Keohane (1984, 1989) argues for an institutional approach to international relations which emphasizes the role of international organizations and the existence of some ordering principle in the international system, less restrictive than the anarchy assumed by Waltz. "Institutionalist theory," as he calls it (1993: 271 ff.) accepts the neorealist tenets that states are the primary actors in world politics, that they behave in self-interested fashions, that states must behave autarkically and rely upon relative capabilities. But this approach differs from neorealism in its assertion that international institutions, nonstate actors, help to shape states' interests. Essentially, state interests should, based on the assertions of this approach, become an objective of explanation, a dependent variable, explained by the (limited) order provided to the international system by institutions. Keohane argues that this attention to the interests of states allies institutionalism with liberal theory insofar as liberal adherents focus their attention on the formation of state interests and how states act to further their own interests. However, he is careful to distance himself from liberalism, an appropriate move since he refuses to open the "black box" of states' internal policy making systems (Ikenberry, Lake & Mastanduno 1988). Rather he asserts that institutions facilitate cooperation as a way for states to pursue their own interests by supplying information and thus reducing the uncertainty in interstate relations (Keohane 1984, 245-246).

That Keohane and others have spent substantial time trying to clarify institutionalism's reliance upon and kinship to neorealism (Keohane 1984, Keohane 1989, Moravcsik 1991, Moravcsik 1996) is significant since it indicates institutionalism's explicit rejection of liberal principles. Moravcsik (1991) argues that institutionalism, like realism, takes state preferences as given while liberalism would discern the sources of variation in state preferences and how that variability informs state behavior. The liberal tradition "focuses on the causes and consequences of *variation* in the configuration of state preferences: that is, the underlying substantive ends of policy derived from state-society relations, while treating international configurations of capabilities and information, central to other theories, as if they were fixed." (Moravcsik 1996, 8 original emphasis). In other words, where states' preferences differ, so will the manifestations of their behavior. Unlike structural realism which cannot predict preferences or interests and so assumes they really do not vary in ways meaningful to international behavior and outcomes, liberalism draws explicit linkages between internal state structures, state preferences and international behavior. Whereas institutionalism claims that international institutions facilitate states' protection of interests, liberalism asserts that "the configuration of state preferences, . . . is the fundamental determinant of state behavior." (Moravcsik 1996, 7) Contrast this to Waltz's statement that the results of state behavior are rarely consistent with the intentions of states. According to Moravcsik, preferences are critical to a liberal theory of international relations since they, rather than state power or information or uncertainty, form the fundamental constraint on state behavior; "as state preferences

vary, so does state behavior." (1996, 8) Realism and institutionalism identify the acquisition and retention of power as the preference of states, absent variation. Only the processes by which states attempt to acquire and retain power vary across states. Liberalism asserts the opposite; that "variation in ends [preferences], not means, matters most."(1996, 10)

But identifying specific preferences is perhaps not a tractable undertaking. Such a pursuit would require a micro-theory of preferences. Liberalism does not endeavor to do this. Rather, preferences may be undefined or unobserved in many cases, but the actions associated with those preferences, with the pursuit of preferred outcomes, are the visible manifestations of preferences. It is feasible instead to generalize regarding the preferences of individuals on the basis of rational choice theory, to require individual action be translated through domestic institutions and then to link institutional characteristics with state behavior. In this fashion, individual preferences are transformed through aggregation, and institutions compete and collaborate to derive single policy outcomes which result in action.

If preferences are so critical to explaining state behavior, then a theory of state behavior should supply appropriate expectations about states' likely goals and how they might achieve those goals. In particular, such a theory should rest on assumptions regarding individual leaders and their motivations, and would particularly rely on the domestic structures which contain those individual leaders. Given certain expectations about how individual leaders will behave, how do states aggregate the preferences of domestic authorities so that they take single, identifiable actions

consistent with the unitary actor assumption common to international relations literature? Assumptions regarding individuals combined with detail regarding the particular institutional arrangements of a state will provide information regarding how those actors' preferences will be translated into action. In particular, if domestic institutions aggregate the preferences of individuals into competing blocs, then policy decisions, foreign policy being of interest here, will result from the relative strengths of those blocs of aggregated preferences. That is, multiple actors will arrive at some arrangement regarding policy decisions such that single identifiable policies result. This competition between or among domestic political actors is the primary manner in which domestic political concerns will shape foreign policy.

Ultimately, a liberal theory of international behavior or more specifically, a theory of foreign policy making should focus explicitly on political institutions and the extent to which the foreign policy process is likely to be impeded by their interaction. Political institutions aggregate preferences over policies into single positions, but then the positions those institutions choose must be reconciled in order to arrive at single policy actions. As the groups and individuals who control political institutions change, so may the preferred positions to which they aggregate. More importantly, the ease with which multiple institutions' policy positions can be reconciled may change dramatically so that decision making is sometimes easier, sometimes more difficult. The extent to which institutional preferences are similar or different will indicate the character of the decision making process (how conflictual it will be) and what policies are ultimately selected and implemented. It is not important to know

what the exact ideological or preferential positions institutions inhabit, but rather to know how those institutions interact and what the decision making environment is likely to be given the relationship between domestic political institutions.

2.2 Literature Linking Domestic and International Politics

Research examining the nexus of domestic and international politics generally focuses on how domestic political structure and domestic events or conditions influence state decisions in the international system. A large portion of this research attempts to explain aggressive or violent international behavior insofar as it is driven by domestic concerns. Relevant to the discussion here are two particular literatures, each with well known monikers: the democratic peace literature, and diversionary, gambling for resurrection, or scapegoating literature. The following sections review these literatures with an eye toward examining two particular shortcomings they exhibit. First, the democratic peace literature tends to treat institutional structure as if it is essentially static within regime, when in fact, substantial and important variation occurs in apparently static institutions. Second, the diversionary literatures generally attribute political goals to leaders who employ aggressive foreign policy tactics, when in fact, politically motivated leaders seem more likely to pursue policy options that directly placate domestic constituents. While the sections below examine these shortcomings, alternative propositions appear in the next chapter.

2.2.1 Democratic Peace Research

Scholarly attention to the role of domestic politics in shaping the international system and the behavior of states has increased dramatically in recent years, especially under the mantra of the democratic peace. The Kantian notion that democratic states should behave differently from their nondemocratic counterparts and specifically that they should be more pacific in their relations with one another is continually borne out in empirical studies. The fundamental assumption underlying the democratic peace is that different polities, driven by different internal processes and concerns and constrained internally by different forces, will make foreign policy differently, so we should not be surprised when the outcomes (their behavior) also are different. Generally speaking, this voluminous literature relies on variants of this assumption and searches for two things. First, researchers examine the historical record to determine if, in fact, a democratic peace seems to exist. Second, and of greater relevance here, researchers try to explain why the democratic peace holds and what other implications can be drawn from the central observation.

The democratic peace proposition generally holds that pairs of democratic states behave differently than do other pairs of states. Democratic states do not and (arguably) have never fought each other in the modern era (Ray 1993). Levy (1988, 88) goes as far as to call the democratic peace "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations;" Diehl calls the finding "axiomatic" (Diehl 1983). Maoz & Russett (1993, 624) claim the democratic peace finding is

"probably one of the most significant nontrivial products of the scientific study of world politics." Meanwhile democratic states seem to be just as prone to the use of force in general as their autocratic counterparts, and autocratic states have no hesitation in fighting one another.

Democratic peace advocates propose at least three primary explanations of the apparently pacific behavior of democratic dyads. Some researchers argue that democratic executives face substantial structural constraints at home that make motivating military force somewhat difficult anyway, but doing so against a kindred democracy is made nearly impossible (Morgan & Campbell 1991, Russett 1993). These executives suffer not only from adversarial legislative bodies and cabinets, but from electorates that are generally intolerant of executive behavior that seems less than competent or that seems especially self-serving. Finally, as Morgan and Campbell note, political competition, the availability of a vociferous and willing replacement executive serves to temper the will to fight. Fighting another democracy, a democratic executive must know, is not an especially profitable way to demonstrate her competence to a watchful electorate. And so, with her mind on retaining office, she and her democratic opponent reach some solution to their disagreement without resorting to war.[1]

[1]Geva, DeRouen & Mintz (1993, 218) recast the structural constraint hypothesis in a utility maximization argument such that "leaders of democratic states do not use force against other democracies because such an action is perceived by the public as a failure of foreign policy." The result of comparing expected utilities then, is that political costs outweigh the domestic and international benefits that might come from fighting another democracy.

Other researchers, on the other hand, argue that democratic structure is less relevant than the norms that characterize democratic populations and their elected leaders (Russett 1993, Maoz & Russett 1993). Democratic norms like compromise and regard for personal freedom lead democratic executives to pursue nonviolent solutions to disputes such that they avoid war. The power of these shared norms is especially strong between two democratic foes who are restrained from the use of force by their joint commitment to international peace, to compromise and to a liberal and interdependent international community where conflict is counterproductive.

More recently, Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith (1998a) produce a game theoretic model in which democratic states are constrained from fighting one another by their institutional configurations. Specifically, democratic leaders concern themselves with retaining office by demonstrating competence, and must avoid policy failure on any front including foreign policy. As a result, democratic leaders who engage in international conflict will make a greater effort to win and will expend more resources in the effort. Two democrats facing each other on the brink of war will recognize that neither one can afford to lose the war and so the war is likely to be exceptionally long and costly. As a result, those democrats will choose to settle their differences without war.

Empirical examination of the democratic peace generally produces results supportive of its existence. Doyle (1983a, 1983b, 1986) is often cited as the first to report the democratic peace finding, though Babst (1972), Babst (1964), Wallensteen (1973) and Small & Singer (1976) reported the finding earlier. Others have confirmed the

finding, sometimes defining democracy a bit differently, sometimes more broadly.[2] Layne (1994) is among the first to dispute what Russett (1993, chapter 1) calls "the fact of the democratic peace." In four case studies, he argues that pairs of democracies barely avert war, and that they ultimately do so not because of their liberal characters, but as a result of power and prestige related concerns. In other words, realpolitik rather than democratic peace explains the peace in these cases. Another critic, David Spiro, argues that democratic peace advocates do not provide consistent lists of democracies, nor do they perform convincing statistical tests (Spiro 1994). He complains primarily that because war itself is so rare, the absence of war between democratic states is better explained by random chance than by liberalism.[3] More recently, Ray (1995) provides one of the most detailed arguments in support of the democratic peace finding.

2.2.2 Problems and Consequences

Democratic peace research, whether supportive of the finding or not, generally correlates measures of regime characteristics with conflict propensity. Explanations of the democratic peace usually predict conflict behavior on the basis of institutional configurations like the presence of political competition, the proximity of elections, the constraint of an adversarial legislature or the presence of an attentive electorate. These explanations, at least by implication, pertain to the *microprocesses* and

[2]At a minimum, reports of the democratic peace finding include Rummel (1976), Rummel (1979), Rummel (1981), Chan (1984), Weede (1984), Domke (1988), Maoz & Abdolali (1989), Bremer (1992), Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992).

[3]Farber & Gowa (1995) and Mansfield & Snyder (1995) also question the pacific nature of democracies, especially of nascent democratic states.

arrangements of political institutions of the state. Yet all the findings, virtually all of the theory and associated empirical analyses pertain to the *macropolitical* conditions of the state and that state's conflict behavior. These structural characteristics of the polity are largely static, unchanging over time except when states undergo political upheaval and the polity is replaced. Regime or polity-changing rebellion is relatively rare in any case, but is especially unusual in democratic systems. As a result, once a state is classified as a democracy, it is unlikely to shed that mantle in empirical analysis. Further, even when scholars distinguish among democratic states based on the extent of the state's democratic structures, those democratic structures or constraints on executive action change slowly and rarely if at all. The upshot is that empirical studies of internal structure and regime characteristics focus almost exclusively on the *mechanism* of the polity rather than on the *practice* of politics within the polity. As a result, only substantial political change, often violent and tumultuous, appear in empirical analyses; otherwise, polities remain largely constant across time.

By focusing on macropolity, scholars are cornered into classifying similar states, and in the democratic peace effort, classify states by regime type. Such a categorization typically leads to a dichotomy (democratic, autocratic) or trichotomy (democratic, autocratic, anocratic) at best. The upside is that we develop a structured understanding of the differences in behavior between these types of states. Two shortcomings (and perhaps there are others) are that these categories are vast and each contain substantial variation across states and, more importantly to this

research, individual states exhibit institutional variation *across time*. So while we begin to explain the differences between these groups, we fail to recognize the variation *within* the groups and our theories do not account for different behavior by two members of the same group, nor for different behavior by a single state at two points in time. These failures are troubling since, returning to the fundamental assumption of the democratic peace, states' internal processes vary significantly enough that their manifested behaviors should vary also. If we limit the amount of variation recognizable in states' internal processes, we will by default limit the variation in state behavior for which we are able to account.

The underlying problem with focusing on broad structural characteristics of regimes is that the normal political operation of the polity is discounted in its ability to vary in meaningful ways. In other words, in the daily life of the state, political changes occur *within* the rules, constraints and confines of the political structure. For instance, a democratic state may be characterized by frequent elections, a competitive political environment, and joint rule by an executive and a legislature; the United States is such a democracy. However, the notion that the executive, the primary foreign policy decision maker in such a state is constrained (or unconstrained) to the same extent in all foreign policy decisions for as long as her state is characterized by these institutions is not especially convincing. Especially in democratic states, institutions may at different times constrain each other to varying degrees depending on extant domestic political, economic and social conditions and depending on the types of policy a leader considers.

Moravcsik's liberalism at least implicitly acknowledges the possibility (if not the likelihood) that normal political change within a state is likely to influence the very character of its political institutions. At the very least, the personnel of government changes over time so those in control of the institutions change. Though individuals in the elite class that controls state institutions may have generally similar interests, variation in their policy preferences and especially in the means of achieving goals will vary, sometimes substantially. Moreover, insofar as those institutions are responsive to normal political change, the nature of the decisions those institutions produce is likely to change across time as well. Moravcsik's claim that institutions serve to aggregate policy preferences and then to translate those preferences into policy suggests that as the individual or group preferences being aggregated change, so will the aggregate outcome. Though his brand of liberalism really differentiates between states and especially between the preferences and policies of states, his emphasis on the importance of domestic political institutions directly suggests a variability in state decision making.

A similar notion really is operationalized from a rational choice perspective in the foreign policy forecasting model developed by Bueno de Mesquita, Newman & Rabushka (1985). Their expected utility model assesses the power and the interests or preferences of relevant domestic decision making groups in order to determine the most likely policy outcomes. Often, these decision making groups are political parties or interest groups; clearly, how powerful any of these groups is likely to be will change over time. As a result, the weight of any particular faction's preferences regarding

policy outcomes changes over time as well. Because factions are more or less powerful over time, the aggregation of preferences over time will produce different aggregate outcomes, so policies themselves are likely to change as well.

Were the forecasting model to be employed to examine a set of policy decisions over a longer period of time, it would be imperative to account for shifts in power among decision makers and for the resulting changes in aggregate policy preferences.[4] Failing to recognize the dynamics of political power, especially the polyarchic flows of power democratic theorists identify as characteristic of democratic systems, would produce inaccurate forecasts of state decisions. Likewise, the failure of regime-based empirical examinations of foreign policy action in general and conflict behavior in particular to recognize the subtle but important changes in domestic political institutional constraints across time is likely to result in error. This is especially true insofar as it forces researchers essentially to treat the effect of domestic political structure and constraint as a constant, when in fact, substantial changes take place during the normal operation of the political system.

[4]An important distinction exists between the information necessary for Bueno de Mesquita, Newman & Rabushka's (1985) forecasting model and what is necessary for this model. The forecasting model is aimed at predicting the likely outcome of a very particular decision making process. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita et al. initially employ the model to forecast the likely outcome of Sino-British negotiations over the return of Hong Kong to China. The time period over which the actual decision making occurs is finite, and the question being answered by policy formation and treaty negotiation is essentially singular. The question this dissertation addresses, by contrast, is more general and oriented toward the infinitely iterated foreign policy decision making process. As a result, whereas Bueno de Mesquita et al. require information regarding the specific policy preferences over particular issues, the theoretic and empirical model here only requires that we know whether or not actors' policy preferences are similar or different. Also, since this model is directed toward the infinite policy making process rather than toward the resolution of a finite question, it is essential to observe changes in the similarity or dissimilarity of policy preferences between or among political actors.

The sum of democratic peace research really seems to be the virtually consistent finding that democracies do not fight one another. What remains fairly commonly accepted, though still empirically questionable, is that different constraints characterize democratic and autocratic states, and that these constraints account for different behaviors by the two types of states. Not only are those constraints, whether normative or structural, generally treated as if they are static within states, but another prominent portion of international relations research at least implicitly assumes that those same constraints actually make extreme foreign policy action more likely. As the next section proposes, the fundamental presumption of diversionary foreign policy research is very much in contradiction to the democratic peace presumption that democracies behave differently because they are more heavily constrained.

2.2.3 Diversionary Foreign Policy Literature

Generally speaking, diversionary foreign policy research focuses on determining the extent to which leaders' political motives influence their foreign policy decisions. Most frequently, leaders respond to some threat to their continued tenure in office by engaging in some kind of high profile foreign policy activity (usually the use of military force) in order either to rally the public at home, to demonstrate competence to an uncertain electorate, or more nefariously, to divert public attention away from domestic dissatisfaction. A variety of different approaches characterize this research as do findings that nearly equally support or deny the primary hypothesis.

The notion of an internal-external conflict linkage perhaps originates in the social sciences in Sumner (1906) who suggests that groups that frequently faced external threats tended to develop cohesive and integrated governments and societies as a result. Mid-century sociologists advanced another portion of Sumner's ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, that internal dissent leads to external conflict as leaders seek to unify their divided publics by providing common enemies (Coser 1956, Simmel 1964). The historian Geoffery Blainey argues along the same lines that leaders may attempt to use these common enemies as scapegoats to be beaten up and blamed for internal trouble (Blainey 1973).[5] A substantial literature in political science addresses the internal-external conflict relationship, especially the scapegoat hypothesis (e.g. Rosencrance 1963, Rummel 1963, Tanter 1966, Tanter 1969, Wilkenfeld 1968, Hazelwood 1975), though more recently, empirical attention has turned more toward linking domestic political and economic trouble (rather than internal conflict) with international conflict.

Political scientists have taken this logic one step further, asserting that under particular conditions, leaders may actually have incentives to engage in foreign military operations in order to divert public attention away from domestic turmoil, be it economic or political. It is this scenario that has entered the public consciousness as well, virtually becoming something between urban myth and conventional wisdom.

[5]The scapegoating argument holds that leaders in domestic trouble seek an external scapegoat; internal trouble leads to external conflict. However, as Blainey notes, troubled states can better deal with internal dissent if they are *not* involved in external conflict at the same time. With regard to proponents of scapegoating, he writes, "Scapegoat explanations appear to be acts of faith rather than reasoned arguments. Deep faith is often satisfied with shallow evidence" (1973, 80, 81).

Contemporary political science research on this question generally falls into two categories. The first asserts the diversionary motivation of political leaders, especially electorally threatened democratic leaders. The second argues that leaders seek through foreign policy to demonstrate that they are competent; specifically, they do this when they have little to lose, so dire are their circumstances. In both cases, leaders experiencing domestic problems, usually problems that affect their electoral chances, turn to foreign policy forays in order to retain office. The underlying motivation attributed to leaders is to generate a rally in political support. Mueller (1973) originates the notion that democratically elected leaders (US Presidents in particular) make gains in the polls when they face foreign opponents in military conflict.[6] In such circumstances, domestic constituents rally to the support of their leader, essentially providing him an electoral incentive to seek events which might produce such rallies. Blechman & Kaplan (1978) suggest specifically that US presidents seek such opportunities; researchers thereafter have often correlated measures of electoral need with episodes of a state's involvement in international conflict (e.g. Ostrom & Job 1986, James & Oneal 1991, Morgan & Bickers 1992, Brace & Hinckley 1992, Meernik 1994, DeRouen 1995, Miller 1995, Meernik & Waterman 1996, Gelpi 1997, Leeds & Davis 1997).

The notion that leaders employ military force in order to generate rallies receives some anecdotal support. The Falklands War, an oft cited example, occurred shortly before British elections in 1983 and at a time when the ruling Conservative party's

[6]Other scholars make similar assertions (e.g. Erikson 1989, MacKuen 1983, Ostrom & Simon 1985, Russett 1990).

fortunes were languishing in economic turmoil. But Conservative ratings in the polls rebounded with the Falklands episode and the Conservative party retained its hold on British government.[7] Empirical evidence that foreign conflict generates rallies in the polls, however, is lacking. Both Brace & Hinckley (1992) and Lian & Oneal (1994) report that no clear relationship exists between the use of military force and Presidential approval. They conclude that US Presidents may have *less* incentive to use force when under electoral duress.

Perhaps as commonly, leaders may have incentives to divert attention *away* from, or even to conceal, foreign military episodes.[8] During his 1964 bid for reelection, Lyndon Johnson tried to keep the nascent conflict in Vietnam out of the public spotlight, explaining to an advisor, "If you have a mother-in-law with only one eye and she has it in the center of the forehead, you don't keep her in the living room." (Stoessinger 1982, 101) On a tour of Europe in 1969, President Nixon ordered secret bombing raids on North Vietnamese supply depots in Cambodia, but delayed the order until he could return to the US, concerned that news of the raids could harm him less if he were at home (Kissinger 1979, 243ff). US Presidents and democratically elected leaders in general worry about appearances and events for the very reason that appearances and events determine their political futures. And if these leaders recognize that military conflict generates support in the polls and makes it more

[7]While Norpoth (1991) attributes the Thatcher government's resurgence to the Falklands success, Sanders, Ward & Marsh (1991) argue that Conservative election prospects were affected much more by improving economic conditions.

[8]Brace & Hinckley (1992, 91–93) provide additional anecdotes where US administrations have incentives to conceal some or all of a foreign policy event from the public.

difficult for domestic opponents to criticize them, perhaps leaders have substantial incentives to "create" diversionary events.

Among the earliest empirical assertions of diversionary military activity are Blechman & Kaplan (1978), Stoll (1984), and Ostrom & Job (1986). The best known of these, Ostrom and Job's study, reports that American Presidents suffering in the polls appear to resort to arms in response, and presumably with the hope that they will benefit from the alleged "rally 'round the flag phenomenon."[9] Later work suggests that Ostrom and Job's finding is an artifact of failing to account adequately for traditional realist variables representing power (James & Oneal 1991). However, recasting the Ostrom and Job model from a realist perspective, James and Oneal find that the apparent importance of domestic political variables does not disappear in the presence of international variables.

Whether or not executives (usually US presidents) seek to divert or create rallies through the use of force, however, becomes less clear as more researchers examine the question empirically. Morgan & Bickers (1992) find that presidents use force *more often* in reaction to low partisan approval, *and more frequently* in response to high overall approval. They suggest that presidents require a strong universal (aggregate) foundation to resort to arms, but also respond to core constituencies

[9]What is often not noted about the Ostrom and Job study, however, is that they find that negative changes in approval are associated with the tendency to use force, but *so are high levels of approval.* Rather than suggesting diversionary motives, the latter finding suggests that American presidents may try to cash in high approval, engaging in risky foreign policies they might not otherwise have attempted. Further, and more importantly, it suggests that the effects of approval are not likely to be linear, though most analysts continue to model approval as if it were. Finally, Ostrom and Job examine the effects of economic conditions and approval in the same models, ignoring the theoretically obvious and empirically supported causal relationship between the two variables.

particular demands.[10] DeRouen (1995), on the other hand, finds aggregate approval to be *negatively* related to the use of force. [11] Meernik (1994, 136), examining the opportunity to use force as his unit of analysis, reports findings exactly contrary to those reported by Ostrom and Job and James and Oneal, concluding that "when balancing domestic and international conditions, presidents' decisions are more often motivated by national interest than personal political gain."[12] His analyses suggest little or no relationship between presidential popularity, election cycles or economic conditions and the use of military force.

The very fact that serious scholars can arrive at such contrary conclusions simply by specifying models differently suggests that the phenomenon in question is more complex than existing theory can recognize or for which it can successfully account. The answer is undoubtedly *not* to continue searching for a research design panacea, but lies instead in reexamining the underlying theoretical logic and its attendant assumptions. The next section examines the theory of diversionary behavior and suggests that the theory makes leaps of illogic that render hypotheses, the tests of which are inconclusive.

[10]Morgan and Bickers examine approval *and* partisan approval in the same models, apparently ignoring the extremely strong correlation between the two variables; they report the two to be correlated at $r = .88$ (Morgan & Bickers 1992, footnote 4). In fact, the relationship between the two variables is probably causal as well since partisan approval is a subset of and included in overall approval. The exact effect of this misspecification, however, is unknown.

[11]DeRouen models the relationships among approval, economic conditions and the use of force in a nonrecursive system of equation.

[12]Precisely how the insignificance of domestic variables indicates that personal gain is not a motivation for foreign policy is not clear.

2.2.4 Problems and Consequences

Any discussion of diversionary or gambling research is likely to become extraordinarily complex for two primary reasons. First, the logic of these arguments is intuitively appealing, so suggesting alternatives has an innate bias to overcome. Second and more importantly, arguing against diversionary theories but in favor of strong linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy seems somewhat self-defeating if not contradictory.

Under careful examination, however, it becomes clear that the logic of diversionary or gambling arguments is neither so simple nor so strong. Similarly, an even stronger theoretic linkage between domestic and international politics can be constructed if we discard traditional diversionary arguments. This section enumerates logical problems and implications of diversionary arguments and examines their likely consequences.

Scapegoating, gambling and diversionary arguments all have at their root the notion that a leader has a problem at home and that he decides the most useful action he can take is to resort to arms. Gelpi (1997, 280), for instance, concludes that the "diversionary initiation of force will generally be a pathology of democratic systems," suggesting democratic leaders will succumb to the temptation of international violence when domestic trouble is brewing.[13] Similarly, Ostrom and Job focus on "political uses of force," acts they define as "overt policy acts directed by the US

[13]Gelpi also argues that "democratic institutions can actually create incentives to initiate force when faced with domestic unrest," and that domestic politics can "make the use of force potentially profitable for democratic leaders" (279).

president that fall somewhere between acts of diplomacy and intentional uses of military power such as in Korea and Vietnam" (541–542).[14] They also claim that presidents will respond to failure by attempting to "deflect attention" away from it, and that "a 'successful,' highly visible use of force may be seen as a needed tonic" (549). Smith (1996, 147) argues that leaders under pressure from electorates make "suboptimal foreign policy decisions ... Since the government cares, not only about taking the best course of action for the nation, but also about getting reelected, it is biased towards violent behavior." Similarly, Hess & Orphanides (1995, 841) write that a leader "may be willing to [go to war] when he recognizes that his reelection would be jeopardized if voters based their decisions *solely* on his conduct in other matters, such as the domestic economy. In that case, a war changes the likely outcome of the election from a sure loss to a potential victory." The presumption Hess and Orphanides and others make is that leaders need to change the subject and that foreign conflict is a topic most likely to serve their electoral interests. Whether due to desperation, to miscalculation or to genuine conviction that international conflict is a reasonable response to domestic turmoil, research assumes leaders respond to trouble at home with the use of force.

At a minimum, such arguments make the following assumptions:

[14]Ostrom and Job's interest "is focused on the use of the US military by the president in circumstances short of involvement, or intended involvement, in extended military combat. In these instances, the armed forces may be said to have been engaged not for the achievement of a military objective per se, but for 'political' purposes, and their actions said to constitute 'political uses of the armed forces' ... " (541).

Assumption 1 *The leader believes that foreign policy will address his problem more efficiently than would domestic policy. Put another way, the expected utility for foreign policy exceeds the expected utility of domestic policy alternatives.*

Assumption 2 *Military force, in spite of the risks associated with resorting to arms, is likely to alleviate his domestic problems more effectively than would other foreign policy actions. In other words, the expected utility for the use of force is greater than the expected utility for any other foreign policy action.*

Assumption 1 is troubling logically insofar as it indicates that political leaders are better equipped to deal with domestic problems through foreign policy than through domestic political means. The arsenal of domestic political tools a leader generally has access to is vast. Admittedly, many of the policy tools to which a leader might resort may be largely symbolic in nature. These policies may not actually change whatever condition offends the electorate or domestic audience, but the leader can employ symbolic policy tools to demonstrate his empathy for the aggrieved. Brace & Hinckley (1992), for example, argue specifically that American presidents can and do make speeches and take trips in order to influence public opinion in their favor. Their analyses suggest that such symbolic acts actually do affect presidential approval in positive and nontrivial ways. Travel and speech-making are low cost, low risk efforts a political leader can undertake; in fact, actions such as these are not even policy options so much as political strategies (effective ones at that).

However, political leaders also often have substantial domestic policy resources with which they can effectively send signals to core constituents and to the electorate at large regarding their commitment to solving domestic problems. In the US, spending bills in Congress are often filled with funds for special projects benefiting particular groups. Members of Congress typically benefit from these distributions and, ultimately, so does the President when he signs such a bill into law. Presidents can respond to constituents by refusing to carry out congressional mandates regarding spending. The White House can *impound* funds, refusing to spend them as congress has required in its budget; congress attempted to outlaw this in the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. Presidents have circumvented the law via practices like *deferral* (temporarily refusing to spend money) or *recision* (cancelling budgeted spending altogether). In eras of budget cutting and fiscal conservation, these strategies are at least symbolically powerful to particular constituencies of the president. Further, and more proactively, presidents typically have substantial *discretionary spending authority*, enabled by budget items designed to allow the White House to deal effectively with unforeseen needs. Funds such as these can and sometimes are spent in ways that directly benefit constituencies whose support the president needs. Additionally, American presidents can propose and publicly support legislation intended to help particular constituents. If the legislation passes Congress, the president claims victory and probably reaps the benefits of the symbolic action he has taken to alleviate whatever domestic suffering is underway. If the legislation fails, the president is the friend of the downtrodden and can scapegoat the congress,

all to his own political benefit. So why a leader should logically be expected to turn immediately and without fail to the foreign policy arena as the best and most obvious way in which to deal with domestic political problems is not entirely clear.

Assumption 1 has rather vast implications and invites a detailed examination of domestic policy options and why they might or might not be preferable to foreign policy options. However, this assumption is perhaps taken on faith even more blindly than Assumption 2, that leaders select *violent* foreign policies to address domestic trouble.[15] The second assumption implies several somewhat startling things a leader must believe if he is to employ the military in response to domestic trouble.

Implication 2.1 *He must believe that the resort to arms will solve or at least assuage his domestic trouble.*

Implication 2.2 *He must believe that the use of force is his best option. That is, the use of force is superior to other alternatives in its likely effect and in its likely success.*

Implication 2.3 *He must have an available opponent toward whom he can direct his forces in a plausible fashion so that his attempt to divert is not so transparent as to breed even further trouble at home. In other words, he must have a credible opponent available at the correct moment.*

[15]Whether or not, and to what extent, leaders select foreign policy or domestic policy or some combination of the two is a question beyond the scope of this research. Rather, this research seeks to unravel the second assumption and its implications, demonstrating the relevance of domestic political process and foreign policy choice to extant theory. Future work will address the process by which leaders select domestic or foreign policy responses to trouble at home.

Implication 2.4 *He must garner or believe he can garner enough support in the legislature to avoid abject opposition by a highly visible and vocal political institution that could conceivably reverse the boost his use of force would provide in the first place.*

Much of the diversionary literature deals exclusively with democratic states, often dealing only with the United States.[16] The rationale generally given for a democratic focus is that democratic leaders, since they suffer the institutional constraints and the continual electoral threat of the democratic system, must sometimes resort to extreme measures in order to protect their electoral interests. Autocrats, on the other hand, though they may suffer from domestic turmoil, have repressive tools they can employ in the face of domestic threat.[17]

Insofar as the implications enumerated above apply to democratic leaders, they are perhaps even more startling. Implications one and two, for instance, suggest that democrats normatively view international conflict and violence as appropriate solutions or responses to domestic threats and that they are willing opportunistically to employ the use of force. Normative explanations of the democratic peace, on the other hand, hold that democratic leaders are constrained in their abilities to wage war by democratic norms. On the contrary, diversionary arguments attribute to leaders

[16]Exceptions include Gelpi (1997), Miller (1995), and Dassel & Reinhardt (1999).

[17]Gelpi explicitly distinguishes between democrats and autocrats on this basis, arguing that democrats respond to domestic trouble with diversionary foreign policy, while autocrats respond with internal repression. Enterline & Gleditsch (1998) test similar hypotheses and find general support for the notion that autocrats do not externalize domestic trouble as frequently as do democrats, but turn to repressive measures instead.

such political desperation that they are willing and able to use force manipulatively in order to gain domestic political advantage. Further, implications 1 and 2 suggest that useful policy tools are in short supply, so short in fact that leaders choose violent foreign policy over other types of foreign policy. Additionally, insofar as the (partial) goal of resorting to arms is to sway public opinion, the use of force as a tool of foreign policy and as a political act must be substantially high profile in order to influence public opinion as such acts are assumed to do. These implications substantively exclude the possibility that leaders who respond to domestic trouble with foreign policy may choose from an array of particular policy options, some of which are belligerent, some of which are not.

Implication three suggests that opportunities for the use of force are omnipresent in the international system, that a democratic leader *always* has so offensive a foe that he can essentially engage that foe in military combat at will without raising the suspicions of the electorate. Meernik (1994) and Meernik & Waterman (1996) suggest that opportunities for military adventurism may not be omnipresent and they present evidence that when opportunities do present themselves, American presidents do not always take them. Their findings cast doubt not only on the diversionary hypothesis (lending to the cloud of confusion surrounding the literature generally), but cast doubt specifically on the notion that leaders always have available opponents. Perhaps even more damaging to implication 3 is Alastair Smith's (1996) formal model of diversionary foreign policy. Smith shows that, though democratic leaders may have incentives to divert, potential opponents know when diversion is

most likely and keep low profiles at those times just to avoid becoming unwitting and unwilling targets. In other words, just when a leader might want and need a diversion and a foreign foe to target, potential targets may become quite scarce. That opportunities to engage in military diversion are ever-available is not supported by logic, by international relations theory, nor by empirical evidence.

Finally, implication four suggests that the institutional and normative constraints that democratic peace advocates argue are strong enough to prohibit war between democratic states do not so restrain a democratic leader in dire domestic straits. Though democratic norms inhibit foreign policy action and institutional structure slows the policy making process, injecting reason into decision making to such an extent that democracies *have never fought one another*, these inhibitions have no effect on a leader's willingness nor on his ability to resort to arms for patently political purposes. Of course, democratic peace advocates argue quite specifically that democracies are only jointly pacific, but that they are individually "not less conflict prone than nondemocracies" (Maoz & Russett 1993, 624).[18] Whether or not democracies are more pacific than autocratic states makes little difference to the argument at hand. What does matter is that democratic normative and institutional structures are generally held to account for the different behaviors of democracies and autocracies. Generally speaking, norms and structural constraints serve theoretically

[18]There is disagreement on this issue among those who study the democratic peace proposition. Rummel (1979) asserts that democratic states (what he calls "libertarian states") should not engage in less international conflict than nondemocratic states. Geller (1985) and Maoz & Abdolali (1989) both report some evidence that democratic states are less likely to go to war *in general* than are nondemocratic regimes. Finally, Bremer (1992, 329) reports, "the presence of a democracy in a dyad significantly reduces its war propensity."

to restrain democratic foreign policy behavior in ways that nondemocratic states are not constrained. Yet the diversionary assumptions and implications suggest rather firmly that these same norms and structures do not hinder what Morgan & Bickers (1992, 26) call "foreign policy adventures." In fact, Gelpi's (1997: 279) statement quoted above is striking enough that it is worth repeating: "democratic institutions can actually create incentives to initiate force when faced with domestic unrest." Gelpi himself remarks on the extent to which this contrasts with monadic democratic peace theories, but he offers little in the way of reconciliation.

For the sake of logical consistency, it is generally inadequate to make the assumptions and to accept the implications diversionary arguments require. Not only do the assumptions largely preclude the possibility that leaders select different policy responses to different stimuli, but they require that leaders employ foreign policy rather than domestic policy options in response to domestic problems. Moreover, the implications that diversionary work suggests are contrary to democratic peace theory and empirical findings, limit the likelihood of foreign policy substitution, and render domestic political institutions largely impotent with regard to their ability to arrest foreign policy adventurism.

Not only are diversionary arguments inconsistent with democratic peace theory, but they are not wholly consistent with rational choice assumptions. Rational choice generally assumes that actors will select options that simultaneously maximize the likelihood of success and the likely payoff. It is difficult to imagine that military conflict, in the short-run or over the long-term, is the policy option with maximum

utility when a leader is faced with a domestic threat. Military action is risky and costly. Battle deaths (on either side in the instant media age) do not serve a leader in the polls especially well. Insofar as leaders gain quick bounces in the polls, those gains are often short-lived and in fact tend to turn into losses as disputes endure for longer periods of time. Further, that a state can win a military engagement is rarely a certainty; anything short of a win (a draw, some sub-optimal conclusion) is likely to be viewed as a loss. And it can be shown empirically that target states have incentives to make military engagements drag on indefinitely since the initiator's costs climb and since target states are more likely to prevail the longer a dispute endures (Clark 1999). Given the generally high risk and the generally low likelihood of success, for leaders to engage in diversionary conflict to make domestic political gains, they must believe the payoffs will be exceptionally high.

More likely, however, leaders are inhibited by the very obstacles democratic peace scholars credit with democratic pacificity. And leaders very likely choose policy options from an array of alternatives; they do not select blindly between the use of force and no action whatsoever. These two assertions form the basis for the next chapter which details two parallel arguments. The first is an argument that political institutions constrain executive action, but that they do so to varying extents across time. Not only does this highlight the inadequacy of treating political institutional structure as static across time, but it also emphasizes how the interaction between political institutions serves to make diversionary conflict unlikely. Moreover, the interaction between political institutions increases the likelihood that leaders select

policy options carefully in response to domestic trouble, and that they substitute policies depending on the varying conditions they face. This is the essence of the second argument, that leaders have strong incentives to address policy problems with the appropriate policy tools, substituting policies for one another. Just as it is inadequate to treat constraints as if they are constant across time, it is theoretically and empirically insufficient to limit foreign policy choice to the dichotomy of conflict or no conflict. Chapter 3 expands these arguments and proposes theoretical ways in which to consider how constraints change and how those changes force leaders to engage in policy substitution.

CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE

As the preceding chapter argues, two prominent and interrelated literatures regarding the study of international conflict are somewhat at odds with one another. While the democratic peace literature generally anticipates that democratic leaders are constrained from pursuing military options as freely as their autocratic counterparts may, the diversionary literature expects democratic leaders to respond to domestic trouble with foreign conflict. Put another way, the constraints characteristic of democracies, whether structural or normative, reduce the likelihood of military force, but those same constraints force democratic executives sometimes to resort to force either to divert attention or to demonstrate competence.

This apparent disconnect between these two bodies of research is only exacerbated by the empirical and logical shortcomings of the two literatures. Democratic peace research generally dichotomizes nations into categories of "democratic" and "nondemocratic." However, a democratic leader's freedom to act, her ability to employ military force or prosecute war, may well change across time *even in the absence of a change in polity.* Inattention to the substantial variance in domestic political constraints that results during the course of normal political events leads us

to treat a state's domestic politics as static and unchanging over long periods of time. Simultaneously, diversionary research generally examines the effects of economic or political trouble on the propensity of the state to engage in military conflict, failing to acknowledge that threatened leaders have a variety of other policy alternatives from which they might select.

This chapter proceeds in four sections designed to address these problems that generally inhibit a logical and convincing connection between domestic political factors and foreign policy behavior. The first two sections provide a conceptual and operational approach to understanding institutional change in stable polities. The latter two sections deal theoretically and logically with foreign policy choice, why scholars should anticipate that leaders substitute policies, and when we should expect particular types of policy. The general goal of this chapter is to unify the somewhat disparate theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 2 and to provide the logical underpinnings for empirical models that link domestic institutional change and interaction with foreign policy choice and substitution.

Specifically, the chapter proceeds in the following fashion. The first section examines the likelihood that states undergo substantial internal political change during the course of normal political events. These changes can explicitly be linked to institutional relationships which serve to constrain executive action differently across time. Section two proposes a particular operational way to characterize the dynamics of institutional relationships via the concept of *institutional congruence.* Next, section three turns to the logical problems associated with the failure to

recognize the theoretic and empirical possibility of policy substitution. Leaders should logically be expected to implement different types of policies in response to different types of problems. Finally, the fourth section describes a public-private goods analogy for international relations. Insofar as leaders employ foreign policy to address the needs and demands of domestic constituents, leaders are engaged in political distribution. The types of goods leaders should logically distribute suggest that leaders are not generally likely to resort to the use of military force in order to address domestic economic problems.

3.1 Institutional Change in Stable Polities

In the broad context of liberalism, the internal characteristics and vagaries of states matter to how they behave in an international context because state preferences are endogenous and variant across states and across time. To the contrary, however, one of the principle results of realism, as Waltz reformulates it, asserts that though states have interests and preferences, they rarely coincide with the outcomes of international behavior (Waltz 1979, 65). In other words, what states want, what states do and what states get do not correspond, but are divergent. And this assumption allows realism to claim that state preferences matter little to international behavior; rather, the international contexts in which states find themselves determine what those states will do and how successful they will be in achieving their aims. These aims can be summed up in terms of power. States pursue power for the sake of an increased share of power in the system and toward the end of security;

Morgenthau (1966, 25), for instance, claimed that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." Since states are concerned centrally with this pursuit, their goals, interests, preferences, whichever we wish to name them, are the same across units and, presumably, across time as well. This facilitates Waltz's notion that international politics can be defined by identifying three fundamental elements of the structure of the international system. First, the system itself is anarchic rather than hierarchic or polyarchic. Second, actors or units which interact in the system all have similar functions; they cannot be meaningfully distinguished from one another. Third, capabilities are distributed across these units; this distribution varies across systems and over time (Waltz 1979, 93). The first two characteristics of the structure of international politics are constant; the third, relative power, is the only variable in the model and thus should be the focus of attention.

Liberalism suggests an alternative view that does not wholly discount the relevance of the international environment, nor of state power, but argues that the units of analysis (states) in international politics vary in substantially important ways that shape behavior in the system. In particular, liberalism assumes that state preferences are endogenous, determined by characteristics of the states, even if they might be conditioned by the international environment. Additionally, these preferences lead directly to the actions of states, meaning that states behave purposively. Moravcsik (1996, 7) contends that the "configuration of state preferences . . . is the fundamental determinant of state behavior." Moreover, according to liberalism, state preferences "reflect domestic and transnational social pressures transmitted through domestic

representative institutions;" domestic institutions assimilate internal and external conditions at any given time into coherent preference orderings for a state upon which actions are then determined (Moravcsik 1996, 8).

Contrast Moravcsik's assertion to realist notions of the origins of state behavior. Whereas states pursue power in the realist tradition, states have preferences determined by internal and external *variables* in the liberal school. That is, conditions, pressures and demands vary within states and across states; so do international conditions which may breed hostility at one point in time, cooperation at another. More important to this research, liberalism holds that domestic institutions act as mechanisms that aggregate the fluctuating preferences of constituencies into joint preferences for outcomes regarding specific issues. In this sense, domestic institutions represent and configure national interests which, in turn, result in actions consistent with achieving preferred outcomes. Thus, domestic institutions, according to liberal thought, play a substantially important role in determining how states will behave in the international system.

Not only are domestic institutions prominent in this liberal conception of international politics, but their prominence and functions provide the rationale for an argument that state preferences, state constraints and therefore, state policies will vary across time. Moravcsik's fundamental assertion is that preferences vary across states.[1] Individual state characteristics shape state preferences, so insofar as states' internal characteristics and design vary, so will their preferences. The

[1]Whether these preferences are over policy outcomes or over the means by which goals are pursued is of little consequence to Moravcsik.

result is that different states will pursue goals differently in the international system. This is consistent with the theoretical foundation of research that tries to explain the democratic peace finding; democratic states are characteristically different from other states, preferences regarding how goals are achieved are different, and so manifest behavior is different as well.[2] This is really how democratic peace and other regime-based arguments that differentiate between the behaviors of types of states are fundamentally liberal. They presume that states vary, whether by norm or by structure, and that those variations result in different orientations toward policy options. As a result, different states behave differently.

More importantly, however, Moravcsik's argument that how state preferences are configured affects state behavior strongly suggests that if preferences in a state shift in any meaningful manner across time, so will the policies the state pursues. Political institutions provide the structure within which preferences are aggregated; should the dynamics of that aggregation process change, the aggregate outcome (policy selection) is likely to change as well. Further, if the distribution of state preferences *prior to their aggregation* changes, so will the aggregate policy outcome. Political institutions serve to translate preferences into policy; institutions are a framework for decision making. But if the actors controlling institutions change or if the preferences those institutions are charged with aggregating change, policy is likely to change as well. The upshot is that Moravcsik's theoretical framework directly implies that states may make different policies at different times in response to similar stimuli.

[2]This is true of both normative and structural explanations of the democratic peace.

This is especially true in democratic states where institutional structure may be static across time, but the aggregation of preferences can change rather dramatically during the course of normal political events.

Bueno de Mesquita (1981a) provides an argument that illustrates the possible relevance of both cross-national variation in state behavior and cross-time variation in policy preferences. He argues that how states respond to the distribution of power in the international system is tempered significantly by individual leaders' risk orientations. In other words, the distribution of power in the system does not itself indicate whether or not states will be likely to engage in conflict. If we observe that power is distributed such that there is a rough balance among states in the system, and we observe only a small number of conflicts, we might erroneously conclude that the balance of power is associated with peace. Instead, Bueno de Mesquita suggests that individual states (leaders) may perceive the distribution of power differently given their own risk orientations. Risk averse leaders may behave differently or be constrained to a different extent by rough equivalence of power than might risk acceptant leaders. As a result, if we only observe the distribution of power in the system and draw conclusions about the behavior of individual states or of dyads, we run the risk of drawing incorrect inferences. State or dyadic behavior may be determined as much by individual characteristics (characteristics that vary across states and within states over time) as by systemic conditions. Temporal variability in a state's risk propensity is especially likely insofar as domestic political institutions compete with one another and cooperate to different degrees over time. At some

points, executive constraints may be greater than at others, so the political risk associated with particular policies may change across time as well. This might further explain the apparent existence of cooperation in the international system in spite of realist assumptions of Hobbesian anarchy and state self-interest.[3]

Liberal theory clearly indicates the likelihood that state policy action is not necessarily constant across time because institutional configurations and how preferences are aggregated change in rather subtle ways. Theoretical and empirical approaches that only attend to states' extant political institutions and fail to acknowledge the dynamic nature of political decision making and institutional constraints ignore important in-state variation. The next section identifies that sources and causes of institutional change over time, focusing particularly on democratic electorates and multiple political institutions.

3.1.1 Sources of Normal Institutional Change

State institutions structure the manner in which societal groups and individuals interact; they establish hierarchies and confer privileges and responsibilities. The primary responsibility leaders take on when they gain positions of power is that of agency. Leaders are responsible for representing the preferences and interests of their constituents. Not only do they have some ethical obligation to carry out their responsibilities as agents, but they have incentives to do so as well. Leaders who act

[3]It also is a strong argument contrary to Waltz's (1979) assertion that the systemic level of analysis subsumes other levels, making them causally, logically and empirically irrelevant. Waltz calls analysis at the national level "reductionist."

as good agents have better chances of retaining their offices than do those who are poor agents.

If leaders, use their positions in political institutions to further their political goals and to retain office, the implications are substantial. First, sole attention to international factors at the expense of the "black-box" of states' political systems, is refuted. Second and most significantly, *leaders' actions are constrained not only by the preferences of other actors, but also by institutional structures of the state which are largely immobile, though not necessarily static.* By this I mean that political institutions (formal decision-making bodies, for instance) establish rules and constraints within which individuals must act; these institutions may be permanent, but *characteristics of those institutions may change over time.* For instance, a state may always have a legislature and an executive, may have regular elections with a consistently sized electorate, but the actors occupying those positions may shift. This is most clearly seen where party control of an institution or of an entire government changes. In such a case, we might expect that decision-making by a self-interested leader may either be facilitated or hindered, depending upon the similarity of preferences among different institutions.

The extent to which policy decisions are likely to change across time in the same state depends on at least four factors, all of which are related to the nature of and the control of political institutions.

1. The number of political institutions charged with decision making authority.

2. Shifting power among societal groups; what Dahl calls the "polyarchic" flow of power in democratic states.

3. Changing control or degree of control of political institutions by ideological tendencies.

4. The extent to which the preferences across multiple institutions converge.

Changes in policy decisions within a single state depend first on the number of political institutions that have authority over policy. Really, the degree of policy change across time depends on the singularity or plurality of policy institutions, two arrangements being most common. Autocratic states tend toward singular political institutions, single executives, sometimes in an oligarchic or junta-like context. Even autocrats who permit institutionalized groups of advisors (like a Politburo) are often singularly endowed with the power to make policy decisions. In such cases, other institutions often act more as selectorates than as policy making organs. On the other hand, democratic states nearly always are characterized by multiple political institutions, usually an executive and a legislature.[4] The decision making process is fundamentally different in democratic states for the very reason that more than one political institution is endowed with decision making authority. Some democratic constitutions are notoriously vague regarding which body has primary authority over

[4]Of course, some autocrats create constitutionally correct legislative bodies that meet regularly and pass legislation. These bodies rarely pose serious obstacles for autocratic policy initiatives however. These same autocrats are often the ones who see neither irony nor comedy in formally renaming their states "The Democratic Republic of such and such."

particular policy areas, lending to the importance of institutional interaction in the policy making process.

The plurality of political institutions in democratic states ensures that constraints will change over time as the second item in the list above indicates. In other words, these political structures provide a mechanism within which policy preferences can change across time. However, shifting preferences of the individuals or groups in society and in control of political institutions are at the root of policy changes over time. Two of the manifest characteristics of democratic states are the ease with which organized interests form and the frequency with which political power ebbs and flows among these groups. As a result, democratic states experience frequent changes in the general direction of policy as different groups gain power at the expense of others. Some scholars of democratic policy making claim that this polyarchic flow of power is the essence of democratic society, but that the inevitable outcome is less-than-efficient and incremental policy making (for example, see Olson 1982). Moreover, these shifts in the distribution of political power among groups in society influence what individuals or groups will control the political institutions of the state. Control of these institutions is centrally important to organized interests insofar as political institutions will ultimately form policy. Since political institutions serve to aggregate preferences into policy alternatives and then into single policies, groups and individuals will compete for the right to control political office and to retain office once they have it.

Competition, however, especially in democratic states where two political institutions are common, often has somewhat unintended and inefficient effects. One of the basic problems of democratic government occurs when different political institutions are controlled by opposing interests. This possibility exists in virtually all democratic systems (in one form or another) and creates an environment ripe for conflict and for political obstruction. Really, interinstitutional conflict is the product of the first three sources of institutional change. Groups compete for political power, they seek to control political institutions of which there are two, and sometimes opposing groups gain control of those intertwined decision making bodies. Regular elections and the polyarchic flow of power among groups add just the right element of chaos such that the ideological timbre of political institutions can and often does change with startling regularity. Two consequences emerge. First, as groups controlling political institutions change, so will the process of preference aggregation. So the very tone of policy can change as well, meaning that the same state may implement dramatically different policies in response to similar stimuli at different points in time. Second, and perhaps more distressing to the integrity of the policy making process, the opportunity for frequent change in the control of *multiple* political institutions allows opposing ideological tendencies to control different institutions. Divided control introduces the opportunity for conflict, for coercion and for inefficient governance.

3.1.2 Shifting Constraints in Normal Political Events

States' foreign policy decisions may well result from a complex interaction of competing preferences and from competing interests in multiple political institutions; actors compromise and bargain to make policy decisions. Insofar as the translation of the selectorate's preferences into state preferences and actions by political institutions is straightforward, the waters are muddied substantially by the existence of multiple political institutions that share responsibility over a policy area. For instance, where an executive and a legislature both have power over foreign policy decisions, where they both are responsible to selectorates and where their preferences are independent of one another, the decision-making process is likely to be quite different from a state with a single powerful executive. Political institutions may have similar or dissimilar preferences, especially as they have overlapping or divergent constituents in the selectorate to satisfy.

American debates over trade openness provide an enlightening illustration of how two political institutions may come to strange arrangements as a result of their divergent interests. In 1934, the US Congress ceded to the Presidency the power to negotiate tariff agreements with other nations without Congressional approval. This followed the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 which resulted as members of Congress pursued their own district-level protectionist needs while ignoring the global consequences of enormously high tariffs. Members of Congress voted protection to each individual district, providing themselves electoral protection

at the same time, and serving to globalize the depression and to spur a wave of tariff retaliation. By ceding authority over tariff levels to the president, Congress avoids making policy in response to localized and powerful constituent demands. The President's constituency is much larger and can tolerate lower tariff levels in return for the efficient economic outcomes that presumably result. In this manner, the preferences of Congressional selectorates (and thus members of Congress) do not coincide with the preferences of the presidential selectorate, a much broader and diverse body. Whereas narrow, local constituencies favor the concentrated benefits of protection, the broader national constituency favors economic efficiency.[5] This account emphasizes how different selectoral demands, different constituencies in effect, result in different actions as the preferences of those different selectorates filter through political institutions.

More specifically, however, states still typicaliy come to single, identifiable policies that often are implemented by individual leaders, usually executives. The policy making process, particularly for democracies, will involve multiple political institutions which must interact and compromise to one extent or another in order to make policy. The tariff example above illustrates this notion. So, it is the *interaction* of political institutions that is of particular importance in order to link these institutions with state behavior.

But democracies also have the defining characteristic of frequent, broad-based elections for multiple positions in political institutions. Though the institutions

[5]See Lohmann & O'Halloran (1994) for an insightful discussion of this episode and particularly of the distributive logrolling process that resulted in high tariffs.

themselves do not change, their constituent parts can change frequently and dramatically. Perhaps an extreme example of this can be found in the party realignment in the United States in the 1930s. Though students of American party politics still disagree as to the causes of the realignment, they are unanimous as to its occurrence. The electorate, previously dominated by Republican registration and Republican voting, suddenly swung over a period of four to eight years, to one dominated by Democratic registration and voting. The result was a rather dramatic change in the personnel of government. The Congress and the Presidency were captured by Democrats in 1932; FDR was the first Democrat in the White House since Wilson's departure after 1920, and the next Republican President would not take office until Eisenhower's inauguration in 1953.[6] Likewise, the House of Representatives remained under Democratic control until 1946 and was retained by the Democrats from 1954 until 1995. The drama in this is emphasized by the fact that until 1933, the House had been dominated by Republicans since the only other realignment in US history in 1896.[7] This brief discussion perhaps minimizes the vastness of political and historical scholarship on US party realignment. But it illustrates the substantial changes in the characteristics of institutions that can occur within a polity *in the course of normal political events* rather than during a dramatic change in institutional structure or polity.

[6]With the exception of Wilson, FDR was the only Democrat to hold the White House between 1897 when Grover Cleveland left office and 1933.

[7]A similar story can be told regarding the US Senate which was controlled almost continuously by Republicans for the majority of the period preceding 1932 and then by Democrats from 1933 until 1980.

The "normal course of events" type of institutional change has implications for the executives who suffer the unchanging constraints of the institutional structure itself. In the US case, a president may be faced by a friendly Congress or by a strong opposition that strives to block his own policy agenda. This suggests a more dynamic type of constraint, one that changes as personnel in the institutions changes and one that can have serious consequences for the decision making process in which an executive must take part. Most importantly, the range of policy options from which an executive can select may change dramatically depending upon the orientation of the legislative institution. In the US case, foreign policy decisions in the White House may be arrived at under the assumption that Congress will support those decisions *when the Congress is supportive of White House positions more generally.* On the other hand, foreign policy decisions may be made somewhat more cautiously if the White House faces an opposition Congress.

Normal political events produce similar changes in institutional configurations in democracies other than the United States as well. The parliamentary case is only different insofar as it is more difficult to discern control of executive powers, especially in coalition governments. Though parliamentary systems are defined by the absence of a formal separation of powers between executive and legislative institutions, executive authority particularly with regard to foreign policy matters is reasonably clear. In fact, the American presidential system, characterized by formal separation of executive and legislative powers, still suffers from substantial interinstitutional conflict regarding foreign policy authority. Much like the American

president, a prime minister is likely to find herself more heavily constrained by a coalition government, or by a marginal majority in the parliament. Her policy positions and decisions are more likely to undergo serious scrutiny and to come under fire from the opposition when the opposition is relatively large, perhaps only a few seats shy of a majority. A coalition arrangement may similarly hobble a PM by creating an executive structure within which other interests can make credible policy demands. Her ability to carry out policy, foreign policy in particular, may be limited by the division of preferences in her own cabinet and by the lack of unity in the parliament at-large.

Whether the democratic system is parliamentary or presidential or mixed, the problem is fundamentally the same, especially with regard to foreign policy. States typically require single leaders to speak for them in matters of foreign affairs; usually, this individual is the executive. However the freedom and authority with which an executive is able to make foreign policy decisions is determined very much by the extent to which he shares similar or dissimilar policy preferences with the legislative institution. The theoretical effect of divided institutional control on an executive's ability to make foreign policy is substantial since he must always be aware not only that the legislature might not support his foreign policy initiatives, but that it may actively oppose his decisions. The consequences of legislative opposition are that his decisions may not appear credible or serious to an international audience, and he may suffer domestically as the opposition suggests his incompetence in foreign affairs. The next section describes an operational manner in which to conceptualize

the similarity or dissimilarity of preferences between political institutions and how changes in their interaction are likely to influence decision making. More particularly, section 3.2 describes specifically how constraints on decision making change over time during the normal course of political events and in the absence of dramatic regime change.

3.2 Institutional Congruence

In any state, leaders must concern themselves with the relative power and relative policy preferences of other institutions involved in policy-making. To the extent that other institutions agree or disagree with an executive's policies, the executive will be either effective or ineffective in implementing his program. As a result, the joint disposition of political institutions in a state will determine the policies that can be enacted and the extent to which those policies will be successful.

We can generalize regarding institutional relationships and dispositions and their effects on policy options by conceiving a dimension along which institutional positions change. Domestic political institutions will share similar or dissimilar policy preferences across time. As indicated previously, democratic states should be especially susceptible to changes in policy preferences given the frequency of election cycles and the large number of offices generally available to candidates. The result is that, at times, the two primary political institutions, in most democracies the legislature and the executive, will share similar preferences while at others they will be largely opposed to one another. I label this concept *congruence.* Institutional

congruence indicates the extent to which institutions will either collaborate and cooperate, or will obstruct each others' initiatives.

The concept of congruence or incongruence between political institutions can be applied to the institutional arrangement in virtually any state, though it is perhaps most useful in the democratic case. As a concept, it provides detail about the institutional disposition of a state that the simple democratic-nondemocratic dichotomy discourages. It allows us to differentiate not only *across* states in the democratic category, but to observe changes in both institutions and in state behavior *in the same state across time.* Within-state variation is fundamentally important to policy making in any state where the polyarchy of interests produces changes in the control of political institutions over time. It is not theoretically reasonable to expect that a political system founded on the very notion of frequent and normal political transition *within a fixed institutional framework* will not experience substantial changes in policy direction across time. Moreover, it is not reasonable to assume that these changes are trivial in terms of their impact on policy. Specifically, it may be that a country retains a particular foreign policy direction for a long period of time, but the specific decisions that state makes with regard to foreign policy may vary dramatically. For instance, a democratic government characterized by broad agreement among its political actors may find foreign policy decisions like the use of force far easier to take than might that same government under incongruent conditions.

From an operational standpoint, congruence is a continuum indicating the extent to which political institutions share similar or dissimilar policy preferences. Such a conception can be applied to virtually any state whose structure contains multiple political institutions. Generally speaking, the effect of *incongruence* on the policy making process should be to inhibit decision making, to foster disagreement and obstructionist behavior, and to empower opposition members to disrupt the policy agenda of the interests that control executive authority. Congruence, on the other hand, should foster agreement and consensus, facilitate decision making, and empower the executive to make decisions and carry them out without the impediment of strong and vociferous opposition in another powerful political institution. This suggests a proposition regarding how congruence generally should affect policy making:

Proposition 1 *Institutional congruence facilitates decision making, generally unifying policy preferences among policy makers, and reducing conflict within the policy making process. Congruence affects both the decision to implement a policy and the implementation process itself.*

In the US case, congruence is especially easy to conceive using the conventions of divided and unified government. These terms refer to party control of the Presidency and the Congress. Unified government occurs when the same party controls both institutions. Otherwise, divided government exists. Scholars in American politics have long debated the causes and effects of divided government, generally concluding that

the divided control of political institutions breeds stagnation, gridlock and inefficiency (Mayhew 1991, Fiorina 1992, Sundquist 1988).[8] This too is the popular perception, though scholars still marvel at the increasing tendency of the US electorate in post-World War II era to keep divided governments in place (Cox & Kernell 1991). Divided government has so alarmed some policy-makers that they have proposed fairly dramatic changes in the political system in order to avoid institutional division and the vicissitudes assumed to accompany it. Senator Fulbright, Democrat from Arkansas, concerned over the prospect of divided government following Republican success in the House in the 1946 midterm elections, called on fellow Democrat and President Harry Truman to appoint a Republican Secretary of State and then to resign. All this he proposed in order to preserve the alleged efficiency of unified government and to avoid the turmoil divided government is alleged to bring with it (Cox & Kernell 1991).[9]

Since Fulbright's proposal immediately followed World War II and coincided with the ascendant superpower tensions, it is not a leap of faith to believe that a great deal of his concern over divided government had to do with its implications for US foreign policy. In particular, Fulbright and others had to have been concerned with the prospect of internal division suggesting weakness and indecision to the apparently expansionist-minded Soviets. With regard to international politics, US foreign policy in particular, the degree of congruence between political institutions is an important

[8]It should be noted that most political science work on divided government attempts to identify and explain its causes. Its effects, of particular importance here, are often speculated upon, usually assumed to be nefarious, but rarely examined in empirical studies.

[9]Following Fulbright's proposal, Truman referred to him as "Halfbright" (McCullough 1992).

determinant, especially of conflict behavior (Clark 1998). Generally speaking, institutional congruence indicates that institutional actors are in broad agreement regarding policy; the policy preferences of these actors are similar. The policy process, as a result, should be relatively nonconflictual, perhaps even consensual. Foreign policy initiatives by the White House should face little serious opposition from the Congress in most cases. The president, generally aware of the friendly Congress, may be encouraged to make difficult decisions that he might not have been able to make in the face of a cantankerous or oppositional Congress. Alternatively, a President faced by an opposed Congress may experience difficulty in both domestic and foreign policy. Decisions to use force, for example, may be much more difficult to make under incongruence, under divided government. In fact, the use of force may, at times, be removed from the President's action set altogether because of the opposition he knows he will face in the Congress.[10] Clark (1998) provides empirical evidence not only that the use of force is more frequent under congruent arrangements in the US, but that disputes undertaken during institutional congruence tend to last significantly longer than those begun under incongruent conditions. The ability of a President to pursue foreign policy goals using force is generally inhibited by institutional incongruence.

Institutional incongruence has substantial implications for foreign policy choice, especially insofar as foreign policies are used to respond to domestic political or

[10]I should be clear that this does not mean a President will want to use force more freely when he has a friendly Congress. Rather, when these institutions share congruent policy preferences, the use of force remains a *viable* policy alternative, whereas incongruence may limit the action set such that resort to arms is not tractable.

economic problems. Executives who suffer contrary legislatures will often find controversial policies difficult to implement without facing serious public opposition from the legislature. The use of military force is often a controversial policy, and may be a policy option that becomes largely unavailable because of skepticism in the legislature except in the most extreme circumstances. Incongruence between the two institutions makes general agreement difficult enough, but agreement over aggressive foreign policy may be even more difficult. As a result, a leader in need of a foreign policy response to domestic trouble has an even greater incentive to turn away from military action and to less controversial types of policy.

The next two sections address this particular issue, that leaders evaluate the utilities of multiple policy alternatives and select the policies most likely to advance their political goals. Whether or not particular policies are tenable alternatives at any moment in time depends not only on the extent to which a policy is an effective response to a contemporary problem a leader faces, but depends also on the extant degree of institutional congruence. Of the following sections, the first addresses the empirically logical necessity of considering the likelihood of policy substitution, focusing especially on the consequences of ignoring the multiple options from which leaders select. The second section provides an economic analogy that ultimately suggests that leaders do not logically have an incentive to resort to arms in response to domestic political or economic turmoil. Finally, the chapter concludes by linking institutional congruence and foreign policy choice in a manner that alludes to the empirical tests of the following chapters.

3.3 The Logic of Foreign Policy Substitution

Scholars interested in international relations typically identify particular domains of foreign policy or of state interaction and produce theories, hypotheses and empirical analyses of the causes of behavior within their particular domain. Separating international phenomena into manageable and theoretically distinguishable subsets facilitates scientific inquiry and allows scholars to focus on particular problems or puzzles in the international arena. However, the often hidden cost of defining subsets of international behavior or foreign policy behavior is that only a limited set of possible outputs can be examined. As a result, the types of behavior being explained are limited, though the explanatory factors often are not. Specifically, with regard to foreign policy decision making, scholars examine some policy alternatives while ignoring others. This tendency to develop what Most and Starr call "islands of theory," theory and empirical results of limited scope, has the unintended consequence of excluding from consideration alternative policies available to state leaders.

Most and Starr speak extensively to the logical causes and consequences of excluding policy alternatives from theoretical discussion and from empirical analyses.[11] Generally, they argue that the examination of specific foreign policies, specific alternatives available to leaders, necessarily results in the exclusion of *other* policy alternatives. However, if scholars are interested more broadly in drawing conclusions regarding the foreign policy process or foreign policy outcomes, the failure to examine

[11]Most & Starr (1989, chapter 5) provide what is perhaps the seminal account of the logic of foreign policy substitutability. The discussion in this section relies heavily on their work.

a broader range of policy options excludes important alternatives from which a leader might choose. Put differently, investigating the causes of y_1 may produce important findings regarding when and why policy makers will select y_1 as a policy response. But the examination of y_1 alone forbids the possibility (either theoretical or empirical) that leaders may substitute y_2 for y_1. Moreover, since y_1 is but one manifestation of Y, that is, of foreign policy more generally, this approach ignores the possibility that a factor x may in one instance cause the selection of y_1, and may in the next cause the selection of y_2. The upshot is that x may cause Y, though it may not consistently cause y_1, but some other manifestation of Y (i.e. y_2 or y_3).

Two potential consequences emerge from the possibility that Y consists of complementary parts, y_i. First, examination of Y without regard to its component parts may establish that various factors affect the likelihood of observing Y, yet we have no way of knowing the specific effects of the covariates. For instance, examining the effects of domestic political and economic variables on foreign policy action, simply observing whether or not foreign policy action occurs (Y), fails to tell us anything about the relationship between domestic politics and *conflict* (y_1), or domestic politics and *trade* (y_2). The lack of specificity further means that though domestic political factors may consistently influence foreign policy, we cannot be at all sure that domestic politics consistently lead to the same or even to similar foreign policies. In the end, the categories of the dependent variable (foreign policy action, no foreign policy action) are so broadly defined that even apparently strong relationships are not especially meaningful.

Though generality in the dependent variable and in the explanans may leave apparent relationships unclear, overspecificity in the dependent variable can be equally problematic. If Y is composed of n complementary parts y_i, the sole examination of y_1 explicitly suggests that y_1 is an independent alternative. In other words, the examination of y_1 to the exclusion of other manifestations of Y (y_2,y_3) indicates that y_1 is independent of y_2 and y_3 and not interchangeable with these other policies. This is a strong assumption. Further, if the assumption does not hold, the danger exists that findings related to y_1 may be biased because of the complementarity between y_1 and other $y_i s$. In other words, if y_1 and y_2 are both manifestations of Y, they are likely to be correlated with one another. Covariates that are related to y_1 may also be related to y_2, though for different reasons and in different ways. However, if y_1 and y_2 are correlated, the relationship between covariates and y_1 may be due, either in part or in whole, to the relationship between y_1 and y_2.

The complementarity issue becomes even more complex when we consider the manner in which many researchers operationalize their dependent variables. Scholars who study international conflict, for example, often examine the relationship between various domestic political factors and the onset of militarized conflict. Some researchers suggest that domestic factors influence foreign policy decisions either as leaders attempt to demonstrate their competence (Downs & Rocke 1995, Smith 1998), or as they try to divert attention from domestic turmoil (see among others Ostrom & Job 1986, James & Oneal 1991, Miller 1995, Meernik 1994, Meernik &

Waterman 1996, Leeds & Davis 1997). They most often operationalize the dependent variable as a dichotomy representing the absence (0) or presence (1) of military conflict. The expectations underlying hypotheses often are fairly general regarding the incentives for leaders to employ foreign policy tools to affect domestic political conditions, especially their own electoral fortunes. However, the operationalization of the dependent variable leaves some portions of potential foreign policy behavior *in each category of the dependent variable.* Put another way, the *militarized dispute* category (1) clearly contains a very specific type of foreign policy. The (0) category, however, contains all action other than military force, so it contains foreign policy options like diplomatic maneuvering, trade action, sanctioning, etc. The conceptual dependent variable, foreign policy action, occurs in both dependent variable categories simultaneously.

For instance, a leader in trouble at home may indeed resort to foreign policy tactics to influence her domestic circumstances. But she may employ high-profile negotiations, diplomacy, trade aggression or trade conciliation rather than military force. Should she do so, empirical models may produce findings that suggest domestic political factors do not in fact influence the decision to use force and we may conclude more generally that the link between domestic turmoil and foreign policy behavior is weak or nonexistent. To some extent, such a conclusion follows under the implicit assumption that foreign policies are interchangeable, but independent of one another. However, a leader in similar circumstances may *simultaneously* employ military might, trade threats and diplomacy; note that two of these policies occupy the "zero"

category of the dependent variable, while the third occupies the "one" category. It appears that the categories of the dependent variable, though exhaustive, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the end, the correlation between complementary manifestations of Y and their appearances in different categories of the dependent variable may lead to inconclusive empirical findings.

Table 3.1, adapted from Most and Starr, illustrates these implications by examining the simple relationship between an independent variable, x_1 and the dependent concept, Y. Y is composed of three complementary components, y_1, y_2 and y_3.[12]

Table 3.1. Logical Causation and Complementary Outcomes†

Case 1	x_1	y_1	$-y_2$	$-y_3$	Y
Case 2	x_1	$-y_1$	y_2	$-y_3$	Y
Case 3	x_1	$-y_1$	$-y_2$	y_3	Y
Case 4	x_1	y_1	y_2	y_3	Y
Case 5	$-x_1$	$-y_1$	$-y_2$	$-y_3$	-Y
Case 6	$-x_1$	y_1	$-y_2$	$-y_3$	Y
Case 7	$-x_1$	y_1	y_2	$-y_3$	Y
Case 8	$-x_1$	$-y_1$	y_2	y_3	Y

† Figure adapted from Most & Starr (1989, 103).

Most and Starr observe that a researcher interested in the effect of x_1 on Y would conclude that x_1 is sufficient but not necessary for Y. However, such a researcher would not know which manifestation(s) of Y is caused by x_1. Additionally, Most and Starr note that a researcher interested more narrowly in a single y_i might conclude

[12]The notation x_1 indicates the presence of x, whereas $-x_1$ indicates the absence of x. The same is true for y_i and for Y.

that no relationship exists between x_1 and y_i since x_1 does not seem to be necessary or sufficient for any single y_i. Not only are the apparent relationships different depending upon the selection of the dependent variable in Table 3.1, but the conclusions we might draw differ depending on the nature of the complementarity among $y_i s$. For instance, Case 4 indicates that y_1 and y_2 and y_3 can occur simultaneously. Similarly, Case 8 indicates that y_2 and y_3 can occur at the same time, but to the exclusion of y_1. Not only are these $y_i s$ likely to be correlated, but the examination of a single y_i to the exclusion of other alternatives places nonindependent outcomes in different categories of the dependent variable. So, for instance, if we are interested in the presence (1) or absence (0) of y_1, a score of "one" on the dependent variable can simultaneously represent y_1 by itself, or y_1 , y_2 and y_3 (as in Case 4). Similarly, y_2 and y_3 appear in the "zero" category even if they occur and if their occurrence is related to the occurrence of y_1.

As Most and Starr remark, "researchers may be led astray if they narrowly focus their research on only one type of empirical foreign policy behavior." (102) They argue that the strategy of selecting only one of many potential policy choices "would make sense only if decision makers in all states respond identically to identical stimuli and they do not have the capacity to substitute . . . To the extent that decision makers have some latitude in their choice of options and they are sometimes able to substitute one such alternative for another, a given factor could be expected to lead to, stimulate or 'cause' a variety of empirically distinct foreign policy acts, events or behaviors." (104, 106) The potential problems of ignoring substitutability include:

- the likelihood that cases in different categories of the dependent variable are not independent of one another
- the possibility of finding no relationship between x_1 and y_1, though a relationship exists between x_1 and y_2.
- the possibility that an apparent empirical relationship between x_1 and y_1 is a function of the correlation between y_1 and y_2.

These implications suggest the importance of accounting both theoretically and empirically for relevant policy alternatives and the risk associated with examining single choices to the exclusion of all others. The likelihood of theoretical and inferential error is significant if we ignore the possibility of substitution. However, the logic of policy substitution is not purely analytic, not entirely founded in research design concerns. Rather, substitution is logically intuitive given the concerns to which leaders must respond as they make policy. The next section specifically addresses this intuition by drawing an analogy between private goods and economic policy alternatives, and public goods and the use of force.

3.4 Domestic Problems, Logical Responses: A Private Goods Analogy

As section 3.3 argues, the failure to account for the multiple policy alternatives from which a leader might choose may result in theoretic and empirical mistakes. Analyses that only examine the possible selection of one policy may find no relationship and lead to the conclusion that no relationship exists at all between certain

stimuli and an entire policy arena. In fact, it may be that leaders choose *other* policies that the analysis left unexamined. So the nonfinding may be accurate with regard to one particular policy, but not with regard to a broader policy area.

Substitution, however, is not only an important concept from the standpoint of estimation and inference. Logically, it makes sense in a conventional wisdom sort of way that leaders may choose to do A at one point, B at another, especially if they are faced with different dilemmas to solve. In fact, just as we expect baseball players to carry baseball gloves rather than boxing gloves, we should anticipate that leaders will employ policy tools appropriate to the task they face.

It is from this logical standpoint that diversionary arguments immediately step into logical tarpits. Many diversionary endeavors try theoretically and empirically to correlate economic trouble at home with the use of military force. Likewise, they argue that political trouble like sagging support in the polls provides ample reason to engage in military conflict. These arguments have a cynical appeal to them; leaders desperate to remain in the good graces of cranky electorates and to retain office, start wars so the public will rally behind them. As the last chapter argued, however, the logic behind these arguments is entirely shaky and simply ignores the other policy options leaders have available to them. More to the point of this section, however, such arguments fail to see that economic problems cry for economic solutions; political problems demand political solutions. These solutions may be stop-gap in nature, they may not actually work; they may cause long-term damage in return for short-term gratification, or they may be altogether symbolic.

But they have the magnificently desirable qualities of being low-risk, of being likely to provide some success, and, best of all, they can be targeted toward particular groups, constituents who are especially important to the leader's continued tenure in office. This section argues primarily that leaders will select policies appropriate to the challenges they face and that, in response to domestic concerns, military force is rarely the optimal solution.

3.4.1 Choosing the Right Tool for the Job

Policy substitutability is logically dependent on three straightforward assumptions regarding policy makers and policy options. First, policy makers will establish utilities for policy alternatives and will select the alternative that is most likely to succeed.[13] Second, policy makers have, at any given time, a variety of policy options from which to select. It is from this set of alternatives that leaders choose and implement the policy most likely to succeed. Third, the utility of any particular policy can change over time depending generally on the extent to which it addresses a contemporary problem and depending on whether or not a leader is restrained in her use of that policy. A policy option may not be suitable in one circumstance and therefore will not be considered, while in another circumstance, it may be the

[13]Success does not necessarily mean that the foreign policy achieves its overt goal. Rather, success may take on symbolic proportions insofar as leaders seek to implement foreign policies to appease or distract domestic constituents. For instance, the implementation of minor trade sanctions against a foreign industry may have little chance of changing the behavior of that foreign competitor - the sanction may be overturned ultimately by the WTO. However, the apparently tough action against foreign industry may symbolize the leader's commitment to protecting domestic economic prosperity and may strengthen the leader's domestic base. Thus, a policy likely to fail from the outset may be successful in fulfilling the leader's ulterior motives.

ideal policy to adopt. Similarly, at times, electorates or other political institutions may object to the use of a policy, thus making it unemployable; at other times, in the absence of opposition, that same policy may be much easier for a leader to implement. In other words, a policy's viability can change over time. Because a given policy alternative may be more or less useful, more or less viable at a particular time, a leader has an incentive to consider the range of policy options and to substitute one policy for another, depending upon the surrounding political conditions. In other words, a leader must choose the right tool for the job.

Choosing the right tool for the job, however, is a process not especially clear in research linking domestic politics and foreign policy. For example, a voluminous literature seeks to link domestic political or economic turmoil with the onset of military hostilities either as a leader tries to divert attention from domestic problems or as he tries to demonstrate his competence in foreign policy in order to save his career. No matter the motivation, this research often asserts a theoretical and empirical link between domestic economic crisis and military aggression. However, this literature says little regarding the possibility that leaders can substitute other policies in place of the use of force, and largely ignores the tenuous viability of using force. The assumption underlying "diversionary" or "scapegoating" or "gambling for resurrection" literature is that military force is the right policy tool for the job of dealing with domestic unrest.

Executives in general and American presidents in particular have at their disposal myriad policy tools with which they might attempt to influence their chances of

retaining office. These range from mundane activities like traveling and giving speeches (Brace & Hinckley 1992) to the provision of directed benefits (Bartels 1991, Stein & Bickers 1994, Dixit & Londregan 1995) to particularistic constituencies (Lohmann & O'Halloran 1994), to the use of international conflict (Blainey 1973, Ostrom & Job 1986, Stoll 1984, James & Oneal 1991, Morgan & Bickers 1992, DeRouen 1995, Meernik 1994, Lian & Oneal 1994, Leeds & Davis 1997). As a general rule, we should anticipate that leaders will generally employ policy tools with maximum utility. That is, leaders will select the policies most likely to have the desired effect, with lowest risk or cost and the highest likelihood of success. On its face, this rarely describes international conflict. Though academics and politicos alike have suggested that a rally effect follows episodes of international conflict (Mueller 1973), boosting presidential approval, empirical evidence suggests that rally effects appear inconsistently, are small, and rarely last very long (Brace & Hinckley 1992, Lian & Oneal 1994). Since polling and prognostication are favorite pastimes if not cottage industries of the modern White House, Presidents are surely aware of the vagaries of public opinion and of the improbability of generous bounces in approval following an international episode.[14]

Not only are rallies unlikely results of international conflict, but conflict itself is not logically the most efficient way a leader can positively affect his electoral fortunes. However, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997a, 1997b) have suggested that, under

[14]On the improbability and uncertainty surrounding rally effects, James and Oneal (1991, 328) write, "If presidents do employ America's armed forces to arrest declining popularity or influence election, a program of education for U.S. leaders seems badly needed, because the rally effect is neither certain nor strong."

certain circumstances, conflict approximates a public good and therefore can be seen as a form of political distribution to constituents. If this is the case, on the surface, conflict seems an appropriate response for a leader to make to a domestic crisis; she attempts to appease domestic constituents via distribution. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1998a) pursue this same logic, arguing specifically that the utility of private goods declines as the group to whom those goods must be distributed grows. This is especially true in democratic states where the selectorate is large and where the minimum winning coalition, the target of distribution, is also quite large. Due to the nonexcludable and inexhaustible nature of public goods, they are better suited for distribution to large groups like the winning coalition in a democracy. Thus, they suggest that public goods, including conflict insofar as it approximates a public good in large winning coalitions, are useful tools for leaders seeking to retain political power.[15]

However, the distribution of public goods to an entire electorate or a winning coalition is inefficient compared to the distribution of *private goods* to selected, perhaps marginal, and certainly core constituencies.[16] Unlike public goods, private goods possess the defining characteristic of being excludable; some individuals will receive the good while others will be denied it. This explicitly creates "haves" and "have-nots," two groups distinguished not only by their possessions, but by

[15]Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson (1997b) also claim that conflict may approximate a *private good* in small winning coalitions (in autocracies) since the benefits of conflict can be divided among the members of such a small group without diluting those benefits substantially.

[16]"Marginal" constituents are those who are likely to form the margin between political victory and political defeat. Often, these constituents are indifferent between supporting a political leader and not participating. Directed distribution is, theoretically, an efficient way to change their indifference.

their expectations of future distribution and, for the "haves," by their obligation to support the source of distribution. Those who benefit from distributive politics have particular motivations to support those who distribute and to see that they retain office. This obligation is self-serving, but is powerful. American politicians at the federal level are powerfully endowed as a group with distributional authority and resources. US presidents are foremost among those who can distribute private goods in a variety of ways, and they do so frequently.

Public goods, unlike private goods, cannot be targeted at specific audiences (since they are by definition inexhaustible and nonexcludable). Their distribution does not inherently create classes of individuals among which distinctions can be drawn, so individuals cannot identify themselves as recipients of a public good while noting others who did not receive the same good. Public goods do not confer special status upon anyone, but rely upon the provision of intangible notions like safety or patriotism. While public goods are likely important to the maintenance of society and while leaders may well distribute public goods, it is unlikely that public goods will motivate the political support a leader in crisis may need, nor can they be targeted toward core constituencies.

Incumbent politicians retain office primarily through the successful distribution of goods to these core constituencies. For instance, Weingast, Shepsle & Johansen (1981, 652), writing with regard to members of the US Congress, argue that members are reelection oriented and that their chances for reelection "are positively associated with the next benefits they deliver to their constituents." Niskansan (1971) asserts

that, in order to serve their electoral interests, members of Congress end up on those committees most able to provide selective benefits to their constituents. Those members proceed to use their committee positions to provide particularistic benefits in such a way that helps to guarantee reelection though it results in inefficient policies. Further, Fiorina (1977) claims that Congress purposively legislates bureaucracy in vague terms destined to breed inefficiency and contradiction. Constituents suffer the consequences of bureaucratic blunders and turn to members of Congress who correct such problems, gaining in the meantime reputations as problem solvers and defenders of citizens victimized by the bureaucracy. In this fashion, it benefits members of Congress to maintain a difficult and error-prone bureaucracy since they can distribute the 'good' of problem-solving. This good is approximately private in that it is targetable to core constituents and is excludable as well.

Just as the Congress has maintained and institutionalized ways that it can dole out pork in return for political support, the presidency can distribute goods in a variety of ways as well. Chapter 2, for instance, discussed the president's discretion regarding spending authority and symbolic types of distribution in which the executive can engage. Perhaps most strikingly, the 1993 political battle to approve the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides a colorful illustration of executive power to distribute private goods. The president targeted marginal members of congress, those wavering between supporting the treaty and voting against it, and offered them personal benefits (including invitations to special White House events), and guaranteed budget items for special projects in members'

districts. Such projects, like subsidies for honey producers, not only provided political protection for individual members of congress, but also provided at least a sense of economic protection for small industries threatened by the international competition NAFTA would create. Both goods, targeted economic protection and targeted political protection for individual members of congress, are approximately private since they are excludable.

Though private goods are always excludable, they can take many different forms (as the NAFTA example illustrates). They are, however, always directed at a particular constituency and, for that very reason, should be more effective in motivating support than will be public goods. Since researchers generally assume rational decision-making, it is reasonable also to expect that an executive will select the policy tool most likely to increase his or her electoral chances. Generally speaking, then, we should anticipate that leaders will prefer to distribute private goods rather than public goods *when their electoral fortunes are threatened.* In other words, leaders will, under different circumstances, substitute one type of distribution for another depending upon their particular needs at a given time. If war or military conflict more generally approximate public goods, then they should be less effective tools for ensuring reelection than would be some private goods-based policy like the distribution of pork to targeted portions of the domestic audience. This is especially true when states face economic crises. Economic issues are explicitly about private goods and their distribution and redistribution. Thus, it makes less sense for a leader to address an economic issue with a military solution; to do so would be to address a

private goods issue with an act of public goods distribution. This suggests a second proposition:

Proposition 2 *Domestic economic turmoil or political trouble that threatens a leader's continued tenure in office should generally instigate efforts to distribute private goods to core constituents rather than to distribute public goods to the entire selectorate.*

It is appropriate to draw one more distinction between private and public goods regarding the matter of economic efficiency. In general, the distribution of private goods is not efficient in the political circumstance described above, and this inefficiency contributes to the costs of distribution. Dixit & Londregan (1995) suggest that the distribution of economic goods on the basis of political (rather than market) characteristics is destined to result in inefficient outcomes. "Inefficiency" indicates that economic resources, otherwise available to the community at large, are diverted to a specific constituency; the costs of this diversion are greater than the benefits and, in fact, the costs are borne by the community at large while the benefits are enjoyed by a particular concentrated interest.[17] In the case of the distribution of private goods for the benefit of a political leader, a scarce resource is diverted from the public toward a particular interest. The costs are diffuse while the benefits are concentrated. While these concentrated benefits exact a *quid pro quo* from the recipients, such distributions have costs for the leader. The leader must explain to

[17]Again, see Lohmann & O'Halloran's (1994) discussion of "distributive log-rolling," where logrolling produces tariff rates that are universally high and therefore inefficient.

the community at large why such a distribution is merited and the leader must suffer the economic inefficiency that accompanies his distribution. However, because the benefits of the distribution are concentrated, those who receive the benefit are likely to recognize their privileged positions. As a result, the distribution of private goods, though inefficient and costly in a broad economic sense, produces specific benefits for a core constituency and exacts support for a leader.

The private goods analog is a powerful one because of its implications for what policies leaders logically should implement when they face domestic economic trouble. While many empirical analyses try to link economic distress and the use of force, it seems that leaders facing faltering economies are best served not by the military, but by implementing distributive policies. Military action may create the public good of patriotic fervor and perhaps even a temporary rally; but economic policy changes create private goods and imply a *quid pro quo* between the leader and the beneficiaries of the economic policy. If, for example, a leader takes minor protectionist action against a foreign industry, the symbolism of her action is powerful to the constituents she is trying to protect. Whether the action is really meaningful in an economic sense or even whether it ultimately succeeds or fails is perhaps less important than the explicit creation of "haves" and "have-nots." Isolating particular constituents as beneficiaries of such a policy helps to ensure their continued political support. Military action is not likely to have such an effect.

3.5 Joining Congruence and Substitution

Among the foundations of contemporary empirical research of international relations is the presumption that domestic politics somehow influences how states behave. The logical link between the two spheres is often accomplished by focusing on the self-preservation instinct of a state's leader, his joint need to serve the interests of the state and to satisfy domestic constituents so that he can retain office. The threat-to-office constraint presumably shapes a leader's decisions as do other constraints like the structure of the political institutions in which he serves. However, international relations literature also argues that in spite of the constraints posed by institutional structure or by norms of behavior, a leader can actually motivate the use of military force in order to preserve his own position. This striking inconsistency rests on the assumption that a leader can nearly always resort to arms and will often find it reasonable and useful to do so in response to domestic political threats. However, that same inconsistency simultaneously invites a closer examination of the constraints a leader suffers *and* of the policy alternatives that same leader has available to him. Institutional congruence provides a theoretical dimension along which institutional constraints vary across time, suggesting that leaders will find some policy options easier to take at some times, harder to take at others. Insofar as policy options are more or less tenable at different points in time, leaders should and must evaluate the utility of various policies and implement the policy most likely to address the problems at hand. Leaders will substitute policies for one another

depending on the type of problem they seek to address and depending explicitly on the extent of the constraints they face contemporaneously.

The next two chapters provide specific operationalizations and research designs testing the effects of institutional congruence on foreign policy decisions (chapter 4) and explicitly modeling foreign policy choice as a dependent variable (chapter 5).

CHAPTER 4

INSTITUTIONAL CONGRUENCE AND CONFLICT

Institutional congruence theoretically and substantively should influence the very fabric of foreign policy decisions, serving in part to determine what types of policy are tenable at any particular moment in time. Congruence as a theoretic concept provides insight into the decision making process of the democratic state, acknowledging the transitional and dynamic character of institutions that is at the heart of democratic governance. Whereas regime-based research focuses exclusively on the adamantine structures of the state, it ignores the polyarchic flow of power among groups, the structural mechanism that allows those groups to come and go from positions in government, and the constitutional genius that contains all this dynamism within the normal course of political events. Institutional congruence is a dimension that captures the essence of decision making in the context of changing institutional constraints, and it allows that democratic executives are not always subjected to the same inhibitions, nor may they always have at their disposal the same policy alternatives given the constraints they face.

This chapter focuses exclusively on institutional congruence and how it influences foreign policy decisions to engage in military conflict. The use of the military

is a very particular type of foreign policy and one that bears examination in the context of congruence for two primary reasons. First, from a normative standpoint, understanding the sources of international conflict is a predicate for preventing and resolving disputes. Institutional congruence provides a theoretic construction by which we can more effectively detail the effects of democratic structure and the democratic process on choices regarding the use of military might as an extension of foreign policy. Moreover, congruence allows us conceptual insight into the manner in which the interaction between political institutions inhibits or enables conflictual foreign policy behavior. Second, military conflict is the foreign policy option on which so much political science research focuses, asserting that domestic structure influences the use of force and that executives use force to influence their own political fortunes. Military action is among the more extreme types of foreign policy, high profile, risky in a variety of ways, and a policy alternative that may or may not always be available to a leader interested in affecting his own political survival. Because prior research arrives at somewhat cloudy expectations regarding the use of military force, and because military action is a policy "at the margins," the extent to which its use is determined by institutional configurations is centrally important. The following sections describe congruence in detail and propose specific hypotheses regarding the effect of congruence on dispute behavior. Further, they detail a research design within which to test these hypotheses, describe the statistical methods and data necessary for the analysis, and provide empirical evidence in support of the congruence hypotheses.

4.1 Institutional Congruence

In states that have two primary political institutions responsible for policy making (as is the case in many democratic systems), the ability of a unitary leader to arrive at a single policy is affected by the relationship between the two political institutions. The outcome of competition and interaction between political actors to control multiple political institutions can be characterized by the cooperative or uncooperative nature of the relationship among political actors. Political institutions' policy preferences may be *congruent or incongruent.* If, under the rules of the game, a political decision must be shared by a legislature and an executive, the ease of decision-making will be determined by how similar or dissimilar executive and legislative views of the world are. Two political institutions characterized by similar policy preferences will find agreement on a policy action much more readily than will political institutions at odds with each other. Congruence can be conceived as a continuum of the degree to which policy preferences are similar or dissimilar between two political institutions. Greater congruence will facilitate decision-making while incongruence will obstruct it.

The primary theoretical expectation of this chapter is that the degree of harmony or preference congruence is related to how a state will behave in international conflict. In particular, I focus on the way that congruence of preferences affects both conflict propensity and the lengths of militarized disputes. A greater degree of congruence should be associated with more conflict and with longer average disputes. Where

institutions are in agreement, leaders should be willing to "go the distance," or should be resolved such that they will not abandon their objectives as a result of internal strife and discord. This should be especially true in democratic states like the US where, as Fearon's work might lead us to believe, leaders will be able to generate even greater audience costs than will leaders in autocratic states (Fearon 1994). In other words, democratic leaders have more to lose once they engage in disputes, so they should be more likely to see disputes through to their ends; this tendency should be reinforced where a democracy's political institutions are united in their preferences. Further, leaders who enjoy institutional congruence may enter into more serious disputes in the first place, leading in the end to longer dispute periods. A leader hobbled by institutional incongruence and opposition may not engage in disputes that are likely to be serious in the first place, so the disputes in which he does engage may tend naturally to be shorter. Ultimately, where institutional preferences are congruent, militarized disputes should be more frequent and dispute lengths should be longer than in cases where state institutions have opposing preferences and domestic dissent dampens enthusiasm for foreign episodes.

While this chapter contends that congruence will be positively associated with conflict propensity, an alternative explanation for conflict tendencies is apparent given Smith's (1996) claims regarding strategic interaction. Smith argues that if political leaders have incentives to employ diversionary foreign policies, it is precisely when those leaders are vulnerable that their potential targets will become wary and cautious in order to avoid become scapegoats. If leaders of potential diversionary

targets are indeed aware of other states' internal conditions and behave cautiously when they believe they may be targeted, then domestic turmoil should not *increase* conflict propensity, but should *decrease* it. With regard to congruence, if potential targets view congruent institutional arrangements as dangerously resolved, those potential target states may keep low international profiles in order to avoid conflict. In this case, congruence would actually *decrease* conflict propensity because potential opponents would behave less belligerently, offering fewer opportunities for conflict. Appendix C offers a full discussion of this alternative expectation and provides empirical tests of the strategic interaction proposition, though the reader should be consoled that the original expectations regarding congruence still find support. However, the strategic interaction proposition is theoretically rich enough to suggest a variety of future research pursuits especially regarding what types of internal conditions can successfully signal a foreign state that it should keep a low profile.

4.1.1 The American Case

In the US case, two political institutions are of particular importance; the Presidency and the Congress. Both institutions have substantial authority over foreign and military affairs, both are directly and regularly accountable to an attentive selectorate, and the two institutions do not always see eye-to-eye on matters of policy.[1] Given their joint control over and joint interest in foreign policy and

[1]Though the President is the commander of the armed forces, only the Congress can declare war. Further, though the President makes much of US foreign policy, the Congress authorizes Defense and State department budgets, confirms nominees to these departments, and oversees various ongoings regarding foreign policy via the committee system.

military disputes in particular, it seems likely that the character of foreign policy will be affected by the degree to which the views of Congress and the President correspond. Foreign policy made by political actors who agree on policy goals is likely to be different from foreign policy made when these actors can only agree to disagree.

In US politics, it is common to perceive the relationship between the Presidency and the Congress on the basis of partisan control. Much has been made (and rightly so) over the causes and effects of divided and of unified government.[2] Divided government has so concerned policy-makers that they have, at times, been driven to proposals many might view as extreme, including Senator Fulbright's proposal described in chapter 3, efforts to implement term limits on members of Congress, and constitutionally mandated "summits" between the White House and Congress. Senator Carl Hatch even made a similarly unusual proposal that the constitution be amended to allow members of the House four year terms in order to avoid the mid-term elections to which he attributed divided government (Cox & Kernell 1991).

While both parties in the American system cover broad ideological ranges, both also command substantial authority in voting behavior in the capital. That members vote along party lines and vote in accord with party leaders are common findings in research on the Congress (Fiorina 1977, Fiorina 1992, Kingdon 1981, Matthews 1960, Mayhew 1974a, Mayhew 1991). And that partisan control of Congress helps to determine the effectiveness of a President and the success he will have in the

[2]Government is unified when one party controls the White House, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. Otherwise, government is divided.

legislative arena is commonly asserted in the Presidency literature (see, for example, Bond & Fleisher 1990, Brace & Hinckley 1992, Rivers & Rose 1985). The persistence since World War II of divided government has been blamed for problems centering around the inability of institutions to arrive at consensus. Fiorina (1992, 87) writes that "divided control gives each branch of government an electoral incentive to work for the failure of the branch held by the other [party]." This is the case because one branch cannot accept the other's initiatives since to do so would suggest the other side's competence: "the president cannot run against Congress in the next election if he admits that congressional initiatives are meritorious." (Fiorina 1992, 87) According to Sundquist (1988), the unifying force of political parties is what has made the political system of separated institutions work effectively. If party no longer unites these institutions, the consequence will be inefficient and divisive rancor and stalemate. Alternatively, unified governments arrive at decisions more efficiently and remain committed to those decisions in ways absent under divided government. This should not be especially surprising. When the competing number of preferences is diminished, competition diminishes as well. And where decision-makers share preference orderings, their decisions will be more by consensus than by compromise.[3]

4.1.2 Cross-National Examination

The concept of institutional congruence, if it is theoretically and empirically generalizable, should apply to any state characterized by multiple decision making

[3]Appendix A reports partisan control of American political institutions roughly since World War II.

institutions. Democratic states often have this characteristic, normally containing legislative and executive institutions that are jointly responsible for making policy. Though the institutional structures themselves may vary across states, institutional congruence should exhibit essentially the same effect on policy making: policy implementation should be enabled by congruence, inhibited by incongruence.

In order to assess the extent to which institutional congruence is empirically generalizable, the analyses below examine the effect of institutional change on conflict behavior in a pooled sample of sixteen democratic states *other than the United States.*[4] These countries differ from the US in two important ways that require different operationalizations of the concept of congruence. First, these states are parliamentary democracies, and as such are characterized by the absence of a formal separation of power between the executive and the legislative institutions.[5] Second, many of these countries contain multiparty rather than two-party systems. In the American case, the combination of the two-party system and the formal separation of power between the executive and legislative institutions facilitates a simple measure of congruence based on party control. No such analog is really applicable to multiparty systems, nor to parliamentary structures within which the executive is derived from the legislative ranks.

[4]A list of these states and a summary of their institutional characteristics can be found in Appendix B.

[5]Among the states in the sample, some are actually mixed democratic systems in which they have prime ministers selected from the parliament *and* they have independently elected executives. I treat these mixed systems as if they were parliamentary because the measures of congruence I derive for parliamentary systems are equally applicable to the mixed structures. The measurement scheme applied in the American case relying largely on the notion of divided government is equally inapplicable to either the parliamentary or the mixed case.

Conceptually, congruence is founded on the simple notion that multiple decision makers that share similar preferences will arrive at policy decisions more easily and will implement those policies differently than will multiple decision makers who have differing or opposed preferences regarding policy. In the American case, divided government provides a convenient representation of this concept, especially since the two parties in government tend to have substantially different policy preferences.[6] As a result, policy decisions should be substantively different between periods of divided and unified government.

In the parliamentary and multiparty case, the key to unified decision making is the strength of the party in parliament. We can conceive of this in two different ways. First, if a majority party exists, that party forms the government, effectively dominating the executive decision making structure *and* commanding a winning voting bloc in the parliament itself. The simple presence of a majority indicates that the policy preferences in the government and, roughly speaking, *between* the legislative and executive institutions are likely to be similar. As a result of this form of congruence, policy making should proceed more efficiently and with less rancor than it is likely to in a parliament without a majority party. In the absence of a majority party, coalition governments usually emerge, though they often are fraught with conflict regarding policy decisions even when the coalition members are from relatively similar ideological tendencies. Not only does the absence of a majority

[6]This is true in the policy making process. Of course, research shows that these same policy makers seek to obfuscate their true positions, to equivocate on issues during election campaigns and to look as much like the opposition as possible. For example, see Downs (1957) or Shepsle (1972).

party suggest division within the executive structure, but it certainly indicates division in the parliament as a whole. The disjuncture between the legislative and executive structures is likely to be substantial especially compared to the case in which a majority party exists.

The importance of a majority in parliamentary systems suggests a second yet similar manner in which to operationalize congruence. Though the mere existence of a majority party suggests unity will be more likely than it might be otherwise, majorities are not always large, nor are they always commanding in terms of determining votes in Parliament. Further, in some cases a distinctly powerful political party may only hold a plurality in parliament, though it may hold far more seats than its nearest competitor. Though it may dominate the policy making process and dominate the government, its plurality status guarantees it will be forced to form some kind of partnership government. On the other hand, a party holding a slim majority may suffer from the strength of a close competitor such that its majority status does not confer upon it the ability to dominate the policy making process. The upshot is that the majority/nonmajority dichotomy does not necessarily reflect the detail of congruence in marginal cases where the similarity or dissimilarity of policy preferences is not distinct.

Operational problems such as these are especially common in analyses that employ dichotomous indicators of continuous concepts. Congruence or similarity of policy preferences, is a continuous concept, while the presence or absence of a majority, though a useful dichotomy, does not recognize marginal changes in control

of parliament. A continuous measure would provide a new level of detail regarding institutional congruence. One way to construct such a measure is to evaluate the extent to which the strongest party in the parliament controls the policy making process and that similar preferences characterize the institutions of government. How far either above or below the majority threshold the largest party in the parliament is should indicate in a continuous manner the extent to which policy preferences within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive are congruent or incongruent. Large positive values indicate that policy preferences are largely similar, while small positive values indicate weaker majorities and greater disagreement on general questions of policy direction. Negative values occur where no majority exists, and indicate the strength of the plurality party. More specifically, negative values report how far the plurality party is from gaining a majority. In general terms, larger values indicate greater institutional congruence while smaller values indicate that the policy making process is characterized by discord in an environment of institutional incongruence.

4.2 Research Design

The two sets of analyses below focus on the United States in the period 1943 to 1992 and then on a pool of 16 democratic states for the same period. During this period, the US involved itself in 181 militarized interstate disputes, while the pool of states involved themselves collectively in 202 disputes.[7] I examine the

[7]Dispute data are drawn from the MID data set, version 2.1.

frequencies, probabilities and lengths of these disputes using event count, probit and continuous-time hazard models respectively. According to the theory described above, the propensity of the US or of other democratic states to engage in military disputes and the duration of any given dispute in this period should be determined by both domestic political and international variables. Specifically, conflict propensity and dispute length should be affected by the degree to which domestic political institutions are in general agreement with one another. Where political institutions are controlled by groups with similar interests, the ability of an executive to put the military option to use as a tool of foreign policy is enhanced. Alternatively, an executive can be effectively hobbled by a hostile, obstructionist legislative majority. And similarly, to the extent institutions' policy preferences coincide, their resolve regarding any given dispute should be substantial and the dispute should endure as a result.

4.2.1 Dependent Variables

Though the analyses examine different types of dependent variables, all of the analyses rely conceptually on the decision of the state to engage in militarized conflict. Whether or not a state engages in conflict depends entirely upon its decision to take action toward another state, regardless of whether it is initiating the conflict or is responding to some provocation.

The decision to engage in a militarized dispute is conceptualized such that MID involvement occurs if:

- the state in question initiates a dispute.
- the state is targeted in a dispute *and* reciprocates, effectively joining the dispute.

The state in question does *not* engage in a militarized dispute if:

- the state does not initiate and is not targeted.
- the state is targeted *but does not respond, thus not entering the dispute.*[8]

Of 181 MIDs between 1943 and 1994, the US initiated 39.2 percent (71 MIDs), was targeted in 43.6 percent (79 MIDs), and was targeted and reciprocated in 18.8 percent of the disputes (34 MIDs).[9] As a result, the US is only coded to have engaged in a MID if it actually took action against another state. It is coded not to have engaged in a MID if it took no action even though it was targeted by a foreign power.[10] In the cross–national context, states in the sample initiated disputes 0.7% of the time (58 disputes), were targeted 1.8% of the time (144 disputes), and reciprocated when targeted 0.65% of the time (51 disputes).

[8]Hart & Ray (1996) note that states targeted in the MID data set, more often than not, do not reciprocate. It is noteworthy, however, that they interpret missing values for the MID variable "highest level of force used by Side B" to indicate that Side B chose not to reciprocate. The analyses here use the dichotomous indicator "reciprocate" from the MID data set.

[9]These figures obtain if *initiate* is coded to occur if the US is on the initiating side (SIDE A) *and* is involved on the first day of the dispute. Alternatively, coding *initiate* requiring only that the US is on SIDE A includes MIDs where the US joins the dispute after the day it commences. This increases the number of US initiated disputes to 75. The US is considered a target in a dispute if it is not SIDE A and is involved on the first day of the dispute.

[10]A Militarized Interstate Dispute occurs if a state threatens force, makes a display of force, moves troops, uses force or goes to war. A state must engage in at least one of these actions to be counted as a MID participant for these analyses. As a result, if a state is targeted but takes none of these courses of action, that state is coded not to have reciprocated and thus, not to have taken part in a MID.

4.2.1.1 Event Count Models: US Case

In order to assess the ways institutional congruence affects conflict propensity, I estimate event count models of US militarized disputes. The dependent variable in these models is the annual number of disputes in which the US engaged each year between 1943 and 1992.[11]

4.2.1.2 Probit Models: Cross-National Analysis

The probit models examining the tendency of states to engage in military conflict employ a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether the state engaged (1) or did not engage (0) in a militarized dispute in a given month. The dependent variable takes on a value of one only in the month the dispute began rather than maintaining such a value for the dispute's entire duration.

4.2.1.3 Hazard Models: US and Cross-National

The dependent variable in the survival models depends on the statistical package employed. Because I replicate all results in LIMDEP v7.0 and STATA v6.0, two different dependent variables are necessary. In the analyses conducted in LIMDEP, the dependent variable is the natural log of the length of each dispute in days. In the STATA analyses, the dependent variable is simply the length of each dispute, measured in days.[12]

[11]The decision to aggregate by year rather than by quarter or by month is driven by the concern that counting by quarter reduces the variation in the dependent variable significantly. One consequence of aggregating by year, however, is that the sample size is limited to the number of years in the study. Also, disputes that span more than one year are only counted during the year in which they commence.

[12]The two statistical packages yield the same estimates and thus, the same inferences. Transforming the dependent variable to its natural logarithm simply facilitates the maximum likelihood

4.2.2 Independent Variables and Hypotheses

For the analyses below, I rely on partisan control of political institutions as a general indicator of institutional congruence. For the American case, the variables of primary interest indicate the degree to which Congressional and Presidential preferences coincide or are congruent. I identify three ways to determine the congruence of preferences between the two institutions. First, I rely on party control of the Congress and the Presidency to indicate the extent to which they will share preferences. I measure this using a dummy variable which takes a value of one when government is unified, zero otherwise.

The second indicator of preference congruence between Congress and the President is the degree to which the President is supported in Congressional votes. Were Congressional and Presidential preferences ever identical, the President's positions on matters before Congress would be supported in every instance. Alternatively, where the preferences of the two institutions are opposed, the Presidential agenda will be supported less frequently in Congressional votes. I measure Presidential support as the percent of Congressional votes (where the President took a position) in support of the President.[13] This variable ranges theoretically from one to one hundred, but actually only from 43 percent to 93 percent (mean = 69 percent).

procedure whereby the software generates the log-likelihood. STATA does this internally while LIMDEP requires that the user perform the log-transformation.

[13]The Presidential support variable is based on *Congressional Quarterly's* presidential support scores from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*

Finally, I examine the effect of a particular type of divided government on the length of the disputes in which the US engages. I create a dummy variable indicating when both houses of Congress are controlled by the party opposite that of the President. In other words, this variable indicates when Congress is united against the President. This is a distinct form of divided government, perhaps the most deleterious, wherein we might expect the greatest disharmony of preferences between the two institutions of government. In particular, when the Congress is united against the President, foreign conflictual behavior should be more difficult either to commence or to sustain. Thus, disputes should be less frequent and shorter on average when the Congress is united against the White House.

To summarize,

1. *unified government* - House, Senate and Presidency controlled by same party - divided otherwise.

2. *Presidential Support* - the percent of the votes in Congress that support positions taken by the president. As this percent climbs, Congressional support for Presidential positions is more frequent and policy preferences are more congruent.

3. *Congress Unified against the President* - Both houses of Congress are controlled by the party opposite that of the president. This represents perhaps the most nefarious form of divided government

With regard to the duration of militarized disputes, divided government or low levels of support for the President should be associated with shorter disputes insofar as unity is an ingredient to resolve. The capacity of the US to send signals of resolve to opponents is diminished when domestic acrimony prevails. Similarly, the ability of the US to continue its participation in disputes is abated when domestic institutions' preferences are divided or opposed. Alternatively, when preferences are united, when government is unified, the ability of the US to pursue its goals is enhanced and disputes will last longer periods of time. With regard to the unified government variable and to the Congressional support variable, higher values indicate greater agreement between the two branches. Therefore, higher values of each should be associated with more episodes of conflict and with longer disputes. Alternatively, when Congress is united against the President, disputes should, on average, be less frequent and shorter. I anticipate the following specific relationships between measures of congruence and both conflict propensity and dispute duration in the American case.

Hypothesis 1 *Unified government will be associated with more annual disputes and with longer disputes than will divided government.*

Hypothesis 2 *Congressional support for the President will be associated with more annual disputes and will be positively associated with dispute duration.*

Hypothesis 3 *Unified Congressional opposition to the President should be negatively associated with both annual dispute frequency and with dispute duration.*

Congruent institutional preferences in the form of unified government or congressional support for the president's agenda effectively expand executive discretion insofar as the president's ability to implement controversial policies depends on at least the tacit agreement of the Congress. Foreign policy, an arena in which the Congress has asserted itself with increasing vigor since World War II, is particularly likely to be vulnerable to changes in how institutional preferences are aligned. This is especially the case regarding high–profile foreign policy decisions like the decision to engage in military conflict that require some degree of political unity lest the political costs to the executive be inordinately high. If the president is to enter military conflict in the face of an ardent and vocal opposition in Congress, a condition likely under incongruence, his ability to win political support from the public and to demonstrate resolve to the nation's opponent will be inhibited. An opposition Congress can question the motivation for military conflict and cast dispersions regarding the legitimacy of the president's national security policy.[14] Though members of congress

[14]Recent history provides examples of this and demonstrates the careful hair–splitting that members of congress have perfected in the post–Vietnam era. Opponents in Congress often question whether military exercises are truly in the "national interest," whether the US has any strategic or resource–based concerns of consequence in the region, but carefully support "the men and women of the armed forces." Rhetoric to this effect has been invoked daily during the recent air war with Serbia, often by Republicans who refer to the conflict as "Clinton's war," or "Albright's war" in reference to the Secretary of State. They have, however, been careful to voice support for US and NATO troops and have approved tax relief for troops involved in the war and have passed emergency spending legislation to fund the continued air war. Incongruence, however, may well have determined an important strategic element of the conflict: the use of ground troops was publicly rejected as a possibility by the Clinton administration from the start of the war. Moreover, but arguably, the confrontation with Serbia had reached similar tension levels periodically since

may risk appearing to be obstructionist, they may well influence public support for the president's military endeavor and make its prosecution more difficult. Unified government generally signals a likemindedness between congress and the presidency and increases the likelihood that foreign policy decisions involving military force will receive public support, making those decisions easier to take in the first place and making the prosecution of military endeavors more tenable. Support for the president's agenda in the congress provides a more refined measure of the same concept, and should exhibit a similar though stronger effect on presidential decision making. Strong support for the president's agenda in general signals a willingness in congress to support presidential initiatives, suggesting congress and the president share similar preferences over policy.

Incongruence, on the other hand, is likely to inhibit decision making simply by increasing the chances that difficult choices like the decisions to employ the military will be publicly challenged by members of congress. The effects of incongruence should be most dramatic when support for the president's agenda is generally weak, and when both houses of congress are controlled by the party opposite that of the president. Not only might congress and the president have substantially dissimilar policy preferences, but they certainly have electoral or political interests that are diametrically opposed to one another.

The independent variables of interest in the cross-national analyses are consistent with the American congruence variables insofar as they indicate the general level of

1992, but action was perhaps restrained in part by institutional incongruence that characterized all but two years of this decade.

agreement or disagreement in policy preferences between legislative and executive institutions. Further, the cross-national measures are similar in that they are based largely on partisan control of the institutions of government. As indicated above, I measure institutional congruence in the cross-national context in two different ways. First, I construct a dummy variable indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of a majority party, anticipating that the presence of a majority will make unified decision making more likely. States governed by majority parties in parliament exhibit institutional congruence, while those absent majority parties suffer incongruence. As a result, majority governments should be more likely to use force, not because they are more warlike, but because they can politically motivate the use of the military. States characterized by institutional incongruence, on the other hand, should find military force to be a tool more difficult to employ because of the disunity within parliament and between parliament and the government. Moreover, institutional congruence in the form of majorities should encourage leaders to pursue favorable outcomes in the disputes they enter. Insofar as majority governments suffer fewer slings and arrows from within the parliament or from within the government itself, retaining resolve in a dispute should be far easier than it generally would be under an incongruent arrangement. Leaders can endure longer periods of conflict toward the end of fully achieving the goals of the state. As a result, disputes should last longer under majorities than under plurality parliaments and coalition governments.

The shortcomings of a dichotomous indicator of a continuous concept suggest the second measure of institutional congruence in the cross-national analyses. The

size of the majority, whether large, small or nonexistent, is a continuous variable indicating how many seats separate the strongest party in parliament from the majority threshold. The variable is measured such that positive values indicate a majority of x seats, while negative values indicate that the plurality party is x seats short of a majority. Smaller values indicate deeper divisions and, since these states have multiparty systems, fragmentation within and between decision making institutions. Larger numbers, on the other hand, indicate a stronger degree of unity in general policy preferences. Consistent with the expectations regarding the majority variable, larger values of this continuous variable (indicating congruence) should be associated with a higher likelihood of military conflict. Likewise, larger values should be associated with longer disputes, since stronger majorities and less parliamentary angst will make prime ministers more able to project unified fronts to military opponents and more able to endure longer disputes in the name of achieving the outcome the state hoped for initially. In sum, I expect the following relationships:

Hypothesis 4 *The existence of a parliamentary majority will be positively associated with both the probability of militarized conflict and with dispute duration.*

Hypothesis 5 *The size of the parliamentary majority will be positively related to the probability of conflict and to dispute duration.*

A majority government is far less likely to be beset by the division that often characterizes coalition governments and the parliaments from which those govern-

ments derive (Lijphart 1984, Lijphart 1994). Likewise, the stronger the largest party in the parliament, the more likely it can control the policy making process and avoid division over difficult decisions involving the use of military force. Unlike a plurality parliament and coalition government, a majority government will enjoy less public opposition in parliament when it pursues controversial policies like the decision to engage in military conflict. The obvious political risks associated with military conflict are only multiplied by strong institutional opposition; those risks are not exacerbated when institutions share congruent preferences. As a result, states with majority governments or with stronger single parties are more likely to be able to resort to arms when the need arises. States suffering incongruence are more likely to conclude that the use of military force, though perhaps desirable at times, is not prudent given the political costs likely to arise from institutional opposition. Additionally, these same factors increase the resolve with which a state can engage an international opponent and so make longer disputes more likely. A majority government or a parliament in which one party is significantly stronger than its competitors is far better equipped to endure a dispute until its goals are achieved than might a government under incongruent conditions. A coalition government is likely, on the other hand, to suffer vocal opposition to its continued dispute involvement and thus will face pressure to resolve the dispute quickly and perhaps short of achieving its initial goals.

4.2.3 Statistical Controls

Evaluating the relationship between institutional change or configuration and how long disputes last requires attention not only to the domestic variables of interest, but to "international" variables that are known to be associated with conflict behavior. In particular, I control for several factors that characterize the dyadic disputes in question here, especially as they are likely to be associated with dispute length. Notice that these control variables are characteristics of individual disputes or of dyads in disputes.[15]

First, the balance of capabilities between states has been shown to influence conflict behavior, though the evidence is somewhat mixed as to whether power parity or power preponderance provide conditions most likely to result in international conflict. However, much recent research suggests that power preponderance is more conducive to peace than to conflict (Bremer 1992, Bremer 1993, Maoz & Russett 1993). I anticipate that relative capabilities will be associated with dispute duration, in such a way that makes it a necessary control variable. When one state in a dyadic dispute is substantially stronger than the other, the stronger state is likely to be able to extract what it wants from the weaker state in short order compared to a situation where the belligerents are equally capable. Where disputes

[15]Controls such as these can easily be included in the hazard models since the unit of analysis is the dispute. However, these controls cannot be employed in the event count or probit analyses since the unit of analysis is a time period (month or year). Especially in the event count case, each annual observation may (and often does) contain multiple disputes between the US and a variety of other states. Though traditional controls are impossible to implement in this case, I control for other political factors that may influence conflict propensity. These are discussed in detail later in Chapter 4, footnote 20.

are between unequals, the resolution is likely to come more quickly and to be in favor of the stronger member of the dyad. Using the Correlates of War (COW) national capability index, I measure relative capabilities by dividing the capability of the larger state by the total capabilities within the dyad. The resulting variable ranges from 0.5 where the states are equal in capabilities, to 1.0 where the larger state holds all of the capabilities within the dyad. Thus, I expect higher values of this variable to be associated with shorter disputes. In the analyses at hand, the US is very often stronger than its opponents in disputes; the mean ratio of capabilities is .84. Likewise, in the cross-national analyses the democracies in question are often stronger than their opponents, though not so much so as the US; the mean ratio of capabilities is .77.

Second, I include a variable indicating whether or not the dispute was reciprocated. Militarized interstate disputes are coded as such by COW if at least one state takes some reciprocal form of military action responding to the action that initiated the crisis. The reciprocation dummy variable indicates whether or not both sides in a dyadic dispute engage in military activity. Where disputes are reciprocated, I anticipate that they will be of longer duration.

Third, I control for the effect of geographic proximity on dispute length by including a variable indicating whether or not states are contiguous. Research suggests that where states are contiguous, the opportunity for conflict and the propensity to engage in conflict are increased (Goertz & Diehl 1992, Gochman 1993, Bueno de Mesquita 1981b). Further, dispute escalation is physically easier (and

more probable) between contiguous states than between states which are far apart (Diehl 1985). I control for contiguity since carrying on disputes is physically easier for belligerents where they do not have to convey troops and project power across great distances. So disputants closer together will be prone to longer disputes than will opponents separated geographically from each other.

Finally, disputes that involve more than two states are likely to be complicated simply by the number of actors. The number of participants in disputes is correlated with the hostility level; more hostile environments do not bode well for dispute resolution (Gochman 1993, Gochman & Maoz 1984). Additionally, more disputants potentially bring more issues and more demands into the dispute making resolution more difficult and dispute length greater. This dummy variable is equal to one when disputes are multilateral, zero when they are bilateral.[16]

4.3 Methodology

As the hypotheses above indicate, it is necessary to perform three different types of analysis, one employing event count models, one estimating the likelihood of events using probit models, the other using survival or hazard models. In the following sections I describe these models in general terms and provide specific information regarding how they are applied to the data described previously.

[16]Regarding the control variables in the American analyses, 51 percent of US disputes are reciprocated, 25 percent are with contiguous states, and 41 percent are multilateral disputes. In the cross-national analyses, 23 percent are with contiguous states, 33 percent are multilateral, and 44 percent are reciprocated.

4.3.1 Event Count Models

The first set of hypotheses predict the effects of domestic institutional congruence on conflict propensity, or more specifically, on the number of conflictual episodes in which the US engages in a given year. This clearly indicates a dependent variable that counts an annual number of events, or in this case, the annual number of militarized interstate disputes involving the United States. As methodologists have long established, least squares regression is inappropriate for event count variables since the events are discrete and since the variable is by nature truncated at 0 (no fewer than 0 events can occur in a given time period). However, event count models, the Poisson model in particular, provide ready solutions to researchers interested in predicting numbers of events.[17] I employ the Poisson model in the first set of analyses testing the hypotheses that congruence affects overall conflict propensity for the United States.

4.3.2 Probit Models

The models examining the likelihood of conflict in the pool of 16 democratic states predict a dichotomous dependent variable, so regression is, again, inappropriate. Rather, the probit model empirically examines the relationship between covariates and a binary dependent variable, but allow a continuous interpretation of the effect

[17]On a technical note, the Poisson model requires the assumption that events are independently generated such that the occurrence of event A has no effect on the likelihood event B will take place. Where overdispersion occurs, the negative binomial model is appropriate. Both models are subsumed by the generalized event count model (King 1989). Since the models presented here do not suffer from overdispersion, I limit my comments to the Poisson model.

of levels of the independent variables on the probability an event will occur. Not only do these models permit binary dependent variables and probability estimates, but the estimates are constrained between 0 and 1; regression estimates of binary dependent variables can produce estimates outside this range. Probit models produce coefficients that are distributed as z–scores, so their interpretation, though not direct, is relatively simple.

4.3.3 Continuous-time Hazard Models

Finally, the last set of analyses focus on the lengths of militarized disputes first involving the US and then involving parliamentary democracies. As the hypotheses above suggest, congruence should lead to longer disputes while incongruence and the attendant interinstitutional conflict should result in shorter disputes. Additionally, it is important to evaluate these hypotheses in the presence of control variables.

The dependent variable, the length of a dispute measured in days, is continuous and censored at zero (negative duration periods are impossible). More importantly, we are really interested in the hazard rate, or the likelihood an ongoing event will end at any particular time. Intuitively, it makes sense that this likelihood will be affected by the independent variables in the model and by time itself and that the hazard is not likely to remain the same from time period to time period. In other words, the hazard rate is not likely to be constant.

Just as regression is inappropriate for an event count or a binary dependent variable, so regression is likely to provide misleading results if applied to a dependent

variable measuring duration. As a result, I turn to the continuous-time hazard models originally derived in the biostatistics literature, but used with increasing frequency in the social sciences (Allison 1984, Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995, Bennett & Stam 1996, Bennett 1997, Bennett & Stam 1998, Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold & Zorn 1997, Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 1997). These models are used in medical research to estimate the effects of medical treatments on the likelihood patients will experience the hazard, or the terminal event; that they will die. In political science, these models have been employed to estimate the likelihood war will end, the chances peace will end, the period of time required for a member of Congress to announce how he will vote on an issue, and even the probable lengths of family arguments.

Analyses of duration depend upon the hazard or likelihood of a terminal event, the event of interest. The hazard function itself may be linear, or more commonly, it may exhibit an increasing or decreasing nonlinear trend, either monotonic or nonmonotonic. An increasing hazard function suggests that the likelihood the terminial event will occur increases with each passing period; a declining hazard function indicates just the opposite. These conditions are known respectively as positive and negative duration dependence. Studies of war duration have typically found a negative duration dependence in the process of war (Vuchinich & Teachman 1993, Bennett & Stam 1996). This suggests that the likelihood a war will end declines with each additional period of time the war survives. Other research examining the duration of lower-level militarized disputes and war report a similar negative duration dependence. Alternatively, Vuchinich & Teachman (1993) find that family conflict

exhibits positive duration dependence; with each passing time period, family conflict is more likely to end or to experience the hazard.

In duration analysis, temporal dependence is endogenous to the dependent variable and can be examined nonparametrically. However, parametric continuous-time hazard analysis allows us two additional opportunities. First, we can examine the effects of independent variables or covariates on duration. Covariates enter into the equation just as they would in a regression model and are interpreted as having an effect on the duration of the event.[18] So a positive coefficient indicates that the covariate in question is associated with longer periods of time; this positive coefficient indicates a *negative* relationship between the covariate and the hazard. That is, an increase in the covariate reduces the hazard that the event will end, or it increases the duration of the event.

The second opportunity parametric hazard analysis offers is that we can specify the particular distribution that we believe best characterizes the duration data. The Weibull distribution is one commonly specified in hazard analyses and will be employed in the analysis below. This distribution provides two advantages and a restriction. First, the Weibull allows the hazard rate to vary across time. It is sensible to assume that the hazards for many events including the termination of international conflict are nonconstant, and social science research has confirmed this. So, if the hazard rate, the likelihood the terminal event will occur, changes over

[18]LIMDEP produces coefficients relative to the dependent variable measuring time whereas some other econometrics packages produce coefficients that represent the effects of covariates on the hazard rate. Interpretations of these coefficients are quite different.

time, the Weibull will allow us to capture its nonconstancy and in fact, will estimate a parameter describing the change in the hazard. Second, if the hazard is indeed constant across time, the Weibull reduces to the exponential model (which assumes a constant hazard); the Weibull subsumes the exponential distribution. The limitation of the Weibull is that it constrains the hazard function to be monotonic, so we must assume, for example, that the hazard either increases or decreases across time, but not both. The rate of change in the hazard may vary, but its direction cannot. This is not a serious constraint given the absence of any theoretical reason to expect a nonmonotonic hazard function. Previous hazard analyses of strikes, riots, wars and even of leaders' survival in office have been modeled using the Weibull distribution and have thus made these same assumptions regarding the hazard (Bennett & Stam 1996, Bennett 1997, Horvath 1968, Vuchinich & Teachman 1993, Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995).

4.4 Results and Discussion

4.4.1 Predicting US Conflict Propensity

The first set of analyses predict the annual amount of international conflict in which the US engaged during the Cold War period. The Poisson regression models test the relationships between institutional congruence and conflict propensity. Table 4.1 presents the results of these models.

Table 4.1. Event Count Models of Annual US Disputes, 1943-1992[a]

	Model 1		Model 2	
	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	Effects[b]	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	Effects[b]
Presidential Support	0.016(0.006)***	+1.17		
Congress Unified Against President			-0.214(0.139)**	-0.92
α	0.532(0.404)*		1.566(0.086)***	
N	40		50	
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	8.13***		2.42*	
E[Y]	5.15	6.32	4.78	3.36

[a] Probit estimates, SEs in parentheses; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01, one-tailed tests. Dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate disputes involving the United States, annually. Cameron-Trivedi tests for overdispersion (1990) do not permit the rejection of the null hypothesis that overdispersion does not exist. Hence, I report Poisson rather than Negative Binomial coefficients.

[b] $E[Y] = e^{\beta X}$, holding independent variables at their means or modes in the baseline models. The marginal effects represent the change in $E[Y]$ given a change in the independent variable of interest to one standard deviation above its mean (as in Model 1), or to its nonmodal value (Model 2).

The first two models indicate that the expected relationship between institutional congruence and conflict propensity does indeed exist. As Model 1 demonstrates, higher levels of Congressional support for the President are associated with more annual militarized disputes involving the US. It appears that shared policy preferences between the Congress and the President enable the President to engage in military exercises more readily than he can when he does not have the general partisan support of Congress. This is not to say that a partisan friendly Congress always supports Presidential action while an opposing Congress does not. Rather,

a general atmosphere of support makes certain foreign policy tools, military options in particular, available to the President as he faces foreign problems. On the other hand, the absence of such an atmosphere of support makes such dramatic action less tractable in general.[19]

The results of Model 2 provide further support for the congruence hypothesis, testing the relationship between the most potentially disabling form of divided government and conflict propensity. When Congress is unified against the party of the President, Presidential action is hobbled to the extent that the use of military options is less practicable. The negative coefficient indicates that an opposed partisan Congress is associated with fewer annual militarized disputes than other partisan arrangements might be.

In either model, we can be more concrete regarding the magnitude of the effect institutional congruence has on conflict propensity by examining the marginal effects of the variables. In Poisson regression, marginal effects are computed as

$$E[Y] = e^{\beta' x} \tag{4.1}$$

holding all independent variables at their means or modes, while the variable of interest (the variable whose impact we wish to estimate) is varied by one standard

[19]Table 4.1 only reports the effects of *Support for the President* and *Congress Unified Against the President* on conflict propensity, excluding the effect of unified/divided government. The *unified government* variable is not statistically significant, though it behaves erratically depending on how the model is specified (monthly observations, annual observations, all US MIDs, US–initiated MIDs, for example), though the other two indicators of congruence produce consistent results across all specifications. I do not report the *unified government* model simply for the sake of clarity.

deviation or from its modal to its nonmodal value. So for instance, in Model 1, allowing Congressional support to vary from its mean (69 percent) to one standard deviation (13 percent) above its mean indicates a change of +1.17 disputes. That is, a one standard deviation increase in the amount of support the President receives in Congress is associated with an average increase of more than one militarized dispute per year. Likewise, computing the effect of Congress unified against the White House for Model 2, we can see an equally dramatic effect. Presidents opposed by a united Congress engage in one (-0.92) less dispute per year than do Presidents not so hobbled by a potentially hostile and certainly opportunistic Congress. In other words, when the US government is divided in its potentially most contentious fashion, US foreign policy resorts to arms less frequently.[20]

[20]Event count models naturally use time units (years in this case) as the units of analysis. As a result, controlling for characteristics of particular events or participants in those events is not possible since frequently more than one event occurs in a given time period. However, it is possible to control for characteristics of the unit of analysis (the year). In these models, it seems entirely likely that American decisions regarding foreign conflict might change in fundamental ways in the wake of Vietnam and following the adoption of the War Powers Act. Thus, I control for the effects of Vietnam (a dummy variable during the period 1965-1973) and for the possibility that the ability of the President to use the military changes in some fundamental way with the passage of the War Powers Act (1973 - a dummy variable indicating the period after its passage). Neither control variable has any distinguishable impact on the models; the congruence hypothesis is still supported. Additionally, it is possible that institutional congruence only influences American decisions to *initiate* disputes, but has no effect on US responses to foreign aggression. Theoretically, I expect that congruence influences both cases since both US initiations and responses are likely to be conditioned by the President's ability to draw support from the Congress. However, I examine a separate event count model of US initiated disputes, identifying American initiation as cases where the US is involved on the first day of the dispute *and* is on the initiating side (see MID data set 2.1, ORIGINATOR and SIDEA variables). Institutional congruence influences initiated disputes in a manner entirely similar to its influence on all disputes. Finally, recognizing that conflict propensity in year t may influence conflict propensity in year $t+1$, I include the lagged dependent variable (the lagged event count) to control for this possible source of autocorrelation. Including this lagged variable has no impact on the models; the congruence hypothesis retains support.

These event count models provide consistent support for the notion that congruence of policy preferences between domestic political institutions substantially affects US conflict propensity. It follows, however, that institutional congruence should not only affect the decision to enter conflict, but should also condition the ability of the US to *endure* international conflict. Just as a hostile Congress can make it difficult for a President to resort to arms, so such a Congress should also impede a President's ability to endure longer periods of conflict. In the following section, I test these assertions in the context of US dispute duration.

4.4.2 Analysis of American Dispute Duration

The second set of analyses estimate the relationship between institutional congruence and US dispute duration, expecting that congruence between political institutions' policy preferences will facilitate the President's ability to pursue a militarized dispute. A generally agreeable environment in the capital increases the President's ability not only to engage in disputes in the first place (as the event count models suggest), but his ability to continue disputes to their satisfactory resolution. Whereas a hostile Congress may make Presidential decision-making more difficult in any policy area, such an atmosphere can only serve to limit Presidential foreign policy alternatives. Though Congress, regardless of partisan interests, tends to support Presidential military action, the foundation of that support and its potential longevity are both suspect when Congress and the President fail to see eye-to-eye on daily matters. As a result, Presidents are more cautious in entering disputes when

Congress is generally unfriendly and they will certainly work to resolve disputes more quickly under these same conditions.

I begin by testing the congruence hypothesis in bivariate survival models found in Table 4.2. These models estimate the effects of the three different measures of institutional congruence on the length of American dispute involvement.

Table 4.2. Weibull Hazard Models of US Dispute Length and Institutional Congruence, 1943-1992[a]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)
Unified Gov't	0.993(0.319)***		
Presidential Support		0.026(0.011)***	
Congress Unified Against President			-0.774(0.315)***
α	3.40(0.224)***	1.832(0.775)**	4.122(0.225)***
N	182	171	182
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	8.73***	54.48***	4.99**
p[b]	0.451	0.440	0.446
σ	2.22***	2.27***	2.24***

[a] Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the length in days of militarized interstate disputes involving the United States. Standard errors are in parentheses. Since hypotheses are directional, significance tests are one-tailed; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01.

[b] The parameter p (which is equal to $1/\sigma$) represents the shape of the hazard function. Values of p less than one indicate the function declines over time; the likelihood an observation (US dispute) will experience the hazard (end the dispute) decreases over time.

All the models in Table 4.2 confirm the hypothesized relationships between preference congruence and dispute length. The dummy variable representing unified

government is associated with longer interstate disputes (Model 1). Model 2 illustrates the relationship between congruence and dispute length using the measure of presidential support. Higher levels of Congressional support for the president lead to longer disputes on average. Model 3 reports a similar relationship between a hostile Congress and dispute length. The coefficient indicates that when Congress is unified against the party of the President, disputes tend to be shorter. These three different specifications using three different indicators of institutional congruence all provide support for the hypothesis that the expectation of Congressional support facilitates the President's ability to pursue dispute issues. On the other hand, the expectation of Congressional obstinance, opposition, and discord leads Presidents to seek to end disputes more quickly.

These results confirm a simple relationship between measures of institutional agreement and conflict duration, but without control variables, conclusions should be avoided. It is also worth noting that the parameter p is less than one, indicating that the hazard rate declines over time or as disputes endure. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, the likelihood a dispute will end decreases with each additional time period it lasts. In other words, as the dispute endures, it becomes less likely that it will end. The curve in Figure 4.1 declines as the duration of the dispute (measured in days) increases on the x–axis, indicating that the hazard rate, the likelihood a dispute will terminate, declines also. This is consistent with findings reporting negative duration dependence in wars (Bennett & Stam 1996, Vuchinich & Teachman 1993) and in militarized disputes. As Vuchinich & Teachman (1993, 549) suggest regarding war



Figure 4.1. Hazard Function, US Disputes 1943-1992

length, perhaps militarized disputes become entrenched and "resistant to resolution." That is, states stockpile resources prior to military engagements (disputes or wars) such that the costs of continuing the dispute once it has begun have already been borne. They assert that the apparent utility of continuing conflict increases once the conflict is in progress. This entrenchment process makes the likelihood a war (or in this case, a dispute) will end decline over time.

Table 4.3 presents more complete specifications of duration models, where I control for the effects described above. Models 4, 5 and 6 are fully specified duration models, Model 4 using the unified government dummy variable, Model 5 using the hostile Congress variable, and Model 6 specifying the Congressional support for the

President variable. As hypothesized, unified government is associated with longer disputes than is divided government. When Congress and the President are controlled by the same party, their preferences regarding policy in general and foreign policy in particular are congruent.

Table 4.3. Weibull Hazard Models of US Dispute Length and Institutional Congruence with Controls, 1943-1992[a]

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)
Unified Gov't	1.11(0.273)***		
Congress Unified Against President		-0.673(0.282)***	
Presidential Support			0.041(0.011)***
Relative Capabilities	0.021(0.815)	-0.346(0.837)	0.331(0.925)
Contiguity	-1.053(0.335)***	-1.112(0.345)***	-0.933(0.362)***
Reciprocated	1.885(0.309)***	1.799(0.325)***	2.067(0.319)***
Multilateral	1.016(0.307)***	1.013(0.327)***	0.941(0.318)***
α	1.993(0.765)**	3.07(0.741)***	-0.961(1.329)
N	178	178	167
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	92.72***	82.13***	85.83***
p[b]	0.577	0.559	0.569
σ	1.73(0.099)***	1.79(0.102)***	1.76(0.103)***

[a] Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the length in days of militarized interstate disputes involving the United States. Standard errors are in parentheses. Since hypotheses are directional, significance tests are one-tailed; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01.

[b] The parameter p (which is equal to $1/\sigma$) represents the shape of the hazard function. Values of p less than one indicate the function declines over time; the likelihood an observation (US dispute) will experience the hazard (end the dispute) decreases over time.

Disputes occurring under such conditions are carried on with greater resolve as a result of this institutional unity. Further, if leaders generate domestic audience costs in order to send signals to opponents, internal unity should reinforce those audience costs and the signal of resolve. This unity makes it easier for the President to press US interests more forcefully and for longer periods.

Providing further support for the congruence hypothesis, the coefficient for the variable indicating that Congress is unified against the President is statistically significant in the presence of a host of control variables (Model 5). Similarly, in Model 6, Congressional support for the President's program is positively associated with US dispute length. All three specifications of the congruence hypothesis find support in these models, leading to the conclusion that attention to the relationships between political institutions is crucial to understanding US conflict behavior.[21]

Of the control variables, three present themselves as important determinants of US dispute length, though none manage to diminish the effects of the congruence indicators. First, disputes with contiguous states tend to be shorter than those with more distant foes; the contiguity coefficient is negative and significant. Since fewer than one-quarter of US disputes between 1943 and 1992 are with US neighbors,

[21]I have also examined models controlling for a variety of other factors that may confound or diminish the results reported here. I have controlled for Presidential approval and found no effect, while the results remain unchanged. Additionally, I have excluded Vietnam since such a long dispute may serve to drive the findings, especially since a substantial portion of the war occurred during unified government: again, the results are robust. I have excluded disputes that last longer than two standard deviations above the mean dispute length; the results persist. I have included a variable indicating whether the US was an initiator or a target of the dispute, and again, no changes occur in the findings. Finally, I have controlled for the period after 1973 since it is plausible that the US would not remain in disputes as long after the passage of the War Powers Act as it might have prior to the act's passage. Once more, all of the results remain unchanged.

it is important to have controlled for this effect. Second, disputes in which both sides take military action are longer than disputes where only one side does so. The reciprocation coefficient is positive and significant. Also as expected, disputes involving multiple states are significantly longer than are bilateral disputes. The multilateral coefficient is also positive and significant. That the findings hold across specifications encourages the assertion that the relationship between institutional congruence and dispute duration is robust.

Interpreting coefficients in these hazard models is not quite as straightforward as it is in regression analysis. Since these models are nonlinear, the marginal effect of one variable depends upon the levels of the other variables. Thus, it is necessary to compute marginal effects for each variable while holding other variables constant. In the Weibull specification, this is achieved by computing

$$E[t|x_i] = e^{(\beta' x_i)} * \Gamma(1/p + 1) \tag{4.2}$$

which produces the expected length of a dispute when the variables are set at certain levels. Computing these expected durations for x_i at two different values allows us to evaluate the effect of a change in x_i on dispute length. For instance, in Figure 4.2, I calculate marginal effects for Models 4 and 5. For Model 4, I evaluate the effect of a change from divided government (the variable is equal to zero) to unified government (the variable equals one) on dispute length. Additionally, I allow the surrounding conditions to change so that we can evaluate the effects of different levels of congruence in different types of disputes.

For Model 4, I compute the marginal effects of unified government under the following conditions:

a. not reciprocated, bilateral, noncontiguous (0,0,0)

b. not reciprocated, multilateral, noncontiguous (0,1,0)

c. not reciprocated, multilateral, contiguous (0,1,1)

d. reciprocated, multilateral, contiguous (1,1,1)

In case [a] (the first entry in Figure 4.2) we can see that the US, under unified government will remain in nonreciprocated, bilateral disputes with noncontiguous opponents more than 23 days longer than it would under divided government. In other words, a dispute of this type (and these three conditions are all the modal conditions) is likely to be substantially longer when institutions in the US share congruent policy preferences. The cross-institutional pressure that divided control might exert to end the dispute is relaxed sufficiently enough to allow the dispute to endure in a manner that is less likely under divided government. The effect of unified government on dispute length is even more pronounced when the dispute is not reciprocated, is *multilateral* and with a noncontiguous state (case [b]). In this case, disputes under unified government last about 64 days longer than they would under divided government. Finally, in case [d], the US under unified control remains in disputes more than 147 days longer than it would under divided control.

It is worth noting the magnitudes of these effects. Many disputes in the period under examination are quite short; 26 percent of these disputes last only 1 day,

Model	Change		Change in duration (days)
	from	*to*	
MODEL 4	*Divided gov't*	*Unified gov't*	
unified government *(not reciprocated, bilateral, noncontiguous; 0,0,0)*	0	1	+23.3
unified government *(not reciprocated, multilateral, noncontiguous; 0,1,0)*	0	1	+64.3
unified government *(not reciprocated, multilateral, contiguous; 0,1,1)*	0	1	+22.4
unified government *(reciprocated and multilateral and contiguous; 1,1,1)*	0	1	+147.7
MODEL 5	*Not against President*	*Unified against President*	
Congress unified *(not reciprocated, bilateral, noncontiguous; 0,0,0)*	0	1	-13.1
Congress unified *(not reciprocated, multilateral, noncontiguous; 0,1,0)*	0	1	-36.1
Congress unified *(not reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous; 0,0,1)*	0	1	-4.3
Congress unified *(reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous; 1,0,1)*	0	1	-26.1
Congress unified *(reciprocated and multilateral, and contiguous; 1,1,1)*	0	1	-71.7

Note: Marginal effects are computed, holding all but the variable of interest at their means, by $\exp^{(\beta' x)} * \Gamma(1/p+1)$ (Greene 1997). *Effects are only reported for significant coefficients, but all variables must be held constant at their means.*

Figure 4.2. Marginal Effects of Changes in Variables on US Dispute Length

whereas a cumulative 37 percent last 5 days or fewer. In other words, this effect can increase the length of a given dispute by a very substantial percentage. Insofar as

dispute length is associated with the costs borne by the participants, these increases in length may prove costly in one manner or another.

Finally, I compute the same types of effect for Model 5 under the following conditions:

a. not reciprocated, bilateral, noncontiguous (0,0,0)

b. not reciprocated, multilateral, noncontiguous (0,1,0)

c. not reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous (0,0,1)

d. reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous (1,0,1)

e. reciprocated and multilateral, and contiguous (1,1,1)

Here, I examine the effects of a unified, hostile Congress on dispute length. Recall that this coefficient is negative, so the effect of facing a hostile Congress should be that disputes are generally shorter. We can see that the effects range from -4 to -71. In case [a], US disputes under this especially divisive form of divided government are nearly 13 days shorter than they would be under other forms of institutional congruence. In case [d] this form of incongruence between Congress and the White House would diminish dispute length by over 71 days. In other words, if a dispute with these characteristics were to occur during a time when the President *is not faced by an opposing Congress*, we could expect the dispute to last 71 days longer than it will under a hostile Congress.

Figure 4.3 provides a graphical representation of how Congressional support for the President influences dispute length for different types of disputes. Consistent

with the dramatic effects of unified government on multilateral, reciprocated disputes with contiguous states, the uppermost line in the figure indicates the Congressional support lengthens disputes substantially as well. Perhaps the most striking thing



Figure 4.3. Effects of Support for the President on US Dispute Length

about Figure 4.3 is the clear differential effect of congressional support on dispute length depending on (1) the level of congressional support, and (2) on the type of dispute in question. In the first case, none of the relationships between support and dispute longevity are linear; the effect of support on dispute length changes over time. In the second case, the different slopes of these curves indicate that congressional

support has stronger effects on reciprocated disputes, disputes that are reciprocated and multilateral, and on those that are also contiguous. As the uppermost curve in Figure 4.3 indicates, increases in institutional congruence dramatically increase the likelihood multilateral, reciprocated disputes with contiguous states will last. Moreover, congruence increases the rate at which these dispute become likely to last longer periods of time. The differential effects of congruence across different types of disputes emphasizes the important contextual nature of changes in institutional agreement. Congruence itself does not cause either conflict or peace, nor does it cause short or long disputes. However, it very explicitly provides an environment that can exacerbate the effects of other factors that influence dispute length.

4.4.3 Cross-National Analyses

The preceding sections provide convincing evidence that institutional congruence affects American dispute behavior in nontrivial ways. However, the extent to which the effect of congruence is generalizable to democratic states as a whole remains unanswered. The theoretical derivation of congruence suggests rather clearly that any democratic state in which multiple political institutions share foreign policy decision making authority should experience changes in policy over time as institutional congruence changes. This section provides an empirical test of the generalizability of institutional congruence by examining how congruence influences the likelihood of dispute involvement and dispute duration in the pool of 16 democratic states described previously. The measures of congruence indicated above are specifically

suited to the parliamentary structure of these democracies, but still very much capture the essence of the theoretical concept of congruence.

Table 4.4 reports probit models examining the independent effects of a majority in parliament, and of parliamentary majority size on conflict propensity.

Table 4.4. Cross-National Estimates of the Effect of Institutional Congruence on the Probability of Conflict, 1943-1992[a]

	Model 1		Model 2	
	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	Effects[b]	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	Effects[b]
Majority	0.296 (0.057)***	+2.1%		
Majority size			0.001 (0.0004)***	+0.5%
Constant	-2.01 (0.038)***		-1.88 (0.028)***	
n	8076		8076	
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	26.83***		7.69***	
$P[Y = 1]$		2.2%		2.9%

[a] Coefficients are probit estimates; standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is dichotomous indicating the occurrence of a Militarized Interstate Dispute. Sample includes 16 countries, monthly observations.

[b] Marginal effects are computed as the change in predicted probability given a one standard deviation change in the variable of interest, other variables held constant at their means. In the case of dichotomous independent variables, the effect reflects the change in that variable from 0 to 1 (modal to nonmodal value), others held constant. See Appendix B for data description. *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01, one-tailed tests.

Consistent with the hypotheses above, the presence of a majority increases the likelihood of militarized conflict in the sample. Similarly, larger majorities enable more decisive executive action and make the use of military force a viable policy alternative for prime ministers. While large majorities indicate that partisan opposition will be relatively weak, small majorities indicate that policy preferences

will be bifurcated in debilitating ways. Recall that the variable measuring the size of the majority can be negative if no majority party exists; its value then indicates how many seats shy of gaining a majority the largest party is. Executives are largely hobbled under these weak majority or coalitional conditions such that motivating military action is more difficult given the institutional division and opposition at home.

In probit analysis, the substantive effects of variables are computed by

$$\phi[\sum(\beta' X + x_i\sigma)] - \phi[\sum(\beta' X)] \tag{4.3}$$

which effectively compares the probability of conflict when all independent variables are at their means or modes (the baseline probability) with the probability of conflict when one independent variable of interest varies by one standard deviation (or to its nonmodal value). Table 4.4 reports the effects of these changes on the likelihood of conflict in the columns labeled *effects*. The presence of a majority in parliament increases the likelihood of militarized conflict in any given month by 2.1% over the baseline probability of conflict. Similarly, an increase in the size of the majority by one standard deviation increases the likelihood of conflict by half of one percent. While these effects appear substantively small, notice that the baseline probabilities are themselves quite small, indicating that conflict is rare in any case, but becomes more than twice as likely under majority government.

The effect of institutional congruence, regardless of the indicator, seems as important in determining conflict behavior for this sample of democratic states as

it does for the United States. Not only does this suggest the generalizability of institutional congruence as a conceptual tool with which to understand decisions to resort to arms, but it also confirms the importance of acknowledging the manner in which normal political change within the structure of the state influences policy making.

However, the hypotheses regarding congruence also suggest that institutional agreement or disagreement will influence dispute length. In the American case, the effect of congruence on how long the US endures disputes is fairly dramatic. Table 4.5 examines the effects of a majority and of the size of the majority on dispute length for the pool of democracies, controlling for the same factors expected to influence the endurance of American disputes. It is apparent at first glance that congruence influences dispute length in the cross-national context in precisely the same manner as it does in the US case. However, while the dichotomous indicator of a majority is statistically significant without question, the continuous indicator is only marginally so.[22] Generally speaking, states that enter disputes remain in those disputes longer under majority governments than they do otherwise. Similarly, states whose parliaments have larger majorities endure disputes longer than do those with smaller majorities or with plurality parties. Institutional incongruence serves to constrain executives as they determine (continuously) whether or not to continue their dispute involvement.

[22]Cross-national models only including the indicators of congruence produce results nearly identical to the estimates in Table 4.5. The *majority* variable is positive and significant, while *majority size* is positive, but only marginally significant.

Table 4.5. Cross-National Hazard Models of Dispute Length and Institutional Congruence with Controls, 1943-1992[a]

	Model 4	Model 5
	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)	$\widehat{\beta}$(S.E.)
Majority	0.448(0.246)**	
Majority Size		0.002(0.0014)*
Relative Capabilities	-0.886(0.785)	-0.998(0.792)
Contiguity	-0.084(0.299)	-0.079(0.303)
Reciprocated	2.38(0.278)***	2.36(0.282)***
Multilateral	0.789(0.300)***	0.827(0.306)***
α	2.87(0.663)***	3.19(0.645)***
N	234	234
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	109.46***	107.62***
p[b]	0.533	0.530
σ	1.87(0.092)***	1.89(0.093)***

[a] Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the length in days of militarized interstate disputes involving 16 democracies (see Appendix B). Standard errors are in parentheses. Since hypotheses are directional, significance tests are one-tailed; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01.

[b] The parameter p (which is equal to $1/\sigma$) represents the shape of the hazard function. Values of p less than one indicate the function declines over time; the likelihood an observation (US dispute) will experience the hazard (end the dispute) decreases over time.

Factionalism and the rancor that comes with it not only make it less attractive for an executive to get involved in military conflict in the first place, but make it considerably more difficult for an executive to remain in conflict.

Not only does institutional congruence seem to influence dispute length in this sample, but it does so in the presence of the control variables. Much like the analysis

of American disputes, it appears that multilateral disputes last longer than bilateral ones, and reciprocated disputes outlast one-sided episodes of conflict.

Again, the extent of the impact congruence has on dispute length depends on the levels of the other independent variables and on the shape of the hazard function. The cross-national modal case is where there is not a parliamentary majority, the dispute is not reciprocated, it is bilateral and it is not among contiguous states. In this case, the dispute lasts nearly 16 days (15.8 days). However, this same hypothetical dispute *under a parliamentary majority* lasts nearly 25 days (24.8 days) or almost 9 days longer.[23] Institutional congruence substantively increases the lengths of militarized disputes. This is especially so given that 48.5% of the disputes in which these 16 states engage last 9 days or fewer. Finally, the effect of institutional congruence on dispute length will vary depending on the type of dispute. Having already considered the modal case above, consider the following types of disputes:

a. not reciprocated, multilateral, noncontiguous (0,1,0)

b. not reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous (0,0,1)

c. reciprocated, bilateral, contiguous (1,0,1)

d. reciprocated and multilateral, and contiguous (1,1,1)

A dispute like case [a] would, according to the model in Table 4.5, last 35 days in the absence of a majority; it would last 55 days under majority government, 20 days longer. Likewise, a dispute like case [b] where the dispute is between contiguous states

[23]Though this is a hypothetical case, it does represent real disputes since these are all the modal conditions.

would last 8 days longer when institutional preferences are congruent than it would otherwise. Case [c] produces a dispute that is reciprocated and between contiguous states; when a majority government exists, the dispute will last 89 days longer on average than it would have otherwise. This dramatic effect illustrates not only that congruence substantially influences how disputes are conducted by executives, but also that reciprocal belligerent behavior is likely to lengthen disputes a great deal. Finally, when disputes are reciprocated, between contiguous states and involve more than two participants (case [d]), a state with a majority government will endure the dispute 196 days longer than would that same state under incongruent institutional control.

Figure 4.4 illustrates these effects across values of the size of the majority party. Characteristics of the disputes like the number of states involved or whether hostilities are reciprocated have two effects. First, these characteristics make disputes likely to last longer from the outset as the different intercept points on the y axis suggest. More importantly, however, they exacerbate the effects of majority size. The slopes indicating the effect of majority size on dispute length increase suggesting that characteristics of the dispute itself influence how severely congruence affects the resolution of the dispute. For example, in the modal category where the dispute is bilateral, not reciprocated and with a noncontiguous state, the effect of congruence on dispute length is not especially pronounced, though majority size does have a substantively important effect on dispute length. However, when the dispute is multilateral and reciprocated, the slope is substantially positive and the level of



Figure 4.4. Effects of Majority Size on Dispute Length

the curve ranges from just over 450 days at the $y-intercept$ to about 900 days when one party has a majority of 100 members of parliament. A long dispute doubles in length, becoming an exceptionally long dispute.

4.5 Conclusions

It seems clear in the case of the United States that the degree of unity or congruence between domestic political institutions matters to the conduct of at least one important portion of foreign policy; the resort to arms. When the preferences of US policy-making institutions are congruent, disputes are more likely to occur,

and they are likely to endure substantially longer than they generally would when US government is divided. Perhaps more striking, however, is the extent to which institutional congruence exhibits similar effects in a much broader cross-section of democratic states.

While scholars in American politics have generally recognized the merits of unified government such as its efficiency, the more effective policies that result, the apparent effect of that unity on US military dispute behavior has gone unnoticed. Students of American politics, politicians and voters alike often bemoan the inefficiencies and gridlock that beset divided government. In fact, the deleterious effects of divided government have not only prompted proposals such as that offered by Senator Fulbright in 1946, but have spawned efforts to amend the Constitution to address the problem, and have led to persistent calls for cooperation between the parties. No doubt, divided government has made the American democratic system of compromise more difficult to manage.

Yet few have considered the restraining effects of divided government. Division between political institutions may breed inefficiency and leave the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue able only to agree to disagree. The same appears to be true in parliamentary systems as well, where the ability of an executive to exercise foreign policy authority may be restrained by ardent opposition in the parliament at-large. The inability to compromise, the suspicion that seems to accompany incongruent preferences between groups that both require reelection, may serve to limit the foreign policy options an executive can realistically exercise. At the very least, institutional

incongruence may matter to foreign policy decision-making "at the margins." More extreme policy options might be rejected much more readily in the face of institutional opposition. The result is less involvement in international conflict, and, where states do enter conflict, shorter episodes of it. Normatively, insofar as shorter disputes are better than longer ones (as they are likely to be associated with lower costs, fatalities, etc. (Bueno de Mesquita 1978)), institutional incongruence may provide a condition favorable to peace.

This finding has important theoretical implications as well, especially insofar as international relations research either ignores variation among democratic polities altogether or as it relies on static identifiers of regime type. While regime change is relatively rare especially among democratic states, normal political change, turnover in the personnel of government, and change in the relationships between political institutions is frequent. The decision making mechanism in a state may itself remain the same for decades, though how efficiently that mechanism operates may depend upon the policy preferences of those in control of political institutions. Change in control of political institutions and in institutional congruence is likely to be frequent and to have a substantial effect on the character of foreign policy decisions. As a result, regarding domestic political *structure* as a determinant of foreign policy may allow us to distinguish broadly between democratic and autocratic states. However, such an approach does not allow us to discern different types of foreign policy behavior in a single state over time. Attention to institutional congruence allows such a distinction.

Perhaps the most interesting implication of these analyses is based on the finding that incongruence appears to restrain conflict propensity and to reduce a leader's willingness to remain in ongoing disputes. If leaders are unable or unwilling to resort to arms because of the institutional opposition they face at home, they are very likely resorting to other types of foreign policy that are less likely to provoke institutional conflict and public policy battles that are likely to injure them in the polls. In other words, the fact that institutional arrangements appear rather convincingly to restrain executive tendencies to use the military strongly suggests that executives substitute other policies when the use of force is too costly on the domestic front. Moreover, as chapter 5 will argue, leaders will respond to institutional opposition by substituting policies that are not only less likely to instigate institutional conflict, but policies that are specifically directed toward the needs of constituents. The policies leaders will employ in order to overcome domestic political threats and institutional opposition are aimed explicitly at the distribution of private goods to constituents who can help those leaders retain office.

CHAPTER 5

CONGRUENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTITUTION

The empirical analyses in the preceding chapter provide substantial and robust evidence that institutional constraints in democratic states vary substantially across time. In the American case, the dichotomy of divided and unified control of the two primary institutions of the federal government substantively influence foreign policy decision making. Likewise, foreign policy decisions in other industrialized democratic states are significantly influenced by institutional congruence, a characteristic that varies dramatically across time. Perhaps the most important conclusion suggested by the results of chapter 4 is that exclusive empirical attention to the macro–institutional characteristics of states ignores important and influential institutional variation that affects the decision making environment.

However, as the findings in the last chapter imply, empirical attention to institutional temporal variation is only half of the story. The restraining effect of institutional incongruence makes foreign policy substitution imperative for executives who find the use of military force too costly. The theoretical importance of congruence as a concept is not simply that congruence enables extreme foreign policy decisions

including the use of force, but that incongruence forces executives to examine other policy alternatives instead of the military option.[1]

As executives, democratic or otherwise, elect to engage in international conflict, they are comparing the utility of conflict to the utility of other specific and interchangeable policy options. Typically, international relations scholars interested in the onset of military conflict examine the effects of independent variables on the binary decision of whether to engage in conflict or not. The "not" category is always the modal category and encompasses foreign policies far more substantively meaningful than "not conflict." Executives making foreign policy decisions are not bound either to choose conflict or to select not to take any action at all. In fact, the "no conflict" category is of theoretical interest since it is comprised of all other possible and potentially useful foreign policies, including the alternative of doing nothing.

In a real sense, the policy alternatives available to an executive at any point in time are not infinite. In fact, those options conceivably could be limited to one. Say, for instance, that the United States suffers a purposeful, direct military attack on its own soil by a foreign power. It seems likely that Presidential discretion regarding the response is virtually nonexistent; he will almost certainly have only the option of resorting to military force in response. Similarly, foreign policy options available to an executive, though rarely limited to one, are often limited by the logic of what tools are appropriate for dealing with particular challenges. Because executives must select

[1]Among these alternative policy options, is the decision to take no action whatsoever.

"the right tool for the job," inadequate or inappropriate policy tools will be discarded from the set of options from which a leader chooses. As a result, we should anticipate that different challenges and problems may well lead executives to consider partially or entirely different sets of responses, and to select different responses depending on the circumstances. In other words, and very directly to the point, we *should not* expect executives to respond to any and all domestic turmoil with the use of military force abroad.[2]

However, both the scholastic and the public mind have been captured to some extent in recent years by the urban legend of diversionary war. Hollywood and academia have examined the incentive for an American president to employ military might in order to divert public attention from intractable domestic problems or from career–threatening scandals. Generally speaking, Hollywood concludes that diversionary behavior is commonplace and cynically employed, while political scientists withhold judgment as the literature of mixed findings expands.

One of the potential shortcomings of the diversionary argument in general is its tendency to equate domestic turmoil with political desperation, to link that desperation with military force, and then to attribute the motive of political diversion to the leader who simultaneously suffers domestically and fights abroad. Not least among the assumptions implicit in this logic is the implication that domestically troubled leaders have so few useful tools that they often turn to the military option.

[2]It may be the case that we should not expect executives to resort to arms in response to any form of domestic turmoil under any circumstances. Rather, it may be that certain domestic conditions simply make it easier for an executive to justify the use of force abroad, whereas other domestic conditions may make the use of force less tenable and less attractive.

This approach tends to ignore other policy tools leaders have available that may be more easily directed at consoling the electorate and that may be considerably less risky and more likely to succeed than is the use of force. More generally, attention to the use of force as a tool of foreign policy to the exclusion of other foreign policy tools allows us to know very little about foreign policy behavior that does not involve the military. The failure to distinguish among important categories of the theoretical dependent variable may produce findings that are simply results of underspecification of the choices available to decision makers.

The ability and incentive for political leaders to *substitute* foreign policy options depending upon the conditions and stimuli they face at any given time is especially important to researchers examining linkages between domestic and international politics. This chapter seeks to explicate the logic of foreign policy choice, specifically making the argument that if executives have foreign policy alternatives, they will select the policies best suited to address the foreign and domestic problems they face. Moreover, as the last chapter suggests, institutional incongruence may force leaders to engage in policy substitution by making the military option so costly as to be virtually intractable. Based on the logical foundation Most & Starr (1989) provide regarding the possibility of foreign policy substitution, and based more specifically on the discussion in Chapter 3, I argue that executives seeking to address domestic turmoil and electoral threat through foreign policy will pursue policies relevant to domestic audiences. Specifically, leaders will address concerns related to private goods with policies designed to distribute private goods. Further, leaders' foreign

policy choices are directly affected by the extent to which other political actors constrain their decisions. This chapter explores the logic of foreign policy choice and substitution, and institutional constraint, and tests several hypotheses regarding the choice between military and economic conflict. Though the empirical analyses are limited to the American case, the theory is general so that the relationships should hold in cross-national analyses to be conducted in future work.

5.1 A Theoretical Argument for Policy Substitution

Implicit in the democratic peace literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is the presumption that democratic leaders are differently constrained than are their autocratic counterparts. Whether their heavier bonds originate in structural organization or in cultural norms, democratic leaders find themselves unable to fight one another. As a result, a democratic leader has one less alternative when he faces a democratic opponent than when he faces an autocratic state. Clearly, the democratic leader still retains his authority to employ the military, but she is constrained from doing so, presumably because she fears the costs of going to war with another democracy will be unbearable. Going to war is effectively removed from the set of alternatives to which she can resort.

Proponents of the democratic peace suggest that democratic leaders are restrained from fighting each other by the cultural norms of democracy or by the structure of democratic political institutions. Institutional congruence, a concept that accounts implicitly for normative and structural concerns, appears rather convincingly either

to enable or to constrain democratic executives as they decide whether or not to use force. The combination of democratic peace theory and the theoretical and empirical effects of congruence/incongruence strongly suggest that leaders sometimes have freer access to the military policy option than they do at other times. When democratic leaders are constrained so that military action is untenable, it is entirely difficult to believe that those leaders lapse into periods of inactivity and take no foreign policy action whatsoever. Rather, it seems logically apparent that those leaders will choose other policy paths to follow.

Though it is broadly recognized that leaders are likely to substitute policies depending on their particular political needs or on the extent to which they are constrained, few researchers actually suggest theoretical expectations regarding substitution or model substitution empirically. Most & Starr (1989) explicitly argue that scholars who ignore the possibility of substitution are in danger of drawing incorrect conclusions. In fact, implicit in their argument and in that of section 3.3 is that failure to account theoretically or empirically for the complementary parts y_i of a concept Y can result easily in Type II errors. A researcher trying to explain y_1 may find no empirical explanation and reject the theory he is testing via the hypothesis that x causes y_1. In fact, it may be the case that x is strongly correlated with y_2, a complement to y_1. The complementary relationship between y_1 and y_2 may serve to obscure the broader relationship between x and Y. On the other hand, he may conclude that x is unrelated to Y because no relationship exists between x and y_1.

Only by accounting for the complementary parts of Y can he possibly arrive at the correct conclusion.

Specific empirical analyses sometimes do account for the possibility of policy substitution, though the applications are often quite narrow and often do not really test substitution hypotheses. For example, Bates, Brock & Tiefenthaler (1991) argue that leaders who want to pursue open trade policies are often prevented from doing so because open trade is likely to cause domestic economic displacement for which they will be punished politically. In order to limit their own political vulnerability, leaders expand the welfare state so that social insurance safety nets protect the population from the economic vicissitudes that result from free trade. Doing so is a form of policy substitution where the expansion of social insurance and the implementation of free trade regimes are complementary policies pursued simultaneously.[3] Clark & Hart (1999) make a similar argument regarding how freely a leader can employ military force as a tool of foreign policy. In their research, social insurance levels and military policy are complementary; the implementation of one policy influences how and when the other can be implemented. None of these authors explicitly model substitution, but their theoretical motivations are grounded in the expectation that leaders use multiple types of policies in order to achieve single goals. More notable, both argue that leaders link domestic economic policies that explicitly distribute private goods with achieving foreign policy goals. Though these empirical designs do not expect or test substitution of one policy for another, both provide evidence that

[3]Also see Quinones & Gates (1995).

leaders employ domestic policies in order to create political environments in which they can pursue foreign policies that might otherwise be politically impossible.

Other research is less circumspect regarding just how policies are substituted for one another. Enterline & Gleditsch (1998), for instance, explicitly model the manner in which political leaders facing domestic turmoil choose between internal repression and externalization, between domestic police action and international conflict. Morgan and Palmer (1997, 1998) specify and test a formal model that examines the trade–offs between two types of goods as leaders substitute policies as they seek to maximize state security. Diehl (1994) models the choices states make between arms acquisitions and alliance formation as they seek security, asking in particular whether the choice is an "either or" question or if arming and allying are complementary policies that a state might pursue simultaneously. Yet, no consensus exists regarding how substitution might be modeled adequately, empirical findings often provide little evidence of substitution (e.g. Enterline & Gleditsch 1998, Diehl 1994), and formal models of substitution are often of limited scope (e.g. McGinnis 1990). Many researchers, however, at least discuss the empirical plausibility of substitution, sometimes as if it were empirically demonstrable (e.g. Levy 1987, Goldstein & Freeman 1991, Morgan & Bickers 1992).

In their seminal work, Most and Starr describe two potential problems with much contemporary empirical research in international relations. First, one causal factor may result in different outcomes at different times. In other words, actors may, at different times, take different actions in response to similar stimuli. Second, different

causal factors may cause a single outcome. It is their first complaint that suggests the possibility of policy substitution, that leaders might select policy y_1 in response to x, but that they might select policy y_2 in response to x at a different time. Not only might leaders select different policies in response to similar stimuli, but they may consistently select a *type* of policy to respond to a *type* of stimulus. For instance, one might hypothesize that Americans typically respond to flying objects like baseballs by swatting them with bats. However, such a hypothesis would find it troubling that Americans typically respond to house flies with fly swatters, to hot air balloons by waving, and to UFOs with video cameras rather than by brandishing baseball bats; the same general phenomenon (flying objects) evokes different responses.[4] However, it is the particular nature of the flying object that makes it amenable to hitting with a bat. Some flying objects ought not to be hit. Among those that should be swatted, some ought to be hit with bats, others with fly swatters, etc. One must choose the right tool for the job.

Specifying expectations about states' international behavior is not altogether different in the sense that general phenomena like domestic issues probably instigate state action in the international system. Yet, to expect that all domestic issues generate the same types of international actions is at least as näive as expecting bat swinging to be the standard response to any and all flying objects. Most and Starr's expectation that leaders are likely to substitute policies for one another is not simply that leaders randomly or weakly–deterministically choose y_1 now and

[4]Similarly, such a hypothesis might be confounded by those Americans who use baseball bats for activities other than hitting baseballs (committing violent crimes, home protection).

y_2 later. Rather, they anticipate that leaders have substantial logical motivations to pursue different responses at different times to what are apparently the same stimuli. Researchers are left the task of identifying heterogeneity in the domestic threats leaders face and heterogeneity in the logical actions those leaders might take in response.

If leaders face different kinds of domestic threats that call for different policy actions, then it is inadequate on its face to hypothesize that domestic threats, X cause either (1) a particular foreign policy response, y_1, or (2) foreign policy responses, Y. In the first case, "$X \rightarrow y_1$" ignores the possibility that "$X \rightarrow y_2$" or any other manifestation of Y, increasing the likelihood of negative findings and Type II errors. The second case, expecting that domestic threats, X cause foreign policy responses in general fails to recognize either (1) that foreign policy action may be instigated by other stimuli as well, or (2) that domestic threats, X may sometimes lead to foreign policy action, sometimes to domestic policy action. Both X and Y are entirely too broad to expect a direct and clear empirical relationship between the two. Moreover, it is unlikely that such a general hypothesis as "X causes Y" derives from any useful theory. Rather, a theory of international relations may anticipate on the basis of its assumptions that international behavior is partially derived from domestic sources. The suggestion that domestic and international politics are linked does not indicate the nature of the linkage, nor does it absolve researchers from the responsibility of trying to identify the particular character of that linkage. Instead, it becomes

incumbent upon researchers to derive logical expectations regarding *when* and *how* domestic factors influence international state behavior.

The theory described in the preceding chapters assumes that domestic political institutions are fundamentally important to state behavior because they aggregate preferences into single policy actions. Such an assumption implies that the character of political institutions and *how* they aggregate preferences into policies is important to the nature of policy decisions and thus, to state behavior. *Institutional congruence* provides a conceptual way to think about the character of institutions, their interactions, and how efficiently they are likely to arrive at policies. The empirical relevance of institutional congruence to decisions regarding international conflict rather strongly suggest that different institutional arrangements result in different types of conflict behavior, and that leaders under institutional scrutiny are probably employing other types of policy either instead of or in addition to the use of force. These theoretical expectations and empirical findings suggest *when* and *how* domestic factors affect foreign policy decision making. Further, they suggest that as leaders select policies, they do so with regard to the domestic institutional environment and with regard to the utility of various policy tools for dealing with particular domestic challenges. As a result, policy choice, the decision to employ foreign policy y_1, y_2, neither y_1 nor y_2, or to employ both in a complementary fashion should be driven by the nature of institutional constraint and by the extent to which y_1 or y_2 individually or collectively serve the needs of the leader.

What remains to be specified are what domestic conditions or threats should lead to particular types of foreign policy. The next section addresses the nature of foreign policy choice, focusing on what tools are available to leaders and on what tools are appropriate for dealing with particular domestic problems. It especially examines the utility of the use of force in light of the public–private goods analogy described in Chapter 3, and suggests an alternative foreign policy choice to which leaders might more reasonably resort.

5.2 Determinants of Foreign Policy Selection

Writing on arms races, McGinnis (1991, 459) argues that any variety of indicators including military expenditures, arms transfers, or levels of hostility "are properly interpreted not as separate explanatory factors but instead as different manifestations of the same underlying process of political competition operating within and between rival states." This illustrates the importance of distinguishing between theoretical concepts and their empirical manifestations, since a single concept may appear in a variety of empirical forms. In other words, leaders may at different times pursue entirely different policy strategies in response to a single problem. This is the essence of foreign policy substitution. However, remaining unexplained is why or how leaders select from an arsenal of foreign policy options and select the alternatives they do.

Like the selection of any type of policy, foreign policy selection depends to a large extent on two related factors. First, the policy options from which leaders can choose at any given point in time are determined in part by institutional

constraints. Though many policy alternatives will be routinely available to a leader, some high–profile or controversial policies may be difficult or impossible to take under particular institutional conditions that constrain policy choice. Second, leaders must choose the policies most suitable to the task at hand; they must select the correct and appropriate tool with which to address whatever political problems they face. Often, this choice is related to the extent to which a policy can mollify a constituency important to the leader's office retention. This section examines these two determinants of foreign policy choice in some detail, focusing explicitly on the decision to use military force rather than selecting alternative policies in response to domestic political trouble.

5.2.1 Institutional Environment and Foreign Policy Options

Foreign policy substitution, though based logically in the notion that leaders select policy alternatives most likely to succeed, depends also on the availability of a policy option at a point in time. Theoretically, a leader always has n policy options from which to choose; the probability she will select any one of those options, however, depends upon its utility given her contemporary political needs. The extent to which any policy option is useful at any given moment depends in turn on the challenges facing a leader and on the constraints that leader suffers as she makes policy. A leader facing economic decline would probably not find a new conscription law terribly useful in dealing with rising inflation. At the same time, a leader encumbered by an

opposition legislature may find the policies he can actually implement limited by the willingness of that legislature to support his actions.

For example, Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 intending to escalate defense spending and to implement a broad–based tax cut. These two policy goals were useful to Reagan insofar as they appealed to his core constituency and had broader appeal to Americans weary of the economic hardship of the 1970s, and startled by apparent American vulnerability in the international system. The political utility of these policies was substantial. Moreover, Republicans captured the Senate in the 1980 election and made advances in the House. Though the House remained under Democratic control, Democratic unity suffered heavy losses when nearly 100 Democrats signaled they would support Reagan's policy agenda. So not only were Reagan's two major policy initiatives likely to yield large political payoffs, but their implementation was possible because the institutional environment made them tenable. The combination of utility and a conducive institutional environment resulted in tax cuts and large defense budgets, and some would say they played a large role in Reagan's reelection in 1984.

Tax cuts and elevated defense spending are policy initiatives American presidents can always pursue; no rules prohibit their support of measures such as these. However, the political efficacy of these policies varies depending on the particular conditions the country faces and depending on the institutional environment. The same is true regarding the foreign policy arena where, as the preceding chapter suggests, institutional configuration strongly influences the likelihood a state will

enter military conflict. Leaders never actually lack the capability of employing the military, but the utility of the use of force changes depending on the institutional environment. That environment may inhibit high–profile and potentially costly foreign policies like the use of force or it may enable the executive to engage in these actions. When political institutions share incongruent policy preferences, the use of force becomes less attractive to executives because of the potentially high political costs associated with military action; likewise, disputes last shorter periods of time because they are harder to sustain in the face of domestic opposition from the legislative institution. Under incongruence, the utility of the use of force and the utility of the continued use of force diminish. As a result, a leader so constrained that the use of force is significantly more difficult to motivate must search for other policy options that can address whatever contemporary problems he faces. A leader faced with a foreign policy problem like a belligerent opponent may have little alternative but to pursue conflictual foreign policy solutions, but he may undertake that policy more advisedly than he would were institutional preferences congruent. However, when a leader faces problems of a domestic nature, his policy alternatives are numerous and include both domestic and foreign policy options. The institutional environment almost certainly can force a leader to explore less costly and lower–profile policies than the use of force. The negative effect of incongruence on conflict behavior does not suggest that leaders abandon the military option and take no action, but that they substitute other policies that are less vulnerable to institutional sniping yet politically potent.

5.2.2 Who Needs Guns When There's a Butter Shortage?

It seems likely that institutional incongruence may force leaders to employ policies that are less risky than to resort to arms, but exactly what policies a domestically threatened executive might explore remains to be specified. What seems certain is that it makes little theoretical sense to expect that domestic economic decline can be adequately addressed by going to war. Of course, economic distress and war can occur simultaneously, but to suggest a direct causal mechanism between economic trouble and the use of military force ignores the constraints executives face (described above) and the more relevant policy tools executives can employ to address the economic problem and to address the political threat that economic problems often pose.

Policy making, in a general sense, is about the distribution of goods to constituents, depending in large part on the political needs of policy makers.[5] Much policy making distributes public goods like economic security or national defense or common goods like national parks and roads. However, policy makers also have substantial discretion in policy making such that they can direct policies at relatively small groups, effectively distributing private goods or goods similar to private goods. For instance, members of the US congress routinely obtain federal contracts for industries in their districts or appropriate funds for projects in their districts in

[5]Some authors observe that the rational choice assumption that leaders make decisions for self–interested, election–motivated purposes is cynical and not reflective of the good intentions of policy makers (e.g. Parker 1992). However, assuming leaders want to distribute goods to constituents and want to remain in office does not necessarily impugn the character of public servants. Arguably, democratic states elect representatives specifically to provide for the public good, and sometimes to provide private goods for the betterment of the public good. Leaders may be centrally interested in retaining office, but that motivation may be driven by the desire to perform public service, something they would be denied were they to lose office.

order to create jobs and to create some new good in the district (again, roads are a favorite). Other members of congress tolerate these directed distributions because they can make similar demands for their districts. Members typically are perceived as productive and interested in their districts if they manage to provide distributions like these, and so their electoral positions are strengthened.

Executives have similar motivations and have similar distribution tools, though often, their tools involve symbolic action especially where economic issues are concerned. Further, executives usually have substantially larger constituencies to placate, though as Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith (1998b) suggest, executives really are interested in placating members of their minimum winning coalitions rather than trying to placate the entire electorate.[6] Democratic executives, they argue, will prefer to distribute public goods rather than private goods because, in their large winning coalitions, private goods will be divided until each individual portion is diminutive and relatively meaningless. Further, distributing private goods reduces the resources available for other policies, thus establishing an opportunity cost since distributing public goods will be more difficult at a later time. However, their argument assumes that distributing goods to all members of the winning coalition is necessary if leaders are to retain office.

Other researchers, on the other hand, have supposed that leaders target "core" constituents, constituents who are especially important to the maintenance of a

[6]American Presidents have enormous national constituencies. Prime Ministers often are elected from single-member districts, so their electoral fortunes lie in relatively small constituencies. However, their leadership positions in their parties and their parties' majority status are more often the result of national success, so in this sense, their constituencies are much larger.

winning coalition (e.g. Morgan & Bickers 1992). Exactly who these core constituents are is not entirely clear. The ideologues in a leader's coalition, no matter how neglected, are ideologically committed to such an extent that supporting the opposition is far more odious than supporting their own leader even if he is not optimal. Marginal members of the coalition, voters who might vote either way, are potentially susceptible to the power of individual attention and thus to the distribution of private goods. No matter which of these constituent groups is pivotal to a leader's chances to retain office, a leader will recognize that small groups rather than an entire winning coalition are critical to his success, so she should seek to distribute goods targeted specifically at those core groups.

Public goods are by definition nonexcludable, so they cannot be targeted at core constituencies. Private goods, on the other hand, can be targeted at core groups, effectively empowering those groups as recipients of benefits denied to the population at–large. As a result, private goods provide a much more powerful tool than do public goods for leaders as they seek to satisfy constituents in order to retain office. In fact, insofar as leaders can distribute public goods, public goods should be largely ineffective in improving a leader's chances at reelection. Private goods, or policies that approximate private goods are likely to be extremely powerful in motivating constituents to support that leader's political career. As chapter 3 argues, private goods need not necessarily deplete a leader's resources in other policy areas since private goods may be largely (or entirely) symbolic. Symbolic distribution, a leader's efforts on behalf of a core constituency, can be extremely powerful as

they demonstrate the leader's commitment to those particular constituents and his willingness to publicly do battle on their behalf.

On these grounds, political leaders who have domestic problems and need to preserve their elected positions should pursue private–good–like policies, not public–good–like policies. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue, war approximates a public–good–like policy in democratic states.[7] If war is analogous to a public good in states with large winning coalitions, and democratic leaders generally find private–goods–like distributions more advantageous as they seek to retain office, then electorally motivated leaders *should not generally pursue military adventurism as a way to deal with domestic turmoil or domestic political threat.* In fact, democratic leaders should not only pursue private–good–like solutions, but they should seek to employ policy tools that directly address the nature of the domestic problem they face, even if their actions are largely symbolic. An executive facing an economic downturn, for example, should pursue an economic solution. Obviously, in many democratic states, control of the macroeconomic mechanism is largely out of the hands of the executive. However, an executive can propose economic policies in the legislature, can approve projects intended for particular districts, or can even initiate trade action against foreign industries that threaten domestic production and employment. The value of symbolic action cannot be overstated. Most of the

[7]They argue that military endeavors distribute public goods like patriotism and further democratic norms (itself a public good). Moreover, the spoils of war may enhance national security or national wealth, but cannot effectively be divided among the members of the large winning coalition without diluting the portions. Autocrats, on the other hand, can pursue war as a private good insofar as the spoils of war can be divided among the few members of the winning coalition.

examples listed above are likely to have more symbolic value than they are actual impact on the economic condition of the country or even of a small constituency. Yet that symbolic value is critical to an electorally motivated leader intent on retaining a winning coalition.

Considered jointly, institutional incongruence and the relevance of private goods to political success suggest that leaders should not generally engage in diversionary military episodes in response to domestic problems. Rather, leaders should pursue private–goods–like solutions, making economic action far more likely in the face of domestic turmoil, especially during economic downturns. Institutional incongruence makes this substitution of economic policy for military policy even more critical. On the other hand, congruence removes some of the constraint from a leader's decisions, allowing him greater freedom to conduct military and economic policy jointly. The next section proposes hypotheses regarding foreign policy selection, specifically indicating under what conditions leaders should select to engage either in economic or military conflict.

5.3 Examining Substitution Empirically

If leaders are indeed interested in employing policy tools appropriate to help them retain office, it seems logical that those rational leaders will evaluate the sources of domestic discontent and the disposition of political institutions before selecting a policy to pursue. Either the presence of institutional incongruence or of specific economic problems might serve effectively to remove the military option from the

table.[8] In particular, foul economic conditions suggest that constituents are likely to be concerned with economic survival, with private goods issues. This alone may be sufficient to reduce the utility of military action as an electoral tool, but may push a leader, a US president toward some economic action. Macroeconomic recourse available to an American leader, however, is severely limited, so a president must look elsewhere.

International conflict research generally focuses on military conflict, less frequently on economic or trade conflict. Even more unusual is research that examines both simultaneously. Yet it seems logical that a president (or any executive) facing a domestic audience in need of private goods will turn to private goods solutions, while if public goods will enhance electoral fortunes, then public goods solutions will be employed. When researchers examine the effects of economic issues, private goods issues, on the use of force (an approximated public good), they are perhaps examining a link that logically should not exist. Rather, it makes sense to expect that a leader facing economic turmoil may try to distribute some private good. Economic conflict, like GATT action against a foreign industry, approximates a private good in that economic conflict nearly always occurs in defense of a domestic industry or industries. Industries nearly always have particularistic constituencies concerned over jobs and wages. International economic conflict most often involves some claim over tariffs

[8]This is not to say that an American president, opposed by Congress and suffering foul economic conditions, will not resort to arms. International factors, a belligerent foreign power for instance, may well force a President to use force. The argument here, however, is that institutional and economic conditions will affect the utility of certain policies at certain times. In the absence of compelling international reasons to use force, domestic concerns may make the use of force effectively impossible as an electoral tool.

and markets, over openness in particular. These issues all are related to economic competition and ultimately to economic success or failure. Therefore, economic conflict between states is very much about distributing economic protection to a particular domestic political constituency. Economic protection often directly affects industrial production and employment. Economic conflict, as a private–good–like policy is excludable (it affects a limited portion of a state's industry and so affects a limited portion of the domestic audience). It is as much a private good as war or military conflict is a public good.

This distinction between economic and military conflict serves as the basis for hypotheses regarding the effects of institutional congruence and of economic conditions on the type of foreign policy response an American president selects.

Hypothesis 6 *Institutional congruence (unified government, presidential support) will increase the likelihood of militarized conflict, while incongruence will make GATT action more likely.*

In general terms, the absence of institutional opposition makes military action a viable policy since the combined institutions are likely to present a unified front. Further, agreement between Congress and the Presidency makes other unobserved policy alternatives available (unobserved in these analyses), so more direct forms of private goods distribution like pork distribution to specific constituencies will be more available under congruence than incongruence. More specifically, because institutional congruence increases the breadth of the policy alternatives from which

an executive can select and reduces the legislature's critical scrutiny, an executive will be more likely to engage in both policies simultaneously under congruence.

Hypothesis 7 *Positive changes in unemployment will be negatively associated with the likelihood of military force, and more likely to result in trade action (GATT).*

Declining economic conditions affect the welfare of important constituents, a welfare that cannot itself be remedied (either practically or symbolically) through military force. As a result, Presidents will be more likely to turn to economic action in the face of economic decline. Again, the tool is appropriate to the job.

These hypotheses reflect the foundation of the theory described previously, that the disposition of domestic political institutions serves either to limit or to expand the set of viable actions an executive can take, and that executives will select policies appropriate to the needs of their constituents (and to their own electoral futures). In the following sections, I describe the data and methods necessary to test these hypotheses and I report and discuss the empirical results.

5.4 Research Design

In order to assess the effects of institutional, political and economic factors on US dispute behavior, and particularly on the choice of foreign policy, I rely on two sets of analyses. First, I examine the effects of institutional and economic variables on the dichotomous decision either to engage in trade conflict or in military conflict. Second, recognizing that other viable alternatives to trade and military

conflict exist, I examine the effects of institutional and economic variables on four choices: no conflict, military conflict, trade conflict, or both trade *and* military conflict simultaneously.

5.4.1 Data

I have constructed a data set representing American foreign policy choices, economic conditions, and institutional arrangements each month between January 1945 and December 1994.[9]

The data generally can be divided into three categories: institutional; economic; and conflictual. The institutional data indicate the partisan division of the US Congress, the divided or unified status of government, and a measure of presidential support in the Congress derived from Congressional votes on items the president supported.[10] The economic data include a measure of annual change in unemployment. Finally, the conflict data indicate whether or not the US involved itself in a militarized dispute (from the MID data set, version 2.1) or in a dispute under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[11]

[9]Because data on some variables are not consistently available, the largest analysis involves 467 months. These analyses examine monthly rather than annual conflict behavior. Annual observations are well-suited to the event count models in Chapter 4 since monthly event counts would substantially reduce the variation in the dependent variable. In probit analysis, using annual observations would aggregate disputes so that most observations on the dependent variable would be equal to (1), reducing its variation substantially. In multinomial probit models, the same problem would occur, but more specifically, the ability to distinguish among the four outcomes would be substantially reduced. As a consequence, it would be nearly impossible to ascertain whether or not substitution occurs because the (0) category (no action) and the (3) category (both MID and GATT action) would be artificially inflated.

[10]The measure of Congressional support for the President's agenda is extracted from Eric Reinhardt's *United States Congressional Party Discipline* data set, and is originally derived from *Congressional Quarterly.*

[11]Data on GATT disputes are also courtesy of Eric Reinhardt.

5.4.1.1 Dependent Variables

From these data, I construct two dependent variables that indicate presidential selection either to engage in military or trade conflict at some level in any given month. The choice between military and trade conflict represents an expansion given the dichotomous choice most analysts study between the onset of military conflict and the absence of military conflict. The first variable takes on a value of zero in months when the US engaged in a GATT dispute, and a value of one in months when the US engaged in a militarized dispute.[12] Thus, it serves to indicate executive selection between two substantially different forms of international conflict. As the hypotheses in the previous section suggest, independent variables should affect these executive selections differently.

The dichotomous indicator of the type of conflict, however, excludes months in which conflict is absent altogether or where the US engages in both military *and* trade conflict. In order to remedy this shortcoming, I construct a second dependent variable ranging in value from zero to three and indicating respectively: the absence of conflict; militarized conflict; trade conflict; both types of conflict. This indicator is clearly *not* ordinal, but rather indicates a variety of different choices. Its construction suggests the use of a random utility model appropriate for a multinomial variable.

[12]As a result, months in which the US either engaged in no new conflict or in both MID and GATT disputes are excluded from this variable. Such a construction obviously omits the months in which the US failed to engage in any new episodes of conflict, in fact, the majority of the months in the data set. This perhaps suggests that a selection mechanism is at work, driving US leaders to choose between engaging in no conflict or in some undefined conflict and then, having taken the latter alternative, choosing between military and trade conflict. The results of bivariate probit selection models produce values of ρ that do not indicate the presence of a selection mechanism.

5.4.1.2 Independent Variables

The hypotheses above suggest several covariates influence both the onset of conflict and the particular type of conflict into which the US will enter. First, I include institutional variables representing the congruence hypothesis. Congruence, the similarity or dissimilarity between institutional policy preferences is represented in two different ways. As a primary measure, I include a dichotomous indicator of whether government is divided (0) or unified (1). Secondarily, I include the measure of Presidential support in the Congress. Each of these variables indicates the extent to which we might expect the two primary decision making institutions to agree or to disagree, not only on matters of foreign policy, but in any forum. These broad measures capture the nature of the relationship between institutions and should indicate how effectively they will cooperate in future decision making.

In addition to the institutional variables, I examine the effect of economic turmoil on foreign policy choice, anticipating that growth in unemployment will be related to the use of trade action rather than the use of military force. This economic indicator measures the monthly change in the rate of unemployment. Also, I control for the effect of the electoral cycle, including a dummy variable indicating presidential election years. Other research suggests that executive behavior is different both with respect to domestic and foreign policy when elections are imminent (for example, see Gaubatz 1991). Failing to control for electoral pressure of this kind would make it impossible to distinguish behavior resulting from the election cycle from behavior resulting from the other covariates.

Perhaps one of the indicators of political need most often included in diversionary models or, more generally, in models linking domestic political concerns and foreign conflict, is presidential approval. The models reported below do not include approval for two primary reasons.[13] First, and most practically, approval is causally related to Congressional support for the president (Bond & Fleisher 1990) and therefore cannot reasonably be included in the support models. Second, it is not at all theoretically apparent how approval should influence foreign policy choice generally or the decision to use force in particular. As the discussion in Chapter 2 indicates, some research reports that higher approval increases the likelihood of conflict since Presidents have more political capital to spend, while other work finds that low approval ratings increase conflict propensity. The former finding is not at all consistent with diversionary claims. The latter is weakly and inconsistently supported. Moreover, though most research in American politics and in international relations treats approval as if it is linear, it almost certainly is not. It is likely that high and low ratings have substantially different effects on presidential behavior than do median ratings. Further, it is likely that changes in approval mean different things at different levels and thereby evoke different types of behavior. For example, a 2% increase in approval from 30% to 32% leaves a president with substantial problems; the same increase from 78% to 80%, on the other hand only strengthens an already–strong president. And the same increase from 49% to 51% probably puts the president across an important psychological threshold that is likely to influence decision making to

[13]To satisfy the skeptic, however, I have run models including approval and find no relationship and that the other hypothesized relationships remain unchanged.

some extent. These issues are entirely unresolved in the community of scholars that study approval, and theoretic expectations regarding how any of these levels of or changes in approval should influence policy are equally undefined. As a result, I am loathe to include variables about whose meaning I am uncertain, and whose effects are not theoretically indicated.

5.5 Methodology

Because the analyses involve two different measures of foreign policy alternatives as dependent variables, I employ two different estimation procedures appropriate to the policy choices.[14] First, in order to predict the dichotomous dependent variable (whether the US selects military or trade conflict), I estimate probit models. Since linear regression is inappropriate for dichotomous variables and can produce probability predictions outside the bounds of 0 and 1, scholars usually employ a nonlinear maximum likelihood method like probit in order to analyze such data. Second, and perhaps less common, I estimate multinomial logit models in order to predict the four outcomes of the other dependent variable (Liao 1994). Recall that this variable ranges from 0–3 and is nominal rather than ordinal. Multinomial logit allows us to estimate the effects of covariates on three of the four outcomes, compared to the fourth outcome. For example, the dependent variable is originally coded so that:

- 0 = no conflict

[14]Analyses conducted in STATA 6.0.

- 1 = military conflict
- 2 = trade conflict
- 3 = both military and trade conflict

Multinomial logit will declare the zero category to be the reference category and will produce coefficients for all independent variables *for each of the other outcomes.*[15] So the results will indicate the effects of the covariates on the probability of a change from

- no conflict to military conflict
- no conflict to trade conflict
- no conflict to both military and trade conflict

As a result, in order to compare other categories (say, the effects of covariates on the probability of choosing military rather than trade action) we must recode the dependent variable so that either trade or military conflict is equal to zero and therefore the reference category. I do so such that the dependent variable is coded as:

[15]The categories of this nominal dependent variable are distributed as:

- 0 = no action = 61.13 percent of 600 monthly observations
- 1 = MID only = 22.6 percent of 600 monthly observations
- 2 = GATT only = 11.8 percent of 600 monthly observations
- 3 = both MID and GATT = 4.3 percent of 600 monthly observations

- 0 = trade conflict
- 1 = both military and trade conflict
- 2 = no conflict
- 3 = military conflict

This arrangement will specifically permit us to examine the effects of the covariates on the choice between military and trade conflict (choice 3 v. choice 0) in the context of a broader choice set. The following section presents the results of these analyses and discusses the implications of the results for arguments about foreign policy substitution.

5.6 Results and Discussion

The probit analyses, presented in two separate specifications in Table 5.1, provide strong initial support for the congruence hypothesis and for the hypothesis regarding unemployment. Generally, they support the idea that US presidents employ different tools depending upon the domestic political and economic conditions they face.

The probit analysis in Model 1 indicates a significant relationship between the level of Presidential support in the Congress and the likelihood the US will select to use military force rather than a GATT action. In fact, the impact of an increase in presidential support on the likelihood of military action is substantial: a 5 percentage

Table 5.1. Probit Analyses of US Policy Options, Militarized or Trade Dispute, 1945–1994[a]

Variable	$\widehat{\beta}$	(S.E.)	z–score
Model 1			
Presidential Support	0.031	(0.008)	3.72***
Δ Unemployment	-0.872	(0.493)	-1.77**
Election year	-0.123	(0.228)	-0.54
Constant	-1.47	(0.579)	-2.54***
n	186		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	18.58***		
Model 2			
Unified Government	0.415	(0.215)	1.94**
Δ Unemployment	-0.771	(0.469)	-1.64**
Election year	-0.329	(0.213)	-1.54*
Constant	0.499	(0.134)	3.73***
n	190		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	8.78**		

[a] Probit estimates, SEs in parentheses; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01, one–tailed tests. Dependent variable indicates the presence of a militarized dispute (1) or a trade dispute (0).

increase in support for the president results in a 4 percent increase in the likelihood that the United States will pursue military rather than economic action.[16]

Similarly, in Model 2, the effect of unified government is to enable presidential military action. Institutional congruence increases the likelihood the US will resort

[16]The effects of variables in probit models cannot be interpreted in the straightforward manner to which least squares models are amenable. Rather, marginal effects are computed by

$$\phi[\sum(\beta' X) + x_i\sigma] - \phi[\sum(\beta' X)]$$

or the change in predicted probability given a one standard deviation change in the variable of interest, other variables held constant at their means or modes. In the case of dichotomous independent variables, the effect reflects the change in that variable from 0 to 1 (modal to nonmodal value), others held constant.

to arms rather than engaging in trade action. In fact, American presidents enjoying unified government choose military over trade action more than 12 percent more frequently than do presidents who are hobbled by divided government. Whereas divided institutional control limits the president's ability to employ the military, partisan support in the Congress makes the military option more tractable for the White House and, as a result of its availability, the military option is used more frequently in these circumstances.

Perhaps most striking in the models in Table 5.1, however, is the effect of unemployment on the choice between military and trade action. In both models, unemployment is negatively associated with the use of force but makes trade action more likely. It appears likely that Presidents generally employ economic tools to address economic problems; they respond to private goods–problems with private goods–solutions. In fact, in Model 1, $\frac{2}{10}$ percent increase in the monthly unemployment rate decreases the likelihood the US will engage in military action by about 6 percent.[17] In other words, given a choice between military and trade action, an American president is 6 percent more likely to pursue trade action when monthly unemployment grows by $\frac{2}{10}$ of a percent.[18]

The probit specification explicitly models the choice between two specific types of policy. It assumes that one of the policy alternatives is selected, ignoring cases in which the US may have taken other action, or no action at all. As footnote 12

[17]The marginal effect here is the effect of a one–standard deviation increase in monthly unemployment (0.20 percent) on the likelihood of a MID.

[18]The marginal effect of unemployment in Model 2 is very similar: a one standard deviation increase in unemployment reduces the likelihood of a MID by nearly 6 percent.

indicates, modeling the choice between MID and GATT action constitutes selection on the dependent variable, though modeling that selection process suggests it has no real effect on the results presented in Table 5.1. Modeling the choice between MID and GATT action is not altogether different from traditional models of foreign policy action that distinguish between a specific action like a militarized dispute (1), and all other possible actions (0). Selection on the dependent variable effectively omits categories of the theoretic dependent variable; modeling military action versus all other possible action (as the traditional approach does) clouds the mutually exclusive character of the dependent variable since foreign policy action exists in the (0) category *and* in the (1) category. Both misrepresent the theoretic dependent variable to some extent, though modeling the choice between two specific alternatives has two advantages. First, the effects of selection can be empirically estimated; again, there appears to be no effect.[19] Second, examining these two options to the exclusion of all others brings into sharp relief the effects of executive constraints and economic concerns on policy alternatives that logically should be employed in response to different types of stimuli.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the effects of both congressional support for the president and changes in unemployment on the type of conflict in which the US engages. Faster

[19]That ρ is not statistically significant suggests that the decision to employ foreign policy in response to domestic trouble is independent of which of these two foreign policy option a leader actually decides to implement. This is not surprising if leaders actually do choose from a broad range of policy options. Research that examines the use of force versus other/no action implicitly assumes that if leaders use foreign policy, they use force. If this is true, then the decision to use foreign policy and the decision to use force are strongly (if not perfectly) correlated. However, if leaders select from a broader range of policies, then the decision to take foreign policy action is not synonymous with the use of force. Rather, the correlation between taking foreign policy action and selecting policy A over policy B is not likely to be high.



Figure 5.1. Effects of Congressional Support and Unemployment on Foreign Policy Choice

rates of growth in unemployment have an increasingly strong effect on the likelihood the US engages in trade action rather than military action. At the same time, stronger support in the congress increases the likelihood of military action, though the positive rate seems to diminish a bit at higher levels of congressional support.

The negative effect of unemployment is notable under any circumstance. However, the level and extent of the effect unemployment has on the likelihood of GATT action varies depending on the electoral and institutional context within which foreign policy

decisions are made. Figure 5.2 illustrates how four different institutional contexts influence the effect of unemployment on foreign policy choice.



Figure 5.2. Effects of Unemployment under Varying Political Conditions on Foreign Policy Choice

Though the slopes are roughly similar under unified and divided government and between election and nonelection years, the probability of military versus trade action changes substantially depending on institutional context. For instance, compare the second lowest curve (the modal category, divided government, no election) with the lowermost (an election year, divided government). In both cases, government is divided, so we can compare the different effect of unemployment between election

and nonelection years. When unemployment grows at .5%, military action is 13% more likely than GATT action during an off–year than during an election year. This comparison suggests that presidents respond to economic problems somewhat differently depending on the proximity of an election and the attentiveness of the electorate.[20] Likewise, when government is unified, unemployment growth of .5% indicates military action is 12% less likely during an election year than during an off–year. Finally, comparing the unified and divided government, .5% growth in unemployment is nearly 30% more likely to evoke a military action under unified control (uppermost curve) than under divided control (lowermost curve).

Even more notable is the differential effect of unemployment on foreign policy choice depending upon support in the congress. As Figure 5.3 demonstrates, when support in the congress is high, unemployment decreases the likelihood of military conflict, but not substantially at all.

In fact, even at exceptionally strong growth in unemployment, a president experiencing strong congressional support is still more than 80% more likely to use force than to employ trade aggression. On the other hand, when support for the president is weak, trade action is more likely and becomes more likely at a faster rate as unemployment increases. The power of institutional congruence to enable a president to employ military might is notable, but less so than the dramatic effect incongruence has as it restrains military force and encourages economic action in response to a growing economic problem.

[20]With unemployment growth at .5%, the probability of military action during an off–year is .42; the probability of military action during an election year .55. The difference in .13



Figure 5.3. Effects of Unemployment under High and Low Congressional Support

These results are wholly consistent with the hypothesis that executive action is either enabled or constrained by contemporary institutional arrangements, especially that institutional congruence makes difficult policies like the use of the military more readily available to the president. Further, they support the hypothesis that American presidents will seek to implement policies that are appropriate to the problem at hand. These findings cast doubt on the notion that American leaders respond somewhat blindly to domestic economic trouble by pursuing diversionary or scapegoating military strategies. Though leaders may be pursuing diversionary

strategies, they are doing so in an arena entirely removed from the military alternative. This suggests that leaders are substituting policy options depending upon the conditions to which they must respond most immediately. Further, it seems likely that Presidents not only are responding to private goods issues with private goods solutions, but that they are choosing policies that are significantly less risky and less costly than is the use of military force.

The analyses reported in Table 5.1, however, are limited to the choice between trade and military action when it seems clear that other alternatives are available to leaders. At the very least, leaders can choose to implement neither of these two alternatives, or to implement both. The addition of these possible choices to a model potentially expands the force of the argument that leaders can select policies from a range of possible options. Further, it may be more realistic to assess the hypotheses as they determine a broader range of policy options than simply the choice between military and trade action. As a result, I present multinomial logit models that permit leaders to choose from among the four options identified above: no action, military action, trade action, both military and trade action at the same time.

As indicated earlier, the dependent variable in the multinomial logit specification is ordered in two different ways so to allow for comparison across categories. Table 5.2 reports the results of the first ordering. The first set of coefficients in Table 5.2 examine the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood the US will take *military action* rather than no action at all. As hypothesized, institutional congruence (presidential support) is positively associated with the likelihood of

military action. Presidential support in the Congress makes the resort to arms a viable policy alternative and thus increases its likelihood. Meanwhile, monthly changes in the rate of unemployment does not influence the choice between taking military action and taking no action at all. This suggests that military action is not generally taken as a response to economic distress when other policy options can be effectively substituted instead. Again, this provides some support for the notion that military action is not the right tool for the job when the problem is economic in nature.

The second set of coefficients are also of interest as they illustrate the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of engaging in a *trade dispute* rather than taking no action at all. Congruence again behaves as predicted, effectively reducing the likelihood of trade action since presidential support in the Congress potentially opens up other private goods solutions (possibly solutions that do not involve an episode of international conflict). Changes in unemployment significantly increase the likelihood of GATT action rather than no action. Again, this finding is commensurate with the notion that American leaders have a variety of policy alternatives from which to choose and that they choose to implement policies that (either effectively or symbolically) address the problems at hand.

Perhaps the most interesting item to note in the second set of coefficients, however, is that the effect of presidential support on policy choice is *nonmonotonic*. By introducing the empirical possibility of policy substitution, it becomes apparent that domestic political variables may have different effects on different manifestations of

Table 5.2. Multinomial Logit Models of US Policy Options[a]

Variable	$\widehat{\beta}$	(S.E.)	z–score
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 1]:MID v. No action			
Presidential Support	0.012	(0.009)	1.31*
Δ Unemployment	0.057	(0.074)	0.77
Election year	0.150	(0.263)	0.57
Constant	-2.04	(0.907)	-2.25**
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 2]:GATT v. No action			
Presidential Support	-0.040	(0.012)	-3.43***
Δ Unemployment	0.201	(0.098)	2.05**
Election year	0.218	(0.327)	0.67
Constant	-0.118	(1.07)	-0.11
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 3]:Both v. No action			
Presidential Support	-0.031	(0.018)	-1.73**
Δ Unemployment	0.491	(0.128)	3.84***
Election year	-0.674	(0.593)	-1.14
Constant	-3.28	(1.52)	-2.16**
n	467		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	45.58***		

[a] Multinomial Logit estimates, SEs in parentheses; *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01, one–tailed tests. Dependent variable indicates (0) no conflict, (1)the presence of a militarized dispute, (2) a trade dispute, or (3) both military and trade conflict simultaneously.

the dependent variable. If the dependent concept, Y is foreign policy or foreign policy directed at addressing domestic problems, we can see that the effects of independent variables on y_1 and on y_2 are substantially different. Sole examination of y_1 to the

exclusion of y_2 may lead us to discover only a portion of the complex relationship between x and Y.

Further, examination of y_1 alone does not afford us the chance to consider the complementarity of y_1 and y_2, the possibility that the two policy options are used as substitutes or are used simultaneously. The third set of coefficients allows us to examine this last possibility. These results reveal that institutional congruence is negatively related to the implementation of both trade and military conflict, though growth in unemployment increases the likelihood the US will engage in both types of conflict simultaneously. It seems likely that while unemployment prods American presidents to pursue private goods–like solutions, support in the Congress encourages presidents to pursue alternatives other than military action. Again, though not tested here, it is entirely likely that a friendly Congress enables strategic log–rolling in such a way that both the president and members of Congress can distribute pork to key constituents in a mutually beneficial arrangement.[21] The combination of support in Congress and growing unemployment may make such domestic policy options the best responses.

While the results in Table 5.2 provide substantial evidence that policy substitution occurs and specifically, that domestic factors affect foreign policy choice in different

[21]Again, Bartels (1991) provides some evidence that members of Congress vote for spending projects with the actual benefits to their own constituents very much in mind. Additionally, members of Congress somewhat notoriously are known for log–rolling behavior so that they can distribute directed benefits to constituents (e.g. Lohmann & O'Halloran 1994). Finally, the Presidency is a well–known platform from which to launch major efforts at directed distribution in order to achieve political goals (like the passage of NAFTA, for example (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold & Zorn 1997)) Support for the President in the Congress, general congruence between the two institutions, facilitates both Congressional and Presidential distribution to key constituents in such a way that both are electorally protected.

Table 5.3. Multinomial Logit Models of US Policy Options[a]

Variable	$\widehat{\beta}$	(S.E.)	z–score
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 1]:Both v. GATT			
Presidential Support	0.009	(0.02)	0.44
Δ Unemployment	0.29	(0.146)	1.98**
Election year	-0.892	(0.635)	-1.41**
Constant	-3.16	(1.70)	-1.86**
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 2]:None v. GATT			
Presidential Support	0.040	(0.012)	3.43***
Δ Unemployment	-0.201	(0.098)	-2.05**
Election year	-0.218	(0.327)	-0.67
Constant	0.118	(1.07)	0.11
Characteristics of Prob[Y = 3]:MID v. GATT			
Presidential Support	0.052	(0.013)	3.96***
Δ Unemployment	-0.144	(0.108)	-1.34*
Election year	-0.068	(0.366)	-0.19
Constant	-1.92	(1.22)	-1.57**
n	467		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$	45.58***		

[a] Multinomial Logit estimates, SEs in parentheses; *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01, one–tailed tests. Dependent variable indicates (0) a trade dispute, (1)both military and trade conflict simultaneously, (2)no conflict, or (3)the presence of a militarized dispute.

ways, they do not allow the explicit comparison of the effects of domestic factors on the choice between military and trade conflict. Table 5.3 presents the results of analyses for which the dependent variable is recoded as indicated in earlier.

For these analyses, the reference category is the presence of a GATT dispute. This facilitates the direct comparison of the factors that contribute to the onset of military rather than economic conflict, a comparison found in the third set of coefficients. These results indicate a significant positive relationship between institutional congruence and the decision to engage in military conflict instead of trade conflict. Yet economic trouble reduces the likelihood of military action compared to the likelihood of GATT action. These results confirm the probit results presented in Table 5.1, but do so in a broader context where American presidents can select either not to engage in conflict at all or to engage in military and trade conflict simultaneously.[22] Foreign policies are implemented on different occasions and in response to different domestic circumstances in such a way that strongly suggests the importance of conceptualizing foreign policy substitution in models of international behavior.

Interpreting the effects of coefficients in multinomial logit analyses, however, is not at all straightforward. In fact, as Greene (1997) demonstrates, the actual effects of the variables may not be the same as the signs of their coefficients. As a result, even the computation of marginal effects or predicted probabilities may not be sufficient for interpretation since the changes are likely to be nonlinear and nonconstant. Graphical

[22]Because the explicit effect of presidential support on GATT action is not modeled in Table 5.3 since GATT action is the reference category, the nonmonotonic effect of presidential support is not present. However, notice that the effect of unemployment is now nonmonotonic. Growth in unemployment increases the likelihood a president will take *both military and trade action* rather than just GATT action, while it decreases the likelihood a president will employ neither tool instead of taking GATT action. In other words, it appears that GATT action is very likely to be a response to unemployment growth; under some circumstances, presidents will take military action as well.

representation is the clearest manner in which to evaluate multinomial logit effects. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the effects of presidential support and unemployment on the likelihoods of military conflict, trade conflict, or both (the coefficients and dependent variable ordering from Table 5.2).[23]



Figure 5.4. Predicted Effects of Congressional Support on Foreign Policy Choice

These figures plot the predicted probabilities of each outcome at all actual values of the independent variable of interest, holding all others at their means or modes.

[23]These figures rely on the results from Table 5.2 in order to facilitate the comparison of the likelihoods of the two outcomes of interest (MID action, GATT action). Because GATT action is the reference category in Table 5.3, the likelihood of GATT action is not estimated and therefore cannot be plotted.

Probabilities are computed by

$$P(Y = j) = \frac{e^{\beta_1' X_1}}{1 + e^{\beta_1' X_1} + e^{\beta_2' X_2} + e^{\beta_3' X_3}} \tag{5.1}$$

where the reference category (no conflict) is held constant at zero while each category j is compared in the numerator to all categories in the denominator. As Figure 5.4 shows, the effects of congressional support are pronounced and intriguing. At first glance, it is apparent that congressional support tends simultaneously to increase the likelihood of military conflict while decreasing the likelihood of trade action. Notice the substantially different slopes in these curves and that they cross each other. Not only are the effects on these foreign policy actions quite different, but the fact that they cross suggests that after some point of presidential support (about 55%), American presidents trade off between the two. At levels below 55%, presidents are more likely to take trade action while above 55%, they are more inclined toward military engagement. This directly supports the contention that presidents engage in foreign policy substitution depending upon institutional congruence. Given Morgan & Palmer's (1998, 2) claim that "the few studies that have been directed specifically at testing substitutability hypotheses have found virtually no evidence that substitution occurs," these findings are even more striking. American presidents appear rather clearly to substitute trade action for military action when they are hobbled by institutional incongruence. Moreover, the tabular results from the multinomial logit really provide no evidence of substitution, only indicating significant effects of independent variables. The only way to understand the complicated effects of

those variables on the different categories of the dependent variable is to plot the predicted probabilities as Figure 5.4 does. Doing so reveals the relationship not only between support for the President and each outcome, but the relationships between outcomes. Exposing the tradeoff between trade and military aggression allows the conclusion that leaders engage in substitution, a conclusion not indicated by the tabular results.

With regard to unemployment, Figure 5.5 is not so dramatic, but still demonstrates substantial differences in the effect of joblessness on the probability a president will select certain types of policy. As the results in Table 5.2 indicate, unemployment has no independent statistically discernible effect on the likelihood of military conflict. However, as Figure 5.5 shows, unemployment not only increases the likelihood of trade action or of simultaneous trade and military action, but the probabilities grow at faster rates when unemployment grows faster. Unemployment does not and theoretically should not directly affect the use of military force (though many researchers have claimed that it should and does). The argument in the preceding sections has illustrated the illogic of linking unemployment with military action when other policy options are available to executives. The results in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.5 illustrate how American presidents increasingly resort to trade action, a private–good–like policy in response to growing economic distress. The absence of an effect on military conflict provides support for the general notion that leaders will seek private–good–like solutions to private–good–like problems; they will use the rights tools for the job.



Figure 5.5. Predicted Effects of Unemployment on Foreign Policy Choice

5.7 Conclusions

Concluding their remarks on foreign policy substitutability, Most and Starr argue convincingly that "how [scholars] approach their problems – the manner in which they conceptualize them and the methods they utilize in their attempts to solve them – ultimately impinge on their results." (118) Insofar as scholars conceptualize international conflict, for example, as a distinct foreign policy outcome or process, theory and analysis will treat conflict as distinct and will not consider the extent to which conflict may be one of several interchangeable, substitutable and

complementary aspects of foreign policy. The consequences of so doing are suggested rather starkly by Most and Starr and are indicated in the first section of this paper.

The analyses summarized in all the tables and figures above provide consistent evidence that domestic political factors evoke different foreign policy responses at different times. Foreign policies are chosen based in part on the criterion of which policy will most effectively address the problem at hand, and with regard to institutional congruence. Most importantly, modeling foreign policy choice in a manner that accounts for substitution among the manifestations of Y allows us to observe the nonmonotonic effects of domestic factors on foreign policy choice. This is not simply a matter of a modeling decision, but more fundamentally a question of how national leaders make policy decisions. Foreign policy is caught at the nexus of domestic political and economic concerns and the pursuit of the national interest. Certainly at some juncture, leaders find themselves needing to serve domestic political interests and finding foreign policy solutions to those problems. However, the equation of domestic or electoral threat with desperation and the resort to arms entirely discounts the range of policy tools, both domestic and foreign, available to most leaders and certainly available to American presidents. Further, assertions that leaders resort to arms for domestic reasons lose sight of the often–strong institutional constraints by which executives are bound. Recognizing that international conflict is a relatively poor tool with which to resolve domestic problems, that institutional constraints are frequently significant, and that other policy alternatives are available for implementation must lead to two conclusions. First, policy substitution is

exceptionally likely and, as domestic circumstances change over time, using different policies to respond to different stimuli is ever more likely. Second, the linkage between domestic turmoil and military conflict is not theoretically satisfying, especially in light of the substitution argument. Though some empirical support for such a link exists in the literature, perhaps that support would diminish in models that accounted for foreign policy substitution.

The substitution argument put forward by Most and Starr and elaborated and tested here is most compelling in its implication that the examination of one aspect of foreign policy to the exclusion of others may lead us astray. In particular, if we find a relationship between x and y_1 without accounting for the likelihood that y_2 might sometimes be substituted for y_1, our finding may be an artifact of the complementarity between y_1 and y_2. Further, since it is probably the ideal of research to understand Y and not just its one manifestation, y_1, it is of paramount importance to consider the dependent relationships among the manifestations of Y.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The influence of domestic politics on international behavior is likely far more complex than contemporary international relations research recognizes. At the very least, the linkage between these two spheres of political behavior requires refining to the extent that political scientists connect *political processes* rather than only linking events and structures. For example, just as the structure of the human body remains largely static across adulthood, so do many states. Yet, deprive the human body of potassium, and muscle spasms result; the structure remains unchanged but the metabolic process is changed in a subtle and impermanent manner. Analogously, states are dynamic organisms whose structural attributes may remain largely the same for long periods of time, but whose inner-workings change as a normal part of statehood. Just as normal dietary changes influence the behavior of the body, so normal political changes influence the behavior of the state. A doctor would be foolish to examine a patient exhibiting muscle spasms and determine that the muscles are in exactly the right places and lack physical damage or strain without investigating the patient's diet (wherein she might prescribe eating bananas). Similarly, political scientists may be trying to explain behaviors that are not entirely the results of

the structures of states, but that vary as the political processes within those states change.

The theory constructed and the empirical results reported in the preceding chapters strongly support the contention that states' decision making processes and the character of the decisions they make change over time even in the absence of dramatic structural upheaval or change. The normal course of political events is strong enough to change how decision makers select policy options, which in turn influences the policies states actually pursue.

Research that is attentive to domestic political process as it influences foreign policy decision making and international behavior is not reductionist any more than is medical research that examines variability in human metabolism. Both seek to explain broader phenomena like the international behavior of states and the health of the human body. In fact, in the case of international relations, failing to recognize the pivotal role that political institutions play in decision making is tantamount to ignoring the very character of the state. Realism's contention that power is the only important dimension along which states vary presumes that state power is the source of all decision making and is the goal of all policy. Even if power is the end states seek to achieve, *at a minimum* domestic political processes determine how effectively a state conducts its pursuit of power. Insofar as realism fails to account for institutional variability, it fails to recognize a chief source of variation among states and among the success or failure of states to achieve their goals in the international system. Neither international behavior nor successful foreign policy can be explained in full by power;

these outcomes vary too broadly across states and across time to be adequately explained by a variable that exhibits relatively little variation across time as is the case with power. Moreover, on its face, the presumption that states do not vary in how they employ their resources or in how effectively they employ those resources is invalid. Institutional structure and institutional change are important sources of variation in how states conduct themselves and ultimately provide a window into the variability of state behavior across space and across time.

Domestic political institutions are critical to states' decision making processes because they aggregate preferences into single policy actions. Though the institutions themselves do not change except under rather extraordinary circumstances, the ease with which decisions are made and the types of actions selected are likely to shift as groups and individuals controlling political institutions change. The democratic state is characterized by this polyarchic flow of power among groups such that the norm in a democracy is change and inconstancy in who governs. These changes alone, say between government x and government y, may not result in dramatic changes in the direction of policy. But the extent to which political institutions vary in their collective preferences over policy will influence how efficiently policy decisions are made and implemented. This is the essence of institutional congruence.

It seems clear from the empirical analyses in the foregoing chapters that the theoretic concept of congruence has real manifestations and influences foreign policy decisions in nontrivial ways. The decision to engage in international conflict is not taken lightly by leaders anyway, but institutional incongruence insures that

executives consider the domestic consequences of resorting to arms. In the absence of substantial, visible and justifiable threats to the national interest, it is indeed difficult to imagine that a democratic leader could reasonably engage in military conflict with the expectation that he would enhance his political fortune. Political authority shared with another institution like a legislature makes such action nearly inconceivable especially if the two institutions share incongruent preferences. Regarding American foreign policy making, the historian Paul Kennedy writes,

> the country may not always be assisted by its division of constitutional and decision-making powers, deliberately created when it was geographically and strategically isolated from the rest of the world two centuries ago, and possessed a decent degree of time to come to an agreement on the few issues which actually concerned 'foreign' policy, but which may be harder to operate when it has become a global superpower, often called upon to make swift decisions vis–à–vis countries which enjoy far fewer constraints. (1987, 524–25)

American leaders suffer indecision at the hands of divided constitutional authority. Though the parliamentary system is not formally divided in the same way, it suffers the same consequence of competing political institutions that sometimes share similar preferences and at other times do not. Incongruence inhibits decision making. The policies most likely to be vulnerable to incongruence are those that require substantial levels of consensus and agreement in the decision making process. The decision to resort to arms is one such policy and, as the models in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest, difficult processes make difficult policies less likely to be selected.

6.1 Consequences for Contemporary Research

Institutional congruence bears on contemporary research in international relations in three ways. First, though it requires more detail regarding the control of a state's decision making apparatus, it theoretically expands the democratic peace assertion by recognizing the dynamism of democratic political institutions in the course of normal political events. Insofar as the democratic peace only distinguishes between democratic and nondemocratic states, huge amounts of variation within those groups remains unexplained. Further, temporal variation, especially among democratic states, is virtually nonexistent so that democratic structure has a constant effect across time on state behavior.

Congruence encourages attention to the decision making process of the democratic state and how that process is likely to influence policy decisions; it also encourages an exploration of extant explanations of the democratic peace. Structural explanations claim that executives in democracies are more constrained than are their autocratic counterparts; normative explanations argue that democracies share norms of peace, cooperation, etc. Institutional congruence advances the notion that constraints on a democratic leader's actions can vary over time; leaders sometimes enjoy greater decision making autonomy than they do at others. This implies that jointly congruent democracies may behave differently than might jointly incongruent democracies. Theoretically, where democratic dyads have engaged in codable militarized disputes, it seems likely that their leaders were less constrained than when they avoided conflict

altogether. Incongruence increases the structural *and* the normative difficulty of motivating military action against another democratic state.

Institutional congruence has even more serious consequences for a second prominent literature in international relations research; diversionary theories. Logic itself suggests that diversionary or gambling behaviors are less than likely, but institutional incongruence makes the self-serving, politically motivated use of force nearly impossible and theoretically implausible. No doubt, some democratic leaders have faced genuine foreign threats against which they waged war under the happy coincidence that they generated rallies and were rescued from the brink of political destruction. But that a democratic leader can motivate the use of force at will in order to avert domestic political costs is inconceivable, particularly in the face of the political obstacle posed by incongruent institutional conditions. The potential costs of engaging in foreign policy adventurism are substantial anyway given the uncertainty that generally accompanies the use of force. But those costs are multiplied by the existence of institutional incongruence. Additionally, the availability of a willing scapegoat is not at all certain especially insofar as potential targets keep low profiles so as not to become actual targets.

More importantly, however, the implausibility of common, reckless, self-interested military action suggests that politically motivated leaders should look for other more useful policies to implement. Policy substitution, the third area of research on which institutional congruence bears, is made logically necessary by the obstacle institutional incongruence can pose to an executive. Military action is not only

risky and difficult to motivate and justify, but it is not logically useful as a political tool. Military action rarely results in meaningful rally effects, and leaders have other tools that are more appropriate for addressing domestic political threats. The logical appeal of foreign policy substitution is nearly irrefutable, and the results in Chapter 5 strongly suggest that foreign policy substitution is an empirical reality, at least in the American case.

6.2 Implications for Future Research

It is theoretically satisfying to anticipate that institutional congruence forces leaders to reevaluate the utility of policy options as institutional conditions change over the course of normal political events. The empirical support congruence finds in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest a variety of future pursuits, not the least of which is to expand the spatial domain in both empirical analyses to include much larger samples of democracies. The finding that institutional incongruence obstructs the use of force perhaps bodes well for a normative preference for peace. However, it seems likely that the cost of institutional incongruence may be borne by inefficient decision making that might inhibit military action to preserve national security. Also, given research in American politics on divided government, it seems certain that the inefficiency bred by incongruence influences the character of domestic policies even more severely. As a result, the apparent effects of incongruence suggest normative questions regarding inefficient policy outcomes and the potential threat to national security posed by institutions that cannot compose cogent foreign policy.

The findings regarding the effect of incongruence on dispute length also suggest incongruence should affect other characteristics of extant foreign policies. For instance, incongruence appears to change the calculus regarding whether or not states should enter disputes, but it also should exhibit direct and indirect effects on the outcomes of disputes and wars. Research on dispute and war outcomes is divided regarding its explanations for why democracies appear to win more often than autocracies do. Some research suggests democracies choose their fights more carefully (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1998a, Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995) while other work argues democracies are better at carrying disputes and wars for any of a variety of reasons (Lake 1992, Reiter & Stam 1998a, Reiter & Stam 1998b, Bennett & Stam 1998). Institutional congruence is likely to affect not only the propensity of a democracy to enter a dispute or war (as the results above indicate), but also should influence the efficiency with which the state conducts the war; thus, it should exhibit an indirect effect and a direct effect on dispute outcomes.

Institutional congruence is not limited in its theoretical effects to military or to conflictual behavior, but should apply to any range of foreign policy alternatives. Future research should not only incorporate congruence as it serves to restrain or enable military action, but should theorize on its relevance to foreign policy substitution more generally. Further, congruence bears at least as much on domestic policy making as it does on foreign policy, perhaps even more heavily since legislatures often have far more authority over the domestic arena than the international one. Students of American politics conceptualize the effect of congruence via divided

and unified government, though they speculate more often on its causes than on its consequences. In the domestic context, the concept of congruence may be useful insofar as it suggests the importance of identifying the similarity of policy preferences between or among actors. Often, actors other than legislatures and executives are relevant to domestic policy and should therefore be considered in assessments of how congruence influences domestic policy decisions. More important, however, is the implication that executives may interchange foreign and domestic policy initiatives as they seek optimal responses to whatever domestic challenges confront them. What is more reasonable than for a leader to respond to a domestic political or economic problem with a domestic policy action, whether symbolic or otherwise? Future research should seek to integrate policy alternatives in such a way that the somewhat artificial division of domestic and foreign policy is eradicated to the extent that leaders may select policy tools from these realms simultaneously or interchangeably.

Ironically, inasmuch as the argument in the foregoing pages is compelling and the empirical results are convincing, the sum of this research suggests that executives choose their actions from far larger sets of possibilities than this or any other research recognizes. Not only is the universe of relevant policy alternatives fairly large, but it spans the domestic and foreign policy domains that are mostly kept separated by the orientation of the researcher. As I study foreign policy, I choose to examine foreign policy alternatives and to explore the relationships between domestic stimuli and the decision to do A rather than B. Yet, a politically troubled leader has manifold domestic policy options from which to select as well, some of which may be worse

than foreign policy options, but some of which are likely to be better. Certainly, I have no illusions about the complexity of policy making, but I also believe that abstraction through models is a powerful manner in which we can understand political phenomena. So rather than lament the impossibility of modeling every policy choice a leader may or may not have, I take the measured view that the findings reported here are evidence of the possibility that we can begin to explain the foreign policy choice between peace and war.

APPENDIX A

US INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL, 1943-1992

Table A.1. Divided and Unified Government in the US, 1943–1992

Years	Presidency	House	Senate	Unified	Congress Unified[†]
1943-1946	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	Y	N
1947-1948	Democratic	Republican	Republican	N	N
1949-1952	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	Y	N
1953-1955	Republican	Republican	Republican	Y	N
1956-1960	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	N	Y
1961-1968	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	Y	N
1969-1976	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	N	Y
1977-1980	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	Y	N
1981-1986	Republican	Democratic	Republican	N	N
1987-1992	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	N	Y

[†] Congress unified against the presidency.

APPENDIX B

CONGRUENCE IN DEMOCRATIC STATES

Table B.1. Congruence in 16 Democratic States, 1943–1992[†]

State	Frequency of Majority	MID Frequency	Mean Majority Size
Australia	0.38	0.01	-1.29
Austria	0.42	0.007	-2.48
Belgium	0.097	0.012	-55.18
Canada	0.77	0.0152	49
Denmark	0	0.019	-43.4
France (V)	0	0.091	-159.5
Germany	0	0.038	-86.6
Greece	0.86	0.051	58.3
Ireland	.261	0.004	-3.24
Italy	0.118	0.028	-86.2
Netherlands	0	0.022	-50.9
New Zealand	1	0.01	11.6
Norway	0.293	0.024	-4.75
Spain	0.72	0.056	12.1
Sweden	0.049	0.016	-18.4
UK	0.90	0.141	60.5

[†] Empirical models also were estimated excluding states that never have majorities (Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands), states that always have majorities (New Zealand), and the UK which has a majority party 90% of the time. The estimates excluding these six states are not different from those including all 16 states. Further, these results hold, excluding the six states listed above, computing robust standard errors and clustering on each state effectively to account for any spatial correlation among cross-sections.

APPENDIX C

CONGRUENCE AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION

The dissertation argues that institutional congruence creates a decision making environment in which policy makers share similar preferences so decision making itself is more unified and less acrimonious than it might be otherwise. The particular effect of congruence is to broaden the range of policy actions available to an executive in the foreign policy arena. More extreme policies that are generally more difficult to motivate because of the risks associated with them become policies a leader can implement. Incongruence, on the other hand, inhibits decision making so that difficult policies like the decision to use force are costly, subject to interinstitutional disagreement and public dispute. As a result, implementing policies like the use of force is more difficult under incongruence than under congruence.

Alastair Smith (1996) suggests that the likelihood of using force, in fact the ability of a leader to use force, depends not solely on his domestic political or economic situation, but on the availability of an opponent toward whom he might direct national wrath. While others question whether or not an opponent will always be readily available for targeting, Smith specifically argues that potential targets, recognizing that they might be targeted as a diversionary attempt by a troubled

leader, keep low profiles in order to avoid becoming scapegoats. So, at the very time that leaders most need targets for their diversionary motives, potential targets become scarce as they actively seek not to provide a reason for military aggression.

Smith's argument that potential targets may try to avoid becoming scapegoats just at the time when potential aggressors most need scapegoats requires at least three assumptions regarding leaders.

leader B must believe in the first place that leader A is likely to externalize domestic trouble

leader B believes that domestic trouble for leader A poses a potential threat rather than an opportunity to exploit A's misfortune

leader B can successfully interpret the conditions facing leader A and arrive at the conclusion that leader A poses a threat

In the first case, a potential target must see himself as a potential target, believing that other states are likely to seek scapegoats should domestic conditions deteriorate. Perhaps leaders do generally expect each other to externalize their domestic troubles. But what domestic problems can they reasonably expect to be externalized? Certainly some threshold exists below which problems are trivial enough that their externalization is too extreme or too costly a response. Moreover, for a leader to fear that his state is likely to be targeted, it seems likely that his state must have an enduring acrimonious relationship with his potential aggressor. It is unreasonable to expect that a leader seeking a scapegoat will turn to a state with

which he has had little prior interaction or with which his prior interaction has been friendly.

The second assumption is related to some extent to the risk orientation of leader B. Leader B not only expects other states to externalize their domestic troubles, but views their domestic difficulties explicitly as threats rather than as opportunities. Leader B is not opportunistic in the sense that trouble for state A provides leader B a chance to pursue a policy state A might have had more interest in opposing were it not internally consumed. Insofar as states' leaders are rational utility maximizers, it is not entirely consistent to presume that they solely perceive the internal weakness of a foreign state as a threat. Rather, leader B should seek opportunities whereby he can exploit state A's internal division, not by attacking state A in any way, but by pursuing policies that state A is less able to oppose given its internal turmoil.[1]

Finally, the third assumption requires that leaders be able to successfully interpret the internal affairs of another state as signals regarding the likelihood of being targeted. Leader B must also arrive at the conclusion that, given the conditions in state A, state B is likely to be targeted so it should pursue nonconfrontational paths. Smith's formulation depends upon the strategic interaction between states, specifically on the attentiveness of states to one another's domestic conditions and to the political threats leaders of other states might face. However, exactly what

[1]Though an example of opportunistic aggression comes to mind. In September 1980, in the upheaval that accompanied the Iranian Revolution, Iranian hostilities with Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, an enduring Kurd revolt, and the crisis over American hostages, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein began what would be nearly a decade–long war against Iran. It appears that the Iraqi leader viewed the revolution and hostilities with the West as an opportunity for Iraq to reclaim historically disputed border territory and to begin to establish Iraqi dominance in the region.

domestic conditions one leader might interpret as a signal of threatening conditions from another state is not clear.

Consider three general categories of conditions that might afflict a state.

```
violence/rebellion
economic/political insecurity
institutional impairment
```

These categories are listed in order from events and conditions that are most apparent to the outside observer to those least visible to an outsider. The first category, *political violence* is likely, especially in the democratic case, to evoke substantial media attention and to elicit highly visible government responses. Insofar as internal conditions signal the willingness of a leader to exercise his diversionary inclinations, violence or rebellion are likely to send the clearest signals that potential target states should tread lightly.

The second and third categories are substantially different from the first in two ways. In the first place, the incentive for a leader to externalize internal violence might be substantially different from the incentive to externalize nonviolent problems. In the second place, these two categories are of decidedly lower visibility on average than episodes of violence are likely to be. Certainly foreign leaders have access to information regarding political crises, scandals or approaching elections, or regarding economic distress and displacement. On occasion, it is even plausible that such internal problems are significant enough that a wary potential target may seek to maintain a low profile. But conditions such as these are so frequent or hinge on

relatively small or subtle economic or political changes that it seems likely that wary leaders will *always* be cautious while less wary leaders will be less cautious. This is especially likely to be true if a potential target must constantly assess the internal conditions of not one, but many potential aggressors. So, while the internal political and economic conditions of a state may change over time, it seems likely that the extent to which potential targets make themselves available or not is related more to the risk propensity of the target itself than to a leader's ability to distinguish between dangerous and nonthreatening internal conditions in another state.

Insofar as economic and political difficulty are not clear sources of danger that provide clear warnings to potential target states, institutional configuration or the character of political institutions is likely to be even more obscure to the foreign observer. Again, a foreign government might easily perceive the extent to which a foe's political forces seem to share similar or dissimilar preferences if those similarities or dissimilarities manifest themselves in publicly obvious ways. For instance, partisan fights that garner heavy media coverage may suggest weakness to a foreign leader, relevant weakness if partisan interests dispute foreign policy issues. However, it seems unlikely that a foreign state would predicate its foreign policy behavior on the institutional configuration of a potential aggressor. Again, if a foreign leader is so intimately aware of other states' domestic conditions and is so reactive to those conditions that he bases his foreign policy stances on them, then the constant threat he is likely to perceive from the combination of political and economic turmoil and institutional congruence *across the multiple states he must keep his eye on*, will drive

him to be constantly wary, reserved, and gun–shy. In sum, Smith's claim regarding how potential targets may react to a potential aggressor's internal problems may be true, but may apply primarily to potential aggressors whose problems are relatively severe, unusual, and patently apparent.

Moreover, at least three alternative possibilities exist regarding why states might experience less conflict when they face internal turmoil. First, leaders ultimately must address domestic problems with domestic solutions. Whether the source of domestic turmoil is economic or political or institutional, foreign diversions may successfully divert attention, but will not solve the underlying problem. As a result, leaders have incentives to address the domestic problems they face or to seek ways to make amends with important domestic constituencies. While leaders are still likely to respond to foreign threats, they are not more likely and may even be less likely actively to pursue foreign foes.[2]

Second, seeking foreign policy diversions is risky in that such acts may be transparent to an unhappy domestic audience. A cynical domestic audience may perceive the foreign policy action to be diversionary in its intent and may seek to punish a leader who pursues such courses of action.[3] As a result, foreign policy action, whether genuinely warranted or not, may lead to electoral punishment. Additionally,

[2]Note that this is commensurate with the congruence hypothesis, specifically that incongruence hobbles a leader such that foreign affairs, the decision to use the military in particular, are more difficult to conduct when institutions are divided than when they are unified.

[3]Additionally, one of the ways incongruence hobbles executive decision making is that legislative opponents are likely to suggest ulterior motives for his actions. In other words, diversionary pursuits may become transparent to the electorate because of the willingness of political opponents to suggest the less–than–honorable motivations behind military action. Public accusations of disingenuous policy decisions may be powerful forces against an executive seeking diversionary opportunities.

foreign policy diversions are risky in that they may successfully divert attention or create rallies, but they leave leaders with real foreign policy situations that they must conclude successfully. If such a foreign policy endeavor were to fail, it would leave the leader vulnerable in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas.[4]

Finally, foreign policy diversions may not only divert attention from domestic problems, but also divert funds such that budgetary solutions to domestic problems are more difficult to pursue or to implement; the result may be to inflame domestic dissent rather than to quell it. As a result, leaders may have significant incentives to address domestic problems in ways not associated with foreign policy, much less with international aggression.

In the context of the dissertation with regard to conflict propensity given institutional congruence, two primary ways are apparent by which to empirically account for the possibility that foreign states become "less available" for conflict. These empirical approaches simultaneously examine the influence of strategic awareness on the part of a target state, and institutional congruence on the part of the United States.

The first approach examines the likelihood the US is targeted given congruence. Two theoretical expectations are apparent. First, following Smith's logic, if foreign states are attentive to internal political divisions sufficiently that they are more

[4]Again, congruence/incongruence are likely to influence the ease with which a leader can pursue any international crisis to a successful conclusion; the duration analyses support this as well. So incongruence is likely to increase the costs of engaging in conflict not only because such actions may be construed as disingenuous, but because the likelihood of prevailing in any conflict the state enters is tempered by incongruence as well. A forward-looking executive is likely to see that prosecuting a military engagement may be quite difficult given an opposition legislature. Though he may successfully divert attention from domestic trouble, he may land in greater trouble when he cannot successfully conclude the diversionary event he precipitated.

oriented toward aggression when incongruence governs and less conflict prone when congruence exists, then empirical models should reveal that the US is targeted less frequently under congruence. However, if foreign states *can* accurately perceive another state's internal division, then it is entirely possible they will seize the opportunity to exploit that division and weakness by pursuing policies they may have found impossible to pursue otherwise. Such states are not likely to foment direct attacks on a major power such as the US, but are more likely to pursue policies that an adversary finds objectionable under the belief that the it will be less able to respond, less able to threaten credibly. So, if states can effectively interpret each others' internal institutional conditions, then congruence should decrease the likelihood the US will be targeted while incongruence will increase that likelihood.

Second, and most probably, foreign states are attentive to the internal divisions their adversaries suffer, but cannot effectively predicate foreign policy on the nuances of foreign states' normal political events. Institutional character (congruence/incongruence) is entirely the result of normal political events and is perhaps less useful and less scrutible to a foreign state than episodes of political violence or economic upheaval may be. As a result, congruence should have no discernible effect on the likelihood the US is targeted.

However, the primary focus of the dissertation regards the influence of congruence on state A's foreign policy decisions, on the likelihood of conflict in particular. The hypotheses above address the effect of institutional arrangements on how *other states* behave. These effects are likely to be related to one another in important ways. For

example, if state B decides to keep a low profile because it sees state A is unified and therefore poses a threat, then congruence may not lead state A to engage in militarized disputes more frequently because its opportunities to do so may diminish as potential adversaries become more cautious. On the other hand, if state B decides to exploit state A's division (incongruence), then state A may find itself with more adversaries and thus, more opportunities to fight under incongruence. Either of these possibilities is contrary to the expectations stated in the dissertation.

Conceivably, strategic awareness reduces the frequency with which the US is targeted; failing to account for this unobserved effect may bias analyses linking congruence with conflict propensity. It is possible, however, to account for these possibilities empirically by modeling the two processes simultaneously using a bivariate probit selection model of (1) the likelihood the US is targeted, and (2) the likelihood the US responds with force given congruence/incongruence.

The bivariate probit model links the likelihood the US is targeted with the likelihood the US responds militarily as follows:

$$US\ is\ Targeted = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y_1^* > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } y_1^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$US\ Reciprocates = \begin{cases} observed, & \text{if } y_1 = 1 \\ unobserved, & \text{if } y_1 = 0 \end{cases}$$

The two equations are estimated simultaneously and permit the unobserved factors that influence the likelihood of being targeted to affect the likelihood of a

militarized response. The two equations actually estimated are

$$Target = \alpha - Congruence + u_{it} \tag{C.1}$$

$$Reciprocate = \gamma + Congruence + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{C.2}$$

To summarize, I anticipate

If state B is aware of state A's institutional arrangements, state B will seek to exploit state A's incongruence, so A is more likely to be targeted. If A is congruent, state B will be cautious, so targeting state A is less likely. As a result, state A is more conflict prone under incongruence and less conflict prone under congruence. This is explicitly contrary the expectations of the dissertation.

If state B is unaware of state A's institutional configuration, then congruence/incongruence should have no effect on the likelihood state A is targeted. As a result, opportunities for conflict remain constant ceteris paribus whether state A experience congruence or incongruence. State A chooses to engage in conflict more often under congruence than under incongruence because domestic division and political risk are less, and difficult policies like the use of force are easier to implement.

Table 1 reports a bivariate probit model of US Targeting and US Reciprocation. Specifically, the first stage of the model tests the effect of Congressional support for the President on the likelihood the US is targeted. Recall that larger values indicate congruence, smaller values indicate incongruence. This variable should be either negatively related to the probability the US is targeted or not related at all. The second stage of the model estimates the effect of congruence on the likelihood the US will respond militarily if it is targeted. Strategic awareness and interaction are

captured in the effect of the first stage (state B decision to target the US) on the second stage (US decision to respond if targeted).

Table C.1. Being Targeted and Responding: Testing Strategic Interaction[†]

	$\widehat{\beta}$	S.E.	$z-score$
Probability of Being Targeted			
Presidential Support	0.012	0.006	2.01
Constant	-2.02***	0.436	-4.63
Probability of Reciprocating			
Presidential Support	0.014**	0.008	1.86
Constant	-2.70***	0.576	-4.69
$\rho_{\epsilon,u}$	0.994	0.003	
n	456		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$,$\rho_{\epsilon,u}$[‡]	176.8***		

[†] Robust standard errors, selection equation predicts whether or not the US is targeted, second stage predicts whether or not the US responds. Significance tests are one-tailed since hypotheses are directional: *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01. Note that the coefficient for *Presidential Support* in the *Target* model is not statistically significant because I expect the coefficient either to be negative or equal to zero.

[‡] Log-likelihood test of the hypothesis that $\rho_{\epsilon,u} = 0$, distributed as χ^2.

The results in Table 1 *do not* support the contention that states are more cautious regarding their interactions with the US when American institutions share similar preferences. Moreover, the results *do* support the notion that congruence makes the use of military conflict a viable policy option such that conflict is more likely under

congruence than under incongruence.[5] Regarding the effect of congruence on the likelihood the US is targeted, the strong positive coefficient is puzzling (though, again, it is not significant given the specific directional hypothesis). The result is contrary to the expectation that congruence would signal foreign states that American resolve is likely to be high and thus reduce the chances foreign states would target the US.[6]

A second empirical approach to examine the effect of strategic interaction on conflict propensity while accounting for the effects of congruence is to create a data set of American opportunities to use force and predict opportunity as a function of congruence. The strategic interaction hypothesis would suggest that a state's congruent institutional arrangements signal other states that it is likely to be resolved regarding its foreign policy decisions and should not be trifled with. As a result, congruence should make potential adversaries less willing to challenge the congruent state, so the opportunities for that state to engage in military conflict are likely to be fewer. Toward this end, I create a data set that combines Meernik's (1994) data on American opportunities to use force with Militarized Interstate Dispute data and variables measuring congruence.[7] The resulting data set contains observations for

[5]Individual probit models of the two processes in Table 1 produce nearly identical results: congruence increases the likelihood the US is targeted and increases the likelihood the US responds.

[6]In the cross–national context of 16 states, bivariate probit models of *target* and *target and reciprocates* produce the same results as the US models. Measures of congruence (*majority* and *majority size*) are positively associated with the likelihood a state is targeted (though, again, the coefficient is not significant given the directional hypothesis), and they are positively related to the likelihood a state reciprocates once it is targeted. These cross–national results suggest that other states do not perceive congruence as a threat and do not change their behavior regarding targeting congruent states. Additionally, congruence increases conflict propensity (the likelihood of reciprocating when targeted) even in the presence of a statistical control for the possibility of strategic interaction.

[7]Generally speaking, Meernik identifies "events likely to be perceived as sufficiently threatening to the United States to cause the president to consider using military action" as opportunities to

each month regarding whether or not the US had an opportunity to use force, and whether or not the US indeed engaged in militarized conflict. This data set allows the identification of opportunities to use force and whether or not those opportunities are actually taken.[8] By linking these two conceptual variables, *opportunity* and the *use of force*, I can examine the behavior of foreign states and the reaction of the United States in a simultaneous fashion that captures the strategic interaction component of US behavior.

Much like the estimation above, this two stage estimation links the opportunity for conflict and the onset of militarized conflict in the following fashion.

$$Conflict\ Opportunity = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y_1^* > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } y_1^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$Militarized\ Conflict\ Onset = \begin{cases} observed, & \text{if } y_1 = 1 \\ unobserved, & \text{if } y_1 = 0 \end{cases}$$

As is the case in the analysis above, the two equations are estimated simultaneously so that the unobserved factors that influence the opportunity for conflict

use force. Detailed discussion of his coding and data collection can be found in Meernik (1994, 123ff).

[8]The analyses in this Appendix all examine monadic behavior, though the dyad is clearly the better unit of analysis where strategic interaction between states is the concept of interest. The analyses at hand accomplish the task of examining strategic interaction by accounting for foreign behavior in the selection stage, and for US (or another democracy's) behavior in the second stage. While this monadic approach does allow the legitimate examination of strategic interaction and congruence, a dyadic analysis would allow more detailed statistical examination and a clearer picture of how states interact with one another. Future research should examine the effect of congruence in the dyadic context, specifically examining the effects of congruence on opponent behavior in both directions, rather than solely for the US or other democratic states.

can also influence the likelihood that militarized conflict will occur. The structural equations are

$$Conflict\ Opportunity = \alpha - Congruence + u_{it} \tag{C.3}$$

$$Dispute\ Onset = \gamma + Congruence + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{C.4}$$

Again, congruence is expected to reduce American opportunities to use force insofar as other states understand congruence to represent American resolve and willingness to exercise aggression. More likely, however, if foreign states do not perceive that congruence increases the chances the US poses a threat, congruence should not have any statistical effect on the likelihood the US has an opportunity to use force. With regard to the second equation, if foreign states are indeed attentive to US institutional configurations and are more cautious under congruence, then US conflict propensity under congruence should not be significantly different from US conflict propensity otherwise. On the other hand, if foreign states do not perceive congruence to be threatening, then congruence should increase American conflict propensity as it enables a policy tool that might not be available to US presidents otherwise.

The results in Table 2 again do not support the contention that states are sufficiently attentive to American institutional configurations to warrant increased caution when US institutional preferences are congruent.[9] However, the positive

[9]Again, individual probit models predicting *opportunity* and *use of force* produce results nearly identical to those reported in the bivariate probit model in Table 2. These analyses are not conducted for the cross–national sample since data regarding the opportunity for conflict are only available for the United States.

Table C.2. Opportunity and Onset: Testing Strategic Interaction[†]

	$\widehat{\beta}$	S.E.	$z-score$
Opportunity			
Presidential Support	0.008	0.005	1.63
Constant	-0.221	0.343	-0.643
Onset			
Presidential Support	0.009**	0.005	1.72
Constant	-0.98	0.375	-2.61
$\rho_{\varepsilon,u}$	0.739	0.078	
n	456		
-2LL$\sim \chi^2$,$\rho_{\varepsilon,u}$[‡]	30.42***		

[†] Robust standard errors, selection equation predicts presence of an opportunity to use force, second stage predicts use of force. Significance tests are one-tailed since hypotheses are directional: *p $\leq$ .10; **p $\leq$ .05; ***p $\leq$ .01. Again, the positive coefficient for *Presidential Support* is not significant since the hypothesis anticipates a negative relationship.

[‡] Log-likelihood test of the hypothesis that $\rho_{\varepsilon,u} = 0$, distributed as χ^2.

effect of congruence on American conflict propensity remains intact even in the presence of a statistical control for the opportunity to fight and for the effect of potential opponents' strategic awareness.

Though Alastair Smith's strategic interaction hypothesis is entirely credible and almost certainly describes the environment within which states make many foreign policy decisions, the extent to which states can interpret other states' internal conditions is limited. Insofar as states' interpretation abilities are limited, the

extent to which they will predicate foreign policy decisions on other states' internal events is also constrained. Institutional congruence provides an executive a political environment within which she is more able to select policies freely and with less overt opposition in the legislature and the public. However, congruence is a subtle and dynamic feature of institutional interaction and does not provide a clear signal to other states regarding the likely foreign policies or level of resolve a congruent state will exhibit. As a result, congruence theoretically should influence a state's conflict propensity and conflict behavior. Congruence should *not* influence how other states conduct their foreign policies with regard to the congruent or incongruent state in question. The results presented in this appendix and in Chapter 4 support these contentions and further suggest the statistical robustness of institutional congruence.

APPENDIX D

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table D.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	n	$\bar{x}$	s.d.	min	max
	US Data				
Dispute	516	.162790	.3695328	0	1
Target	516	.1162791	.3208703	0	1
Target and Reciprocates	516	.0465116	.2107947	0	1
Opportunity to Use Force	516	.6046512	.4893999	0	1
No Action, MID, GATT, Both	516	.6531008	.8756745	0	3
Presidential Support	456	70.34474	12.5909	43.5	93.1
Unified Government	516	.4186047	.493809	0	1
Congress Unified	516	.4418605	.4970902	0	1
Δ Unemployment	467	.0016724	.2148638	-.7	1
Relative Capabilities	155	.8355484	.1883701	.51	1
Multilateral	155	.4709677	.5007744	0	1
Contiguity	155	.0258065	.1590715	0	1
Duration, days	155	94.85806	156.9018	1	812
	Cross-National Data				
Dispute	7536	.0139331	.1172212	0	1
Target	7536	.0184448	.1345622	0	1
Target and Reciprocates	7536	.0065021	.0803785	0	1
Majority	7536	.3694268	.4826816	0	1
Majority Size	7536	-16.08439	66.18212	-269	194
Relative Capabilities	234	.7763543	.1595186	.5002	.9989
Multilateral	237	.3248945	.4693266	0	1
Contiguity	237	.2278481	.4203318	0	1
Reciprocated	237	.4345992	.4967534	0	1
Duration, days	237	145.4768	307.1373	1	2213

REFERENCES

Allison, Paul D. 1984. *Event History Analysis.* Sage University Paper on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Babst, Dean V. 1964. "Elective Governments - A Force For Peace." *The Wisconsin Sociologist* 1(3):9–14.

Babst, Dean V. 1972. "A Force For Peace." *Industrial Research* April:55–58.

Bartels, Larry M. 1991. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup." *American Political Science Review* 85:457–474.

Bates, Robert H., Philip Brock & Jill Tiefenthaler. 1991. "Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Exploration." *International Organization* 45:1–18.

Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination." *International Interactions* 22(4):369–397.

Bennett, D. Scott & Allan C. Stam. 1996. "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985." *American Political Science Review* 90:239–257.

Bennett, D. Scott & Allan C. Stam. 1998. "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:344–366.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. *The Causes of War.* 2 ed. New York: The Free Press.

Blechman, Barry & Stephen Kaplan. 1978. *Force without War.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Bond, Jon R. & Richard Fleisher. 1990. *Presidential Success in the Legislative Arena.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. & Bradford S. Jones. 1997. "Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4):336–383.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Laura W. Arnold & Christopher J.W. Zorn. 1997. "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement." *American Political Science Review* 91(2):324–338.

Brace, Paul R. & Barbara Hinckley. 1992. *Follow the Leader.* New York: Basic Books.

Bremer, Stuart. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution.*

Bremer, Stuart. 1993. "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816–1970." *International Interactions* 18:231–49.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1978. "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22:241–267.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981a. "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 25:541–568.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981b. *The War Trap.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, David Newman & Alvin Rabushka. 1985. *Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson & Alastair Smith. 1998a. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson & Alastair Smith. 1998b. "Peace Through War? Evolutionary Consequences of Democratic War Behavior." paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89(4):841–855.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Randolph M. Siverson. 1997a. "Inside-Out: A Theory of Domestic Political Institutions and the Issues of Conflict." paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Randolph M. Siverson. 1997b. "Institutions and the Issues of Conflict: A Further Test." paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Chan, Steve. 1984. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:617–648.

Clark, David H. 1998. "Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence, Stability and US Dispute Behavior." typescript, Florida State University.

Clark, David H. 1999. "Marathoners Win Long Races: Evaluating the Fate of Target States in Militarized Disputes." unpublished manuscript.

Clark, David H. & Robert A. Hart. 1999. "Paying the Piper? The Implications of Social Insurance Payments for Conflict Propensity." unpublished manuscript.

Coser, Lewis. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict.* New York: The Free Press.

Cox, Gary W. & Samuel Kernell. 1991. *The Politics of Divided Government.* Westview Press.

Dassel, Kurt & Eric Reinhardt. 1999. "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):56–85.

DeRouen, Karl. 1995. "The Indirect Link." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39:671–695.

Diehl, Paul. 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980." *Journal of Politics* 47:1203–1211.

Diehl, Paul F. 1983. "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look." *Journal of Peace Research* 20(3):205–212.

Diehl, Paul F. 1994. "Substitutes or Complements? The Effects of Alliances on Military Spending in Major Power Rivalries." *International Interactions* 19:159–176.

Dixit, Avinash & John Londregan. 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency." *American Political Science Review* 89:856–866.

Domke, William. 1988. *War and the Changing Global System.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Downs, George W. & David M. Rocke. 1995. *Optimal Imperfections? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 1." *Philosophy and Public Affairs.*

Doyle, Michael W. 1983b. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 2." *Philosophy and Public Affairs.*

Doyle, Michael W. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80:1151–1169.

Enterline, Andrew J. & Kristian S. Gleditsch. 1998. "Threats, Opportunity, and Force: Repression and Externalization of Domestic Pressure by Political Leaders, 1948-1982." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.

Erikson, Robert S. 1989. "Economic Condtions and the Presidential Vote." *American Political Science Review* 83:567–573.

Farber, Henry S. & Joanne Gowa. 1995. "Polities and Peace." *International Security* 20:123–146.

Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88:577–592.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. *Divided Government.* New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

Fordham, Benjamin. 1998a. "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(4):418–439.

Fordham, Benjamin. 1998b. "A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force: Supply, Demand, and Endogenous Threat Perception." *International Studies Quarterly* 42(3):567–590.

Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1991. "Election Cycles and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:211–244.

Geller, Daniel S. 1985. *Domestic factors in foreign policy : a cross-national statistical analysis.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Gelpi, Christopher. 1997. "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:255–282.

Geva, Nehemia, Karl R. DeRouen & Alex Mintz. 1993. "The Political Incentive Explanation of 'Democratic Peace': Evidence from Experimental Research." *International Interactions* 18:215–229.

Gochman, Charles S. 1993. "The Evolution of Disputes." *International Interactions* 19:49–76.

Gochman, Charles S. & Zeev Maoz. 1984. "Militarized Interstate Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:558–616.

Goertz, Gary & Paul F. Diehl. 1992. "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries." *International Interactions* 18:151–163.

Goldstein, Joshua S. & John R. Freeman. 1991. "US–Soviet–Chinese Relations: Routine Reciprocity or Rational Expectations?" *American Political Science Review* 85(1):17–36.

Greene, William H. 1997. *Econometric Analysis.* 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Hart, Robert A. Jr. & James Lee Ray. 1996. "Regime Type and Conflict Escalation: Democracy and the Use of Force." paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA.

Hazelwood, L. 1975. "Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict-Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered." In *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, ed. P.J. McGowan. Beverley Hills: Sage.

Hess, Gregory D. & Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework." *The American Economic Review* 85(4):828–845.

Horvath, William J. 1968. "A Statistical Model for the Duration of Wars and Strikes." *Behavioral Science* 13:18–28.

Ikenberry, John, David A. Lake & Mike Mastanduno. 1988. "Introduction: approaches to explaining American foreign economic policy." *International Organization* 42(1):1–14.

Jaggers, Keith & Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave With the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32:469–482.

James, Patrick & John R. Oneal. 1991. "The Influence of International and Domestic Politics on the President's Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:307–332.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000.* New York: Random House.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. 1989. *International Institutions and State Power.* Boulder: Westview Press.

King, Gary. 1989. *Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kingdon, John. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* 2 ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Kissinger, Henry A. 1979. *White House Years.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Kissinger, Henry A. 1982. *Years of Upheaval.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86(1):24–37.

Layne, Christopher. 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." *International Security* 19:5–49.

Leeds, Brett Ashley & David R. Davis. 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:814–834.

Levy, Jack S. 1987. "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." *World Politics* 40:82–107.

Levy, Jack S. 1988. "Domestic Politics and War." In *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. R. Rotberg & T. Rabb. Cambridge University Press.

Lian, Bradley & John R. Oneal. 1994. "Presidents, the Use of Force, and Public Opinion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:277–300.

Liao, Tim Futing. 1994. *Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit and Other Generalized Linear Models.* Sage University Paper on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies ; patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral systems and party systems : a study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lohmann, Suzanne & Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. "Divided government and US trade policy: theory and evidence." *International Organization* 48:595–632.

MacKuen, Michael. 1983. "Political Drama, Economic Conditions and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity." *American Journal of Political Science* 27:165–192.

Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and War." *Foreign Affairs* 74:79–97.

Maoz, Zeev & Bruce Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Peace." *American Political Science Review* 87:624–638.

Maoz, Zeev & Nasrin Abdolali. 1989. "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33:3–35.

Matthews, Donald R. 1960. *US Senators and Their World.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Mayhew, David R. 1974a. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1991. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946-1990.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

McCullough, David. 1992. *Truman.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

McGinnis, Michael D. 1990. "A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry." *International Studies Quarterly* 34:111–136.

McGinnis, Michael D. 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Resrictive Models of Arms Races." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(3):443–473.

Meernik, James. 1994. "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 38:121–138.

Meernik, James & Peter Waterman. 1996. "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(3):573–590.

Miller, Ross A. 1995. "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary use of Force." *American Journal of Political Science* 39:760–785.

Moore, Will H. & David J. Lanoue. 1997. "Executive Popularity and International Conflict Behavior: Evidence from Britain." paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community." *International Organization* 45:19–56.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1996. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Positive Liberal Theory of International Politics.". paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA.

Morgan, T. Clifton & Glenn Palmer. 1997. "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation." *International Interactions.*

Morgan, T. Clifton & Glenn Palmer. 1998. "Foreign Policy Substitutability with Two Goods: Selecting the Right Tool for the Job." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.

Morgan, T. Clifton & Kenneth Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36:25–52.

Morgan, T. Clifton & Sally Campbell. 1991. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36:25–52.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1966. *Politics Among Nations.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Most, Benjamin A. & Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics.* Columbia: University of South Carolina.

Mueller, John. 1973. *Wars, Presidents and Public Opinion.* New York: Wiley.

Niskansan, William A. 1971. *Bureaucracy and Representative Government.* Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Norpoth, Helmut. 1991. "Guns and Butter and Governmental Popularity in Britain." *American Political Science Review* 81:949–959.

Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ostrom, Charles & Dennis Simon. 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity." *American Political Science Review* 79:334–358.

Ostrom, Charles W. & Brian Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80:541–566.

Parker, Glenn. 1992. *Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of the Modern Congress: an Economic Interpretation.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Quinones, Sherry Bennett & Scott Gates. 1995. "Economic Risk and the Politics of Protectionism." *International Interactions* 21:63–83.

Ray, James Lee. 1993. "Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?" *International Interactions* 18:251–276.

Ray, James Lee. 1995. *Democracy and International Conflict.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Reiter, Dan & Allan C. Stam. 1998a. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3):259–277.

Reiter, Dan & Allan C. Stam. 1998b. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92(2):377–390.

Rivers, Douglas & Nancy Rose. 1985. "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and the Presidential Influence in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):183–196.

Rosencrance, Richard N. 1963. *Action and Reaction in World Politics.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1963. "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations." *General Systems Yearbook* 8:1–50.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1976. *Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 2, The Conflict Helix.* Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1979. *Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 4, War, Power and Peace.* Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1981. *Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 5, The Just Peace.* Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Russett, Bruce. 1990. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Russett, Bruce M. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sanders, David, Hugh Ward & David Marsh. 1991. "Macroeconomics, the Falklands War, and the Popularity of the Thatcher Government: A Contrary View." In *Economics and Politics*, ed. Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-Beck & Jean-Dominique Lafay. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1972. "The Strategy of Political Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition." *American Political Science Review* 66:555–568.

Simmel, Georg. 1964. *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations.* New York: Free Press Chapter Conflict, pp. 15–38. trans. Kurt H. Wolff.

Small, Melvin & J. David Singer. 1976. "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1:50–69.

Smith, Alastair. 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(1):133–54.

Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 92(3):623–638.

Spiro, David E. 1994. "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace." *International Security.*

Stein, Robert M. & Kenneth Bickers. 1994. "Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel." *Journal of Politics* 56:377–399.

Stoessinger, John G. 1982. *Why Nations Go to War.* 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's.

Stoll, Richard J. 1984. "The guns of November: Presidential reelections and the use of force, 1947-1982." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:231–246.

Sumner, William Graham. 1906. *Folkways.* Boston: Ginn and Company.

Sundquist, James. 1988. "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States." *Political Science Quarterly* 103:613–635.

Tanter, Raymond. 1966. "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations, 1958-1960." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10:41–64.

Tanter, Raymond. 1969. "International War and Domestic Turmoil." In *Violence in America, A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr. New York: New American Library.

Vuchinich, Samuel & Jay Teachman. 1993. "The Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots and Family Arguments." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:544–568.

Wallensteen, Peter. 1973. *Structure and War: On International Relations 1820-1968.* Stockholm: Raben and Sjogren.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Weede, Erich. 1984. "Democracy and War Involvement." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:649–664.

Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Christopher Johansen. 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics." *Journal of Political Economy.*

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1968. "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations." *Journal of Peace Research* 5:56–69.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David H. Clark

Born in Orlando, Florida, Dave Clark received his B.A. from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee in 1990 then went on to teach high school history and English in Jacksonville, Florida. He received his M.S in political science from Florida State University in 1996 and his Ph.D. from Florida State in 1999. In the fall of 1999, he began a visiting appointment at the University of Iowa. His research appears in the *American Journal of Political Science* and elsewhere. Dave enjoys reading, bourbon whiskey, and traveling with his wife Lin and black Lab, Trooper.